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ABSTRACT
This dissertation attempts to resolve a central problem in the metaphysics of science. This
problem is the conflict in ontologies that our best scientific theories seem to imply. Our best
scientific theories tell us that the universe and everything in it is contingent, changing, and finite.
Yet this model of the universe cannot even be formulated without the tools of contemporary
mathematics. The objects that mathematics describes are necessary, unchanging, and involve
infinities. If we take the statements of mathematics literally, we find all sorts of fantastic objects
which cannot possibly fit within the bounds of our scientific picture of reality. Therefore, simply
populating our ontology with the objects implied by our best theories leaves us with a radically
inconsistent picture of reality. To address this problem, this dissertation proposes a metaphysics
of modality which makes possible the grounding of mathematical truths as necessary and eternal
in a materialist and finitely bounded universe. The building blocks of this account come from the
work of Gilles Deleuze and his metaphysics of the primacy of difference over identity. I argue
for a modal interpretation of Deleuze’s concepts of the virtual, the intensive, and the actual. I
then explicate them in relation to a process of generation which can give rise to new objects and
objective generalities, a process Deleuze calls individuation. This makes possible a grounding of
the propositions of mathematics as expressions of this universe rather than as representations of
it. This grounding allows one to then rightfully say that the objects mathematics describes are not
a part of the ontology of this universe while still maintaining that mathematics can then be
rightfully said to be true as a result of the structures of this universe. That is, the objects which
mathematics describes (numbers, points, etc.) are not the objects which make mathematics true.
What makes mathematics true is instead, the modal structure of difference itself.
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Introduction:
Necessity, Eternity, and Infinity in a Dying Cosmos
We are justified in believing in the existence of the objects which are required by our best
theories to make sense of the universe, the Putnam-Quine Indispensability Argument concludes
(Putnam 1971). Our best theories are chosen for their pragmatic usefulness or scientific success,
and they contain claims about which objects exist. If we accept those theories as the best
explanations available, then we should accept their existence claims as true. However, our best
accounts of the universe trade on two inconsistent ontologies. The natural sciences suggest an
ontology of contingent, changing, and finite beings, but this picture depends on mathematics and
logic in order to express it. The ontology of mathematics suggests the existence of necessary,
unchanging, and infinite beings such as numbers.
Our best scientific theories tell us of a universe of things born from the expansion of an
energetic singularity which will, after a fathomable yet inhuman time, rend itself into
nothingness. While cosmology is far from a settled science, this picture of a finite, contingent
universe is one of, if not the major accounts towards which scientific consensus is converging.1
Yet this picture cannot even be formulated without the formal tools of contemporary
mathematics and logic. If we take the statements of contemporary mathematics and logic naively
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I do not intend to argue for this picture of the cosmos. This project does not depend on a particular cosmological
account, only that such an account does not require necessary objects, an infinity of time, space, or objects, or a
fundamental continuum. I can offer three defenses of this choice as unquestioned posit of this investigation which
are not to be understood as evidence for accepting such a picture as a true or final account of the cosmos. First,
infinities in our scientific theories are regularly banished after further investigation such that it is reasonable to
follow the heuristic that in a final cosmology, whatever that might be, no such infinities will exist. Second, such
finite, contingent accounts of the universe are under-investigated by philosophers, who, at least given the history of
Western Philosophy, seem predisposed to the necessary, eternal, and the infinite. Third, a contingent, finite cosmos
is inherently hostile to a representational account of mathematical truth, and so a successful account of truthmakers
for mathematics in such a cosmos assures us that we have not covertly snuck in representational machinery. If these
hold, then experimental confirmation, say, of an infinite, eternal universe would not undermine this account,; rather,
it would only make this project a metaphysics irrelevant to our cosmos, which given the history of metaphysics, may
still leave the project in good company.
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or literally, we find all sorts of fantastic objects which cannot possibly fit within the bounds of
our scientific picture of reality. By reading naively, I mean taking the existence claims implied
by our theories as literally true of the universe outside the discourse or formal system in which
they are expressed, as a part of the furniture of our reality, and also taking the universal or
general claims implied by them as having a real scope over their objects, not simply as
theoretical posits which let us pragmatically organize the world around us. Reading physics
naively means we believe in the existence of electrons, muons, Higgs fields, angular momentum,
and so on, and that various laws hold of them.2 Reading our formal tools literally means
believing in the existence of sets, numbers, morphisms, Fregean propositions, Kripkean worlds,
etc., and that such objects are timeless and their relations are necessary. Since our best accounts
of the universe involve both scientific theories and formal tools, we must be judicious about how
we read such existence claims. Simply populating our ontology with the objects implied by our
best theories leaves us with a radically inconsistent picture of reality. If the use of mathematics in
the sciences both implies that the universe and everything in it is finite, contingent, and bounded
by time (our scientific ontology) and implies the existence of timeless, necessary, and infinite
objects (our mathematical ontology), then we have a blatant contradiction.
This problem of an inconsistent ontology may be taken as a point in the favor of some
sort of fictionalism or anti-realism where we read neither scientific accounts nor formal tools
literally.3 This seems to me to give up too much as it means relinquishing any understanding of
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Reading scientific truths naively also means opening ourselves to the possibility of embarrassment when we find
our belief in the luminiferous aether or phlogiston turns out false. Avoiding such an embarrassment is perhaps one of
the major reasons philosophers prefer to read formalisms naively and remain skeptical about scientific truths.
Formal truths will never be shown to be false; the systems which prove them can only be made irrelevant, and no
small number of philosophers have preferred certain truth to relevance.
3

In the analytic tradition, it is more common to reject the literal truth of formal tools. Examples of mathematical
fictionalism in response to this issue can be seen in Yablo 2005 and Hacking 2014. A more boundary blurring case
is that of modal fictionalism, such as found in Rosen 1990, because possible worlds can be treated as both formal
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why our best theories are better than our other theories (I will return to this below). Furthermore,
it seems to be precisely these apparently otherworldly features of mathematics (i.e. their
necessity, timelessness, and infinitude) that make mathematics capable of doing the job for
which we use them. Attempts to resolve this problem by retaining some sort of realism or literal
reading amount to giving an account of grounding. Grounding here means to explain how the
objects of one of these ontologies consistently arises in the terms of the other or to provide some
further metaphysical account which explains how both arise consistently. This does not imply
reducing one ontology to the other, but showing rather that were it not for the more fundamental
aspects of what there is, other things would not be the case. In this sense, I mean by grounding
what Wilson 2014 calls “small-g grounding” as opposed to “Grounding.” By this distinction,
Wilson means to call attention to and reject recent accounts in Analytic metaphysics that treat
Grounding as a unique metaphysical relation. These accounts of Grounding, Wilson argues,
leave the metaphysical relationship underdetermined. That is, Grounding does not itself provide
the metaphysical explanation it claims it does. On the other hand, small-g grounding can point to
various different metaphysical relations such as “type identity, token-but-not-type identity,
functional realization, the classical mereological part-whole relation, the causal composition
relation, the set membership relation, the proper subset relation, and the determinable–
determinate relation, among others,” (Wilson, 2014, 539). Given Wilson’s account, I take it that
talk of small-g grounding can operate in a way like Heidegger’s method of formal indication;
that is, talking of grounding is a way of pointing to a metaphysical dependency which further
investigation is required to provide of full account of the specific character of that dependency.
In other words, grounding points to a metaphysical dependence whose specific character is

entities (i.e. worlds as sets of propositions) and as metaphysical entities which are only described by formal
accounts.
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somehow metaphysically explanatory of what there is, but the more technical account of
Grounding Wilson critiques is not that explanation. Such specific characterizations of grounding
in this project will be given by part-whole relations, truthmaker relations, relations of emergence,
and of metaphysical dependence more generally.
Specifying which features of what there is depend on which other features can clarify
which claims are to be taken literally, and which are formal tools which operate beyond
representation. Formal tools such as mathematics or logic can be taken to be representational in
the sense that, if these formal tools produce accurate results, it is believed there must be some
isomorphism between the structure of the universe and the structure of the formal tool.
Philosophers generally are of the habit of trusting their formal tools over the results of the
sciences, and so even those Nominalists who reject the existence of the abstract objects of
mathematical realists still privilege our formal tools (usually classical formal logic) in their
account of scientific knowledge (e.g. Field 2016, more below). In other words, philosophers tend
to assume the formal as preceding, whether epistemically or metaphysically, the scientific, and
thereby constraining ahead of time what can be known and said. Formal tools are taken to
represent the cosmos, or some parts of it, yet are privileged as preceding the actual investigation,
and thereby constraining what can be said in the first place. It is the certainty and regularity of
mathematics alongside a view that such certainty and regularity could only come from being a
fundamental necessity which leads one not only to trust those tools’ use but to accept these tools
as an accurate representation of reality. The acceptance of an implication from certainty to
representational accuracy is a common philosopher’s prejudice which goes unexamined. Yet the
trustworthy use of a tool does not imply its representational accuracy; the hammer does not
operate by representing the house. This acceptance is an implicit grounding of our scientific
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ontology in our formal ontology, which, I think, explains why even Nominalists often find
themselves unexpectedly committed to the existence of abstracts such as numbers, nothingness,
or flying horses, thereby, paraphrasing Quine, getting tangled in Plato’s beard. One does not
have to accept Platonist or Idealist metaphysics in order to fall into these tangles; it is enough to
let our formal tools circumscribe what can be said about the universe.
I take here as fundamental to this project a commitment to grounding of the formal in the
ontology suggested by our best scientific theories, that is, in the material or the physical. Nothing
about the indispensability of mathematics for the carrying out of the physical sciences demands
that mathematics must be fundamental to reality. If so, then the strange features of mathematical
truths (their necessity, eternity, and infinity) can potentially be explained by grounds which do
not share those features. This need not lead to fictionalism either. The conflicts which science
entails by accepting mathematical realism result not from the realism about mathematical truths
itself, but about taking such truths to be about fundamental or necessary objects. Grounding these
truths in the material means taking them not as fundamental but as explainable in nonrepresentational terms of some metaphysical ground outside themselves. This grounding then
opens the possibility for reconciling the surprising features of formal truths with our best
scientific depictions of reality. One should not read this as a reductionist claim wherein only the
fundamental is real. In other words, one can be a mathematical realist without being a Platonist,
and this requires giving up a(n often implicit) mathematical fundamentalism.
I will argue the proper grounds for these formal truths begin with modality; in particular,
a modal account of how necessary truths can be grounded in an ontology that affirms only
contingent objects and their powers. The account of modality given here will be a species of
modal Dispositionalism in that talk of possibility, necessity, possible worlds, and the like is to
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ultimately be understood as talk about the capacities of objects. However, it is my claim that
none of the Dispositionalisms currently on offer can affirm several theses together to which
scientific realism (I argue) commits us.4 These theses are: the truths of mathematics are
necessary and unchanging, the universe is finite in all ways (and as a corollary, since it is
temporally finite, all things, including the universe itself, will eventually cease to exist, therefore
the universe has no fundamental fixity), and that both are consistent with a materialist5 priority of
metaphysical explanation. To provide an account of modality capable of affirming all three
theses, I will make use of the work of Gilles Deleuze and his metaphysics of difference. Most
work on Deleuze and mathematics focuses primarily on Deleuze’s use of mathematics in
describing philosophical concepts or on his references to the history of mathematics for the
purpose of exegesis of Deleuze’s texts.6 Rather than follow this trend, I intend to make use of
Deleuze’s metaphysics in order to address several classical problems of the metaphysics of
mathematics and logic, culminating in providing a solution to the question 'how can a contingent,
finite universe give rise to truthmakers for necessarily and eternally true propositions about
infinity?'

4

I begin with dispositionalism because other accounts of modality necessarily fail to affirm these theses, as argued
below (fictionalism fails the first two, and any realism grounded in abstract objects fails the third), whereas
dispositionalism only contingently fails to due to problems to be explored in chapters 1 and 2.
5

In analytic metaphysics, this claim of materialism may be more readily understood as a sort of modal Actualism,
i.e., the claim that modal facts are grounded in this-worldly things alone. I choose materialism here both to tie the
position to a wider history and because the term “actual” is not synonymous with “this-worldly” for Deleuze. This
will be explicated below.
6

Some important examples of this include DeLanda 2002, Duffy 2006 and 2013, Olkowski 2012, Smith 2003,
Somer-Hall 2010, Widder 2019, and an issue developed to the topic in La Deleuziana (issue 11). More unique in
this regards is Shores 2020 which gives formalized accounts of central Deleuzian concepts, making use especially of
Priest’s para-consistent Logic of Paradox. The present project differs from Shores’s text in that I aim to explicate a
Deleuzian metaphysics for logic and mathematics, whereas Shores shows the usefulness of various non-Classical
logics for formalizing notoriously difficult concepts in Deleuze’s metaphysics.

6

Given the movement between exposition and construction that this text will regularly
undergo, some notes on style are in order. First, while I prefer the use of what Philippe Carrard
calls the "academic we" as a modesty and with a faith in reason in general, some claims read as
less presumptuous with "I." However, the use of “I” risks a self-aggrandizement or an
implication that only "I" could speak thus. This implication is one a text that supports the ofteninhuman sources of sense and truth cannot countenance. My convention will then be to aim for
modesty in both uses: "we" will undertake deduction and exegesis, and "I" will take
responsibility for postulates, constructions, and other such risks. Second, for ease of language, I
will use the term "mathematics" mainly to refer to that which is studied by the human practice of
mathematics, not that human practice itself. This use is in analogy with the way we refer to
animals as "biological" despite being, in the last instance, distinct from the human practice of
biology. By truths of mathematics, I mean specifically the relations of implication between
mathematical propositions. That is, I am not concerned here with arguing for accepting any set of
axioms over any other, but rather explaining the stability of entailment relations between axioms
and theorems relative to a logical structure. Whether we apply Euclidean or Riemannian
geometry to the movements of planets is a question of historical contingency, human projects,
and the physical systems themselves, but what makes it the case that any given theorem in
Euclidean geometry follows from the axioms of that formal system is a case of necessity. This
then entails similar grounding results for the entailment relations which structure formal logics as
well.
A. Material Conditions
I call the project of grounding in this dissertation a species of materialism because I take
the constraints on the cosmos entailed by our current best scientific theories as inviolable. A
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commitment to such constraints follows from two fundamental commitments to Deleuze’s
metaphysics. First, a commitment to rejecting transcendent explanations or, positively phrased, a
commitment to immanence. That is, any and all metaphysical explanations must ultimately be
this-worldly. No appeal to principles, objects, forms, etc. which exist outside the bounds of this
universe can be made without contradicting this commitment to immanence. Second, a
commitment to what Deleuze calls transcendental empiricism. Transcendental empiricism is a
complex issue with much written on it, but we can lay out its two components briefly.7 First, this
is an empiricism in the sense that what is investigated is tied to that which can be made to
appear. Second, it is transcendental in that it seeks the conditions of possibility of that which
appears. These two commitments taken together intersect: what can be called immanent or thisworldly is constrained by what is empirically discoverable or what must be posited to ground or
explain that which is empirically discoverable, and what is posited to explain the empirical must
be immanent or this-worldly.
These scientific constraints include the fact that universe is finitely bounded in time. This
implies the three most central constraints on this project. First, there is no such thing as a
necessary object. If the universe itself has a birthdate and an expected death date (implied by Big
Bang cosmology, cosmic expansion, and the second law of thermodynamics), then so must every
object. Nothing precedes the existence of the cosmos, and nothing survives it. It is then possible
that anything and everything which exists ceases to be. This brute possibility that everything
which is could just as well not be, as much as its eventual realization, means that nothing is
absolutely necessary, and especially that there are no necessary fundamental objects.
Contemporary physics takes time and space as contingent features of the universe whose genesis

7

For a full engagement with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, see Bryant 2008.

8

must be explained, and so cannot be unproblematically assumed as metaphysically fundamental.8
As time itself is a part of the cosmos, even the necessity of the past will ultimately be annulled.
Second, that there are no eternal objects, abstract or otherwise, at least not in the classical sense
of eternal as existing completely separate from time (we will redefine eternity in Chapter 3). This
follows clearly from the same cosmological facts as the first. Even if a single particle were to be
co-primordial with the Big Bang and survive to be the last bit of the universe torn apart by
cosmic expansion, it would have only existed for a finite duration. Third, there are only ever
finite amounts of objects and their combinations. This constraint follows from the fundamental
discreteness of space and time imposed by the Planck scale in quantum mechanics, and the finite
limits of space and time set by contemporary cosmology.9 This directly challenges the grounds
of mathematics that require a fundamental continuum of some kind which would stand as the
source of the Real number line. There is no issue here intra-mathematically; the Planck limit says

8

The approach taken here does not depend on the specific details of either model, but rather on the fact that it
currently appears to be the case that to have a fuller physical picture of the universe, we need an explanation of the
emergence of space time, and that this problem arises both in cosmology by tracing back the universe to the Big
Bang, and in particle physics by searching for a way to reconcile Quantum Mechanics with General Relativity. For
non-specialist texts by working physicists on the subject, the cosmological search is explained in Guth 1998 and the
implications of the search for a theory of quantum gravity (in particular, a non-string theoretical approach) are
explored in Rovelli 2017.
9

Each of these scientific accounts has their potential competitors, their gaps, and their open problems. For instance,
Cosmological Inflation has received conceptual and experimental challenges (Ijjas et al 2013), as well as
reformulations in the face of such challenges (Guth et al, 2013). Quantum gravity, on the other hand, is much more
open field at the forefront of science in the making, and so more is to be gained to looking not at specific solutions
but the structure of the central open problem. Here the problem is the reconciliation between General Relativity and
Quantum Mechanics, and centrally around the issue of explaining how it is that gravity can be understood in a
unified framework with the other 3 fundamental forces explained by the Standard Model of particle physics. Both
models are known to be incomplete or partial descriptions of nature, and the latter, despite being the most
successfully predictive theory we have, is facing experimental disconfirmation in that if it were correct, the Large
Hadron Collider should have found supersymmetrical particles, but it has produced no such particles to date (see
CERN, “Supersymmetry”). Given their status as science in the making, I choose these accounts to provide material
constraints not simply as an endorsement of unerring truth, but that in addition to their status as current best theories,
they provide an account of the universe which is most antagonistic to the necessary, eternal, and infinite features of
formal truths. Therefore, if any of these constraints should be weakened by a revision of the scientific accounts, it
would not amount to a fundamental challenge to the grounding of such truths, though it may mean that certain nonrepresentational truthmakers are not actually required by whatever new scientific consensus comes about.
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nothing about whether or not formal systems of continuous geometry are possible (they clearly
are). Instead, the conflict is at the level of metaphysical grounding where, if we took
mathematics as fundamental to the physical, we will be left to search for what could make our
claims about the continuum true and will eventually find ourselves inventing abstract objects and
positing them as fundamental. Yet even if we reject the illusion of a mathematical foundation for
the physical, there is obviously still a central role for mathematics to play here in accounting for
how the physical is the way it is. For example, since there are only finite objects, it is a
mathematical necessity that there can only be a finite number of possible combinations of those
objects. There is then some structural role played by mathematics; the ground is set by the
material which constrains what we can affirm about what there is, but it is on top of these
grounds and within these constraints that we find the conditions for mathematics, even when it
provides us with truths that seem to go far beyond what such constraints would mark as possible.
There are, of course, other constraints on a materialist metaphysics provided by the sciences, but
they are not of central importance to this project.10 Before moving on to the positive project of
this dissertation, let us survey how previous metaphysics of mathematics in the form of Realism,
Nominalism, and Structuralism have failed to satisfy these constraints.

B. Historical Grounds
Among the oldest and most constant answers to the question of the source of
mathematical truth is Platonic Realism. Platonism about mathematics posits that our

10

For instance, there are further physical limits placed on the possible combinations of what there is, and this
constraint is most directly studied by theoretical computer science as the limits of performable operations given
finite resources. I can think of no greater scientific evidence in favor of a materialist order of grounding than
Landauer’s principle. Landauer’s principle roughly states that there is a greater than zero increase in entropy for
every logically irreversible operation carried out. Even abstract computation has brute physical constraints.
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mathematical statements are literally true of corresponding ideal objects. These objects are
necessary, eternal, and have all the other properties which we discover in undertaking
mathematical practice. This world exhibits roughly mathematical relations between physical
objects because they are produced as copies of those ideal objects. What is left unexplained is
how this production of the concrete and material from the abstract and ideal occurs. Plato offers
only the vague notion of participation and various myths, such as that of the Demiurge in the
Timaeus. Platonism then trades one problem for another and so can explain the necessity of
mathematical truths, but the existence and unfolding of the cosmos remains mysterious. From the
point of view of this project, Platonism is to be rejected because it is committed explicitly to the
very sort of objects which our constraints rule out.
This rejection of Platonism is similar, but not equivalent to Benacerraf’s Dilemma.
Benacerraf 1973 asks a similar question: how are we to square the ontology of mathematics with
the epistemology of mathematics? Benacerraf’s formulation of the problem hinges on an account
of causal epistemology which he leaves purposely general (Benacerraf, 1973, 671). The dilemma
goes like this: if we have mathematical knowledge, then it must be of something. If knowledge is
causal, then our knowledge must be in some way caused by that of which we have knowledge. If
our knowledge is of mathematical objects, we have a contradiction because such objects are noncausal and so could not possibly cause the knowledge we have of them. He calls this horn of the
dilemma Realist, and Platonism falls on this side. In Benacerraf’s words, the realist lacks “an
account of the link between our cognitive faculties and the objects known,” (Benacerraf, 1973,
674). However, if we reject the existence of mathematical objects, then we may have a consistent
epistemology in that our knowledge can be said to come from proofs and our deductive methods.
Benacerraf calls this option Combinatorial, which brings together positions like those of
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Constructivism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. Here we can explain how we have mathematical
knowledge (the proof provides it), but we have no account of what our knowledge is of! That is,
we find ourselves justified by proofs, but with little to say about what truth it is that we have
justified. This, along with some arguments against conventionalist accounts of mathematical
truth (roughly, what we refer to as fictionalism), leads Benacerraf to reject any currently existing
philosophy of mathematics as inadequate. This is a conclusion I share. What differentiates my
criticisms here from Benacerraf’s is that (1) I am concerned with metaphysical dependence
rather than causation, and (2) the criticism is not that these accounts of mathematics fail to
square the ontology with the epistemology, but that they fail to square their mathematical
ontology with a wider metaphysics adequate to contemporary science. However, I take
Benacerraf’s Dilemma as bolstering my criticisms, the rest of which follow below.
Intuitionism, the position that mathematics gets its truth and necessity from the structure
of the human mind, also must be rejected. For Brouwer, intuitionism begins by “Completely
separating mathematics from mathematical language and hence from the phenomena of language
described by theoretical logic, recognising that intuitionistic mathematics is an essentially
languageless activity of the mind having its origin in the perception of a move of time,”
(Brouwer, 1981). Intuitionism does not reject formalization outright, as Intuitionist logics have
been formulated. Rather, Brouwer is making a grounding claim about what creates and stabilizes
mathematical truth. The structure of the mind is what gives us the mathematical truths we find;
formal language merely expresses those truths in a rigorous form. Intuitionism then requires the
mind be somehow unique in ways that materialism, which must always seek to upset the mind's
grandiloquence about itself, cannot accept. The mind itself is not fundamental to reality, and so
any powers it has to generate the possibility of mathematical truth must also be grounded on
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something more fundamental to it. At best, the intuitionist provides an account of access to
mathematical truths, but not their metaphysical grounding.
On the other hand, the advent of modern mathematical logic has led to the various
formulations of Formalist, Nominalist, and Fictionalist attempts to formulate our accounts of
science or mathematics itself without reference to abstract objects. Formalism conceives of
mathematics as the creation of formal rules or operations and thereby equates the notions of truth
and proof in the attempt to justify mathematical truth by procedures and operations internal to
mathematics itself.11 Mathematical truth then would be whatever results from the proper
manipulation of mathematical symbols. Despite any remaining popularity, formalism was dealt
its death blow by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. The incompleteness of any formal system
capable of proving the truths of arithmetic is found explicitly in the separation of proof and truth
in the production of a Gödel sentence, a true sentence whose truth implies its own unprovability.
Even if one rejects the formal challenge to formalism à la Gödel, there remains the more
fundamental challenge to formalism offered by Frege. Frege argues that mathematics cannot be
an empty formal game or only the result of a well specified language because, if it were, there
would be nothing to provide stability to the symbols used to describe such a language (Frege,
1980, 194). Frege’s argument begins with the observation that each inscription is different; no
two written equals signs are exactly alike. He then argues that something besides the language
itself must explain the regular use of different equals signs as the sign of equality between terms.
Specifying formal rules as the source of this stability would just regress the argument as those
rules are written in the same sorts of symbols requiring stability from elsewhere. Frege flatly
rejects any talk of abstraction as a solution to this problem. Instead, Frege concludes that
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For a full account of formalism, see Detlefsen, 2005.
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mathematics must be about something, and therefore, it cannot be an empty formal game. There
is a surprising affinity in Frege’s argument here with Deleuze’s metaphysics in that Frege begins
with difference, and seeks to establish how identity is fixed atop that fundamental difference.
Each instance of a symbol is, by the nature of inscription, different no matter how similar it may
appear to another, yet we identify each instance of an equals sign as a token of a type. Whereas
Frege sought the answer to this question in his “third realm,” (Frege, 1991, 369-71)12 we will
instead follow Deleuze by seeking the answer in modal structure.
While the formalist gambit did not succeed, its legacy continues in Nominalist and
Fictionalist programs which seek the justification of the use of mathematics without appeal to
any sort of mathematical objects or extra-mathematical truths. In general, I reject fictionalism
because it fails to provide a reason for the difference in kind between mathematical truths, which
do seem to be universal, necessary, and eternal, and other abstract ideas, such as the idea of
justice, which are obviously culturally limited, contingent, and historical. By not explaining this
difference, the fictionalist, who takes mathematics to be simply a useful tool or way of speaking,
then lacks an explanation of the unique usefulness and features of mathematical truths as
opposed to other idealizations. However, contemporary fictionalist accounts have a further issue
which extends the scope of our project here. Field’s Science without Numbers (2nd Edition, 2016)
is the paradigm example of an admittedly heroic Nominalist attempt to recast the formal tools
required by our scientific theories so that they do not imply the existence of abstract objects. If
successful, Field’s project would annul the question by showing that no metaphysics of
mathematics is actually required since our scientific theories would not need refer to

It is worth noting here that Frege potentially avoids Benacerraf’s dilemma because his account is non-causal yet
provides proofs, but this account does not avoid our criticisms in terms of ontological dependence because Frege
leaves non-causal objects unexplained.
12
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mathematical objects in order to make sense. That is, reference to mathematical objects would be
dispensable for our best theories and so resolve the inconsistency which results from the PutnamQuine argument (Field, 2016, p-30-1). This recasting is undertaken by a program of carefully
restricting the scope of quantified statements of modern science to range over only those entities
which a Nominalist would find acceptable (e.g. points of spacetime).13 However, while
mathematical objects have been banished, Field still requires relations which are both necessary
and abstract, those of formal logic. How the necessary and abstract relations of formal logic are
to be accepted into the Nominalist’s framework is left unexplained. We should find the necessity
of logical entailment no less strange than the necessity of mathematical objects, and the abstract
nature of such relations as on a par with the abstract objects of mathematics. If Field were to
truly complete his project, he would also need to explain away entailment relations, which
cannot be done since his project depends on taking such relations seriously as abstract, necessary
relations. One might assume that this would only hold if one had a classical Fregean view of the
proposition as an ideal object separate from both world and language—a view the Nominalist is
unlikely to hold. However, even if one provides some Nominalist-approved account of the nature
of propositions as contingent and non-abstract, this has not explained away how entailment
relations between such propositions themselves remain necessary and abstract.
Furthermore, we are left with the question: which logic? There are a multitude of equally
useful, robust logics and formal semantics with completeness and soundness proofs which yet
produce different and conflicting sets of logical truths. For instance, if we affirmed both paraconsistent logics and classical logics, we get a contradiction on whether or not the law of noncontradiction holds (which, may or may not be an issue, and such ambiguity is precisely why we
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I leave aside here the issue of whether or not every scientific theory could be reformulated in such nominalist
appropriate terms as it is of second importance to the question of necessary logical relations.
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must stipulate a logic to do meaningful work). This issue is general here in that logic aims to be
about no particular topic and so to be applicable to any topic whatsoever (Haack, 1978, 228-9).
Straightforwardly, if one takes a logic to be individuated by its set of theorems, then we
obviously have different logics defined in terms of different necessary entailment relations, that,
in absence of pragmatic concerns, give no reason to choose one over the other. For instance, if
we are working in a context where it is helpful to formally track the fact that we do not yet know
the truth values of some of our propositions, we have a reason to make use of intuitionist logic.
This is because the Law of Excluded Middle is not a theorem of intuitionist logic, and our
reasoning is not constrained by the demand that for every proposition, either it or its negation is
true. On the other hand, if we are reasoning in a context where the truth of all atomic
propositions is known, then classical logic and the law of excluded middle will do just fine. That
these logics have different entailment relations individuates them, and it is then a question of
pragmatics for which contexts these different entailment relations are better suited to reason
about. The existence of these relations alone or of different, equally formally respectable logics
should be enough to trouble the Nominalist who employs them in that the relations themselves
exist, are abstract, and hold necessarily. This is of course equally a problem for the logical realist
who is not a logical pluralist as there appears to be no good criteria for choosing one logic over
any other a priori (there are, of course, pragmatic and contextual reasons for such choice a
posteriori). Any project which attempts to explain such necessary relations as those of entailment
must be able to explain the existence of distinct, incompatible formal logics, and so must be both
realist and pluralist.
With the rejection of these common positions, we must ask ourselves what it is we aim to
explain. Mathematics is a formal tool used to study the universe, and so it is instructive to look at
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the use of other such tools in science. Take the microscope. No biologist claims that because the
microscope is indispensable to the study of cellular structure that the existence of such structures
requires that the microscope exist as its transcendent or transcendental grounds. Such would be
the result if a biological Platonist or Intuitionist took the same tack as their mathematical
analogs. The other approaches produce no less absurd results. A fictionalist about microscopes
would simply be laughed at. A formalist builds a larger microscope under which to examine the
first one. The Nominalist disassembles the first microscope, builds a second one out of its parts
with its mirrors in a different position, and claims to have done away with the need of a
microscope in the first place. The question of how to understand the tool the science requires is
clear cut in the case of cellular biology: we require an account of optics, that is, the general
account of the principles which make the tool possible in the first place. It is notable that the
explanation of a tool for biology is not a biological but a physical explanation. The same should
be expected of formal tools which, though they function through axioms and entailment, this
functioning itself cannot be explained by axioms and entailments without circularity. Such an
account is non-representational in that the tool does not function by representing what it is
applied to. We must explain the genesis of the tool and what makes its functioning possible in
the first place. Only then can we explain what makes its representational powers possible, as
surely the microscope does make possible useful representations of what a cell is like.
Here, we find a contemporary approach which attempts such an analogous explanation of
mathematics, mathematical structuralism, which leads us beyond the scope of the metaphysics of
mathematics into modal metaphysics more generally. Mathematical structuralism attempts a
similar approach to that of Field, and we must reject it for the same reasons, though we will
maintain its guiding insight. Mathematical structuralism makes use of fundamentally formal
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resources in order to explain formal necessity. For instance, instead of recasting our scientific
theories, Shapiro 1997 argues that mathematics is itself a science, the science of structure.
Mathematical theories are then reinterpreted to imply not the existence of mathematical objects
(at least not fundamentally), but truths about structural relations. These relations are taken as
prior to their relata. Shapiro then endorses a Platonism about structure, which we must reject for
the same reasons as classical Platonism. Hellman 1989, on the other hand, provides a more
materialist friendly account with his modal structuralism. Mathematics is then understood to be
the study of the structure of possibility itself. From the metaphysician’s point of view, the issue
with the structural account provided by Hellman is that by ‘structure,’ Hellman means a formal
structure constructed out of the tools of modal logic. Doing so ultimately passes the buck to the
necessary relations of logical entailment in the same manner as Field. I take Hellman’s view of
mathematics as the study of modal structure to be broadly correct, but it requires further
grounding. Hellman’s metaphysics of mathematics is only as good as the modal metaphysics
which underlies the formal tools of which he makes use. This position is then open to our
critique of the understanding of formal systems as representational.
We have then found in the contemporary metaphysics of mathematics the remnants of the
Logicist program of reducing mathematics to logic, a program which is widely accepted to have
failed alongside Formalism with Gödel’s incompleteness proofs. To overcome this issue and
provide a solution to our original problem, we must find a metaphysical ground not just to
mathematics, but also for logics, that is, for entailment relations generally. Since logics and
mathematics are both collections of formal tools constructed out of necessary relations, we are
then searching for a metaphysics of necessity, and so of modality more generally.14 We need not
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I take this to be an issue for both model-theoretic and proof-theoretic accounts of entailment as both treat
entailment as a necessary relation. I will focus more on the model-theoretic account here and in Chapter 1 as the
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rehearse in detail the benefits and deficiencies of various metaphysics of modality because they
both do not address the explanatory needs following from the constraints of our best scientific
theories, and they fail to do so for the same reasons as their mathematical counterparts. Modal
realism, which takes there to be really existing possible worlds that make true our propositions
about possibility and necessity, is flagrantly inconsistent with a limited, finite universe of
contingent objects. Modal realism requires a (at least potentially) infinite number of causally
isolated worlds (Lewis, 2001). Constraining ourselves by the actual world means we would have
no access to such worlds, and rejecting the mind as fundamental in any way means
conceivability is not a reliable guide to metaphysical modality even if it is a guide to logical
modality. This mirrors our rejection of Platonism and Intuitionism in mathematics. Modal
fictionalism, much as mathematical fictionalism, fails to account for the metaphysic distinctness
of the necessity of entailment relations, nor can it explain the how the usefulness of such fictions
is possible in the first place.15 There is, however, a contemporary position in modal metaphysics
which can in principle satisfy the constraints set above: Dispositionalism.16
Dispositionalism is the position that modal truths are grounded in an ontology consisting
only of objects and their dispositions (Vetter, 2011, 478-9). The category of disposition covers
whatever an object can do. We may just as well call dispositions powers, abilities, or capacities.
Dispositions are generally understood to be the potential to manifest certain qualities or
properties. Objects are, essentially, collections of dispositions and their current manifestations.

model-theoretic account lends itself more naturally to the mistake of inferring ontological structure from logical
structure critiqued in the next chapter.
15

The full argument for this appears in Chapter 1.
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Dispositionalism is generally taken as a branch of modal Actualism (the position that all modal truths are
grounded in the actual world), but Actualism has several different formulations, many of which require the existence
of necessary objects in the actual world. Since necessary objects are inconsistent with our constraints, we must also
reject many other forms of Actualism. The details of this are worked out in chapters 1 and 2.
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Such an approach has already been used to great success in the work of Cartwright who explains
such abstract entities as physical laws as grounded in physical objects and their dispositions.17
We should take this as evidence for this project as scientific laws are often taken to be abstract,
mathematical (or at least mathematically expressed) entities, and Dispositionalism has already
shown some success in providing an adequate metaphysics for such entities proposed by
scientific theories which does not take them to be fundamental to the objects they describe.
Here we have an ontology appropriate to our materialist constraints embraced from our
best accounts of the sciences. There are contingent, finite objects and their dispositions. Since
dispositions are said of objects, dispositions will also be contingent, and since there are only
finite ways of being otherwise (by our third constraint against infinity), then the potential
manifestations of dispositions will also be finite. Our question, then, is how do we account for
the necessity of mathematical and logical relations, as well as for the truth of propositions about
necessity, eternity, and infinity? This is where I turn to the metaphysics of difference and the
critique of representation offered by Gilles Deleuze.
C. Grounds Beyond Representation
Deleuze provides a critique of representation in that representation relies on an
unjustified assumption of similarity between the world or the universe and our descriptions
thereof. What the projects critiqued above share in common is the acceptance of a literal reading
of the existential quantifier (“there exists”) and the assumption that we can read an ontology and
a metaphysics off of the logical tools we employ without first accounting for what grounds the
working of those tools. This is the representational reading of mathematics and logics. The
Platonist reads these existential quantifiers simply and posits corresponding objects. The
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structuralist reinterprets the domain which these statements are applied to, as does the intuitionist
in an alternative way. The Nominalist a la Field carefully reformulates the theories themselves to
imply only the existence of whatever entities the Nominalist finds acceptable, and so maintains
representation at the cost of some realism (i.e. only what the formal tool can represent can be
taken as real, and if it is real, it must be representable in the formal tool). The fictionalist
maintains the representation reading, but fails to find any objects in existence of which the
formalism is a representation, and so rejects mathematical truth or reference to mathematical
objects. However, in equating realist accounts with representational accounts (that is, taking
being a realist to amount to reading mathematical propositions literally), fictionalist critiques
only target a subset of possible realist positions and do not account for the possibility of nonrepresentational realism. We have no reason to trust the tools of logic any more than those of
mathematics. They themselves must be explained. Logics are, at their core, systems of formal
operations which generate necessary relations between propositions. These necessary relations
are called entailments. These do not provide truth values to propositions (other than logical
truths), and so models and the tools of model theory are required to provide the proper truth
assignments, giving sense to the logical structure. Each of these modern approaches to the
philosophy of mathematics tailors their models to their needs, and then implicitly treats models
(which are, again, a formal tool) as isomorphic with the universe. This is most obvious in
Lewisian Modal realism where quantification over worlds via sets of true propositions is taken to
imply the real existence of other worlds such as ours. That there is such a difference between
what our best scientific theories tell us existence is like versus what our mathematics and logics
tell us should be enough for us to be skeptical of such an isomorphism.
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The issue we find with representation happens when a formal system is separated from its
metaphysical grounding. That is, a system of formal relations is taken as a representation of the
cosmos, and is then projected on the cosmos as a structural isomorphism without attention to the
way formal structure may differ from metaphysical structure. We should expect our explanations
to be different based on whether or not we understand a thing in terms of its grounding. Any
object that exists must have a metaphysical ground which in some way differs from that which it
grounds, a regress which we will later argue terminates at difference itself because difference is
not an object. What makes apples possible is not some pre-existing abstract form or identity of
appleness, but a collection of environmental conditions, the existence of certain nutrients, an
evolutionary history, and so on. If it did not differ, that is, if ground and thing grounded were
identical, we would beg the question or have to admit some fundamental object into our
ontology.18 Logics, mathematics, and their truths are things which exist, and so must have some
ground, as our stated commitment to materialism prevents us from taking ideal or abstract
objects as fundamental to the cosmos. Taking logic or mathematics as isomorphic with the
universe without an account of the generation of mathematical and logical truth in the first place
is no more reliable than finding a myth of the creation of the universe and accepting it without
acknowledging that myths are grounded in the human imagination and capacity for producing
fictions.
Let us look more closely at the necessity which we are investigating. We are not
concerned with propositions in themselves, at least not directly. Rather, it is the relations
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If one is not already onboard with the project of a metaphysics of difference, then admitting a fundamental object
would still be a viable option. However, this would lead into the Heideggerian critique of onto-theology where one
misunderstands the nature of being in general because they have understood it in terms of some privileged entity,
and so such understanding is necessarily partial and lacking. Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference explicitly meant to
avoid this issue by understanding being as difference, and difference is not an entity, (Deleuze, 1994, 64-66).
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between the sets of axioms, operations, semantic models, etc. in a mathematical theory or a logic,
in other words, entailment relations, that are the sort of necessity with which we are concerned.
Entailments are necessary relations between what are otherwise contingent propositions if taken
in the abstract (i.e. if we do not know whether or not the state of affairs to which they refer
obtains). Since we seek to explain the grounds of necessary relations, we need only a relative
necessity since no truth of mathematics or logical entailment is a truth on its own. Such truths are
necessary relative to a set of axioms or a given logical structure. “Parallel lines never meet” is a
contingent proposition if we have not specified the geometry in which we are working, and
“2 + 2 = 4” is gibberish in binary arithmetic without a translation schema. Seeking the grounds
for the necessity of entailment relations provides the possibility of a metaphysical grounding for
logics which can also respect logical pluralism. In other words, since the goal is to ground
entailment relations, this account should generalize to hold for all formal systems with necessary
entailments. Regardless of the fact that different logics have different sets of necessary
entailments, the necessity of such entailments themselves should be accounted for. I take this on
as an additional constraint: any formal system, in principle, should be accounted for as a specific
expression of the metaphysics offered. Since the metaphysics offered here is one of the priority
of difference itself (to be explicated below), any system of entailments which could not be
accounted for by some chain of grounding relations which proceeds through objects and what
those objects can do (their powers), and terminates in difference itself would then be a
counterexample to this project. It is the search for a ground which is both capable of explaining
necessary relations and which requires only the existence of contingent objects that leads us to
Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference.
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D. Difference as Ground
The positive project of this dissertation consists in accounting for the grounds of
mathematical and logical necessity in terms of a metaphysics of difference a la Deleuze. A
metaphysics of difference starts out on the right foot to solving the conflict between
mathematical and scientific truths in that by taking difference as metaphysically prior to identity,
we are barred from identifying a thing with its grounds. In broad terms, that means we must
understand our formal tools as grounded in something which does not necessarily share their
properties. The critique of representation mentioned above is just a special case of the larger
project of rejecting explanations in terms of identity, similarity, analogy, and representation and
replacing them with explanations in terms of the operations of difference. Such relations of
identity, similarity, etc. presuppose a likeness between a thing and its grounds which is supposed
to explain the nature of the thing grounded. Yet, insofar as the ground and the thing grounded are
different from each other, such relations of likeness or identity need first to be explained. In
mathematics, this leads us to the question we saw in Frege: how are different markings on paper
to be identified as signs of the same mathematical operation? Following Deleuze, we must seek
an answer to this question in the fundamental role of difference. To do so, we return to the
project of grounding modality.
It will be shown that difference itself (a technical notion drawn from Deleuze’s work)
grounds the possibility of relative necessities without implying the existence of any fundamental
necessities, objects or otherwise. While mathematics is generally taken to be about numbers or
other such abstract objects, I will argue that such abstract objects are rather formal tools
produced as a way to study the real subject of mathematics: the modal structure of pure
difference.
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Deleuze’s metaphysics finds its first major explication in Difference and Repetition, but
its various aspects are explicated throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre, receiving central attention in
Logic of Sense, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, as well as in his collaborative works with
Felix Guattari. I do not pretend to attempt a complete reconstruction of Deleuze’s metaphysics,
nor is this work primarily an exercise in Deleuze exegesis. Instead, I take a series of problems in
analytic philosophy which are raised in connection to the central problem of reconciling the
truths of science with those of mathematics, and respond to each problem with selections from
Deleuze’s metaphysics. The problems themselves are related but do not necessarily imply each
other. The solutions offered, however, should be seen as a consistent metaphysical system which
is built up in stages in response to those problems and is ultimately meant to solve the central
problem. This project is then a partial reconstruction of Deleuze’s metaphysics, one
circumscribed by the scope of the problems encountered. I move beyond the scope of the
problems proposed only when it is required to show the consistency of the system being
developed.19 The result is, I hope, a metaphysical structure capable of explaining the grounding
of mathematical truths in contingent objects and difference itself. Ultimately, this amounts to the
claim that mathematics is the study of the modal structure of difference itself.20

Those familiar with Deleuze’s metaphysical account of the problem-solution complex should recognize this as an
attempt at a self-consciously Deleuzian methodology.
20
A somewhat similar claim has been made by Gangle 2014 when he claims that Deleuze’s notion of the virtual (a
part of his modal metaphysics we will explore in depth below) is equivalent to Cat, the Category of Categories in
mathematics. I think this claim has much merit and depth to it worth exploring that we will not explore in this work
because analytic philosophy has, for the most part, limited itself to reflections on the Set Theoretical foundations for
mathematics and its attendant logics. However, I have to reject this equation between the virtual and Cat based on
two reasons. First, Cat is a potential foundation for mathematics, but there is more to modal structure in Deleuze
than the virtual, and so if mathematics is the study of virtual structure, mathematics cannot be equivalent with only
one portion of that modal structure. Second, this equation between the virtual and Cat is precisely the sort of
unexplained isomorphism that I take Deleuze’s critique of representation to be aimed at. This is not to reject the
entirety of the claim, but to point out that as an identity claim, it must itself be explained.
19
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Grounding mathematics in a metaphysics of difference presents unique challenges, but it
also revitalizes the fundamental questions of the metaphysics of mathematics. In a metaphysics
which takes identity to be prior to and to explain differences, the truths of mathematics can
appear quite empty. On the far end of this is perhaps early Wittgenstein’s account of formal
truths as mere tautologies and therefore meaningless. Wittgenstein concludes this from the claim
that since formal systems are a series of tautologies, they amount to propositions which lack any
truth conditions and therefore lack any sense (Wittgenstein, 1921, 41). The existence and the
exchangeability of tautologies is only uninteresting if identity is assumed as pre-existing its
various expressions, and the logical equality or tautological substitution of formal systems is
taken not only to be a priori and necessary, but also fundamental. Similarly, tautologies can only
lack sense and truth conditions if they are taken as ungrounded. It is this assumption of
fundamentality that a metaphysics of difference challenges.
The foundational role of difference makes the very existence of tautologies interesting.
This is because tautologies, equations, synonyms, and identifications in general cannot be
assumed or taken for granted, but must themselves be explained by the sorts of differences which
they cover over or cancel in order to establish the identity they express. A = A is not a priori true
in a metaphysics of difference because difference is prior to identity, and difference cannot be
said to be self-identical. Equalities must be established in each domain in which they hold true.
These so-called “trivial truths” are only trivial from the point of view of a logic which has
already established certain equivalences, operations of synonymous replacement, valid
inferences, etc. But metaphysically speaking, the mere fact of such truths requires explanation as
to how logical equivalences are possible at all within a cosmos of ever differentiating
differences. In a metaphysics of difference, every identification, every equals sign, implies a
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prior difference which must first be covered over in order to make that identification possible.
Because of this implication, the supposedly empty formal truths which make up logic and
mathematics become a shockingly strange and fascinating part of our cosmos. These truths
depend on the most incredible covering over of difference in that no matter the fact that whatever
exists does so as fundamentally different from whatever else exists. We may yet say of anything
at all that it is one thing, and then deduce mathematical certainties from this. It is in resolving
this apparent difficulty that the seemingly mysterious and otherworldly properties of
mathematical truth can be shown to be profoundly this-worldly.
E. Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 begins by explicating the critique of representation and its relation to modal
logic and mathematics. Truthmaker theory is argued for as both an alternative to the
representational account of truths and as a common ground with Deleuze’s metaphysics,
following the work of Jeffrey Bell. To respond to the question of modal truthmakers, I look to a
debate found in contemporary Dispositionalism about whether or not dispositions are adequate to
provide truthmakers for necessary truths. I will argue that dispositions are able to do so, and that
in doing so, Dispositionalism also has a motivation to accept a metaphysics of the primacy of
difference. Ultimately, this chapter defends the in-principle possibility of grounding necessary
truths on those features of the universe that depend on difference itself. The following chapters
carry out the project of grounding specific features of necessary truths while maintaining an
ontology which consists only of contingent objects.
Chapter 2 argues that the grounding of modality on difference itself requires an account
of how individual things are themselves generated. Quine’s challenge to modality in general is
taken up: how can we meaningfully discuss what cannot be said to be self-identical? It will be
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argued, alongside Marcus and other Actualists, that all such talk can be understood as about
objects. However, Marcus’s Necessitarianism about objects must be rejected since it blatantly
contradicts our commitment to an ontology without any necessary objects. Since the necessity of
objects in Marcus is tied to a notion of necessary identity, what is required is an account of the
production of identity itself, which thereby undercuts the need for necessary objects. This is
explicitly Deleuze’s notion of individuation. The process of individuation is a power of pure
difference which results in a new object. This new object itself is a process of becomingcontinuous. That is, the production of a new object implies a virtual (structural) continuity
between its components. This becoming-continuous is then defended as the truthmaker for the
mathematical continuum, thereby grounding the specific truths of those branches of mathematics
which depend on the construction of the real line.
We then move to the problem of the relationship between modality and time, a
metaphysical problem made more complex by the fact that modal logics and temporal logics use
the same sort of logical machinery. Chapter 3 argues that given the production of continuity, we
can understand chronological time (which is a continuum) as itself produced. In other words, the
temporal order of past, present, and future, where the past precedes the present and the present
the future, depends on a different temporal order. This second, metaphysical order grounds the
more common chronological order as its condition of possibility, and is itself grounded in the
modal structure of objects and difference. Thereby, time is not fundamental to the cosmos. In this
second order, the present, or more specifically, the powers of things in the present produce the
past (the passing of the present into the past). In order for both the present to pass and the past to
remain as past, we need an account of the inscription of the past through the actions of the
present. The continuity found in Chapter 2 provides a metaphysical ‘surface’ for such
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inscription. Furthermore, since all inscription is partial, it will be shown that there exist powers
of the pure present which make inscription possible but are not themselves inscribed. That is,
these powers do no pass into the past. They remain a sort of atemporal ground of the time,
though they are by no means unchanging. This provides truthmakers for what is traditionally
called the eternity of mathematical truths. The grounds for such truths are metaphysically prior to
chronological time. As long as there is time, these grounds will remain, and so these grounds are
truthmakers for eternal truths. However, this outside of chronological time is no less contingent
than the unfolding of events within chronological time, as eternal truths are made truth only by a
relative necessity between time and its conditions. Despite truthmakers for eternity, there will be
a last temporal moment of the universe, when the grounds of time itself are undone, and so
eternity dies with time.
With an excess over chronological time found, we can make sense of Deleuze’s claim
that history cannot exhaust becoming. That is, there is always more that powers can do than is
ever actually manifested, even more than can ever be inscribed in history. Chapter 4 takes up this
claim to provide an account of truthmakers for counterfactual claims. Since counterfactuals are
linked to both the common concept of essence (how different a thing could have been and yet
remain that same kind of thing is a counterfactual question which the concept of essence is meant
to answer) and necessity. This makes possible an engagement with the problems of giving
meaning to counterfactual truth claims. Whereas Chapter 3 grounded eternal truths on the powers
of difference itself, counterfactual truths will be shown to be grounded on the essential powers of
objects. This will be done by way of investigating specifically what are a thing’s powers to
inscribe and be inscribed upon while still maintaining its own identity. This completes the
connection between the modal and the mathematical as this allows us to understand mathematics
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as the study of structure beyond the material conditions it is grounded in by the counterfactual
extension of powers beyond their current manifestations in a way that maintains their status as
necessary.
Chapter 5 completes our search for the grounds of the supposedly otherworldly features
of mathematical truths by accounting for truthmakers for truths about infinities. Here we will
argue that the structure of the object as both bounded but containing a continuum provides
truthmakers for completed infinities in Set Theory. The grounds of counterfactuals found in the
previous chapter, that is, the powers to affect and be affected which are essential to that object
will be shown to provide the necessity for such truths. We will then argue for a modal structure
of the excess of an object’s parts in relation to the environment over that object itself, and that
this excess provides the truthmaker for the power set operation, thereby giving a ground of which
Cantor’s Theorem can be seen as an expression. This will be used to provide a metaphysical
reading of Skolem’s paradox, that transfinitude is a relative rather than absolute property. If so,
then we have found grounds for truths not just of potential infinite, but for transfinite
mathematics writ large.
In the Conclusion, I will provide a systematic account of what it is for formal truths to
find their grounds in contingent objects and difference itself. Then I will suggest some possible
extensions into and issues with the philosophy of science for this metaphysics. And finally, I will
provide a brief reflection on the existential question of what it means to find ourselves in such a
universe.
F. Broad Outline
This project has many moving parts, but its broad strokes movement can be put simply.
Metaphysically speaking, difference is fundamental. As long as there is anything at all, there will
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be difference. Our ontology contains only contingent, finite objects, and dispositions.
Metaphysical modality can then be accounted for thusly: what is possible is whatever is
grounded in objects and their dispositions; what is necessary is grounded in the powers of
difference itself21. Difference can stand as this ground because, while there are no absolute
necessities, difference is a relative necessity. If there is anything at all, then there will be
difference (chapter 1). We must then discover what difference itself can do, what dispositions it
has in order to clarify the necessities it grounds. Difference is generative of individuals, identity,
and structure, and so can ground the necessary truths about those features of the cosmos (Chapter
2). Individuals, identity, and structure are, however, contingent and temporary, and so cannot
alone provide the support for mathematical truths, which are also taken to be eternal. Time itself
must be shown to be emergent on objects and difference. This leads to a distinction between
temporal and atemporal change. Those necessary relations which are unchanging are grounded
on the conditions of time itself. These truths may be called eternal, but only in the sense that they
will last the duration of the universe and are grounded as metaphysically prior to time. When the
cosmos dies, it will take eternity with it (chapter 3). Given that objects have dispositions which
play an active role in the generation of time itself, they have powers prior to time. The collection
of these powers may, in a qualified sense, be called an essence. Essences then account for range

21

I specify metaphysical modality here because, through formalization, modality takes on a different character as
logical modality. Explicating this fully requires the details of the covering over of difference argued for in Chapter
1, but the main point can be given here. In logical modality, possibility and necessity are inter-defined. The possible
is what is not necessarily impossible, and the necessary is whatever it is not possible to not be. A fundamental
Deleuzian principle is that any primary metaphysical claims must be positive, and any negations must be understood
as a comparison of prior positivities. Therefore, if a negation is inherent in our account, we must not be dealing with
something metaphysically fundamental. For modality, this means we must first find the positive account of the
difference between possibility and necessity in order to understand them metaphysically rather than formally. The
follows converse follows as well, we can only understand possibility and negation as inter-defined through negation
by covering over the metaphysical difference between the powers of objects (possibility) and the powers of
difference (necessity). It is worth noting here that this covering over is not an illusion or a “mistake” of some kind,
but rather is a part of the production of the new.
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of powers to be otherwise of an object. This provides a ground not just for possibility, but for full
blown counterfactual truths. This allows for a further explication of necessity as the limits of
what can be otherwise (chapter 4). Essences are abstract, but they are still finite. Among the
possibilities found in essences are the possibilities for interactions with other objects. It is
possible for there to be asymmetrical interactions where one object’s possibilities of being
otherwise are exhausted by the interaction, but the other remains in excess of the first. This
overwhelming of the capacities for interaction of one object by other which be shown to be
isomorphic to the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, and so can stand as ground for propositions
about infinities (chapter 5). We have then accounted for the grounds of the truth of propositions
about necessities, eternities, and infinities (among other things) in an ontology which contains no
fundamental, absolute necessities, or necessary, eternal, or infinite objects.
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Mathematical Addendum:
Griss’s Negationless Mathematics
The claim that mathematics studies the modal structure of difference itself is far from a
trivial claim, and one whose support I do not think can be established straightforwardly. Rather,
it will require the rest of this dissertation to defend. That said, I would here like to offer what I
take to be a striking piece of evidence towards this claim: Griss’s Negationless Mathematics.
Griss’s program aimed to banish all use of logical negation from mathematical proofs, and to
instead formulate such proofs in terms of an explicitly positive notion of difference.
Furthermore, Deleuze was aware of Griss’s work and cites it in relation to his own account of
intensive difference (Deleuze, 1994, 234 and 330 n.11).1 Here, then I would like to give a brief
overview of Griss’s motivation and a brief example of a definitional and sketch of a proof which
makes use of difference rather than negation.
Griss can be seen as a sort of hyper-Intuitionist mathematician. Intuitionists reject the
Law of Excluded and the inference of Double Negation Elimination2 because they accept that a
proposition may either lack a truth value or the truth value can simply be unknown and therefore
we do not have the justification to assert that it is either true or false. The motivation here is that
such assertions, if allowed, license inferences of which one cannot have a clear conception.
Griss pushes this commitment further by rejecting logical negation outright. For the Intuitionist,
not-A is a perfectly acceptable assertion if one has proved that A is false. Griss, on the other
hand, is committed to the position that logical negation is always illicit, going so far to say that
“Only construction without the use of negation has some sense in intuitionistic mathematics,”

1

For an in depth account of Deleuze’s relation to Griss, see Shores, 2020, 164-174.

2

If one rejects either LEM or DNE, the invalidity of the other follows. This also invalidates reductio arguments
from a proposition without a determined truth value.

33

(Griss, 1946,1127). Instead of negation, Griss claims rigorous mathematical proofs must be
formulated in terms of a positive definition of difference relative to the mathematical objects
discussed in the proof.
Let us look at a simple example. Classically, parallel lines in Euclidean Geometry are
lines which do not intersect. Here is an obvious use of negation in the definition in that parallel
lines are defined by what they lack, that is, a point of intersection. Griss proposed an alternative
definition: line A is parallel to line B if and only if each point which makes up line A differs
from each point which makes up line B.3 A proof that two lines, A and B, are parallel then can be
undertaken like so. Produce a third line, C, of which we stipulate both that it is parallel to B and
that it passes through at least one point on A. If each point on C is the same as each point on A,
then C = A, and A is then proved to be parallel with B because C is parallel with B. If any point
on C differs from any point on A, then A is not parallel to B.4 This is only a sketch of a proof,
but it illustrates Griss’s program. If he is correct, all of mathematics could be reformulated in
such negationless proofs.5 While some further work in negationless mathematics and logic has
followed, it has not been a particularly popular area of research.
This notion of mathematical difference is both positive and necessary. Difference is
positive here in the sense that it is not defined in terms of negation, and it is necessary because it
is the difference that obtains as a relation between mathematical objects, which are themselves

3

This is my slight formalization of the definition given in Griss, 1946, 1128.

4

Note that the negation here is in the conclusion, not a premise, and so is not licensing an inference or being made
use of in the construction.
I am unaware of any formal counter-examples to or knock-down arguments against Griss’s program, though
Deleuze makes reference to a French mathematician and physicist Paulette Février, who argues for limitations to
Griss’s program. Deleuze conjectures that such limitations follow not from the notion of positive difference Griss
employs, but to Griss having an inadequate theory of problems (Deleuze, 1994, 330 n.11). Problems here is a
technical term for Deleuze, and one with a history tied to Intuitionist mathematics; however, I have not yet been able
to research and evaluate Deleuze’s conjecture.
5
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necessary. This notion of mathematical difference should not be confused for Deleuze’s notion
of difference itself (which we will work out in detail in Chapter 1). Since this notion of
mathematical difference relies on mathematical objects in some way, we can only count Griss’s
program as evidence that mathematical truths may be understand as the expression of the
necessary structure of difference itself, not as a step in the explication of the metaphysical
grounding this would imply. We must instead ground such truths, and mathematical objects
themselves, in the modal structure of difference itself. Griss’s program, however, shows us just
how close such a grounding may be.
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Chapter 1:
Nothing is Possible
“This mirroring does not portray a likeness”
-Heidegger, “The Thing”

There are no possible objects; there are only objects which make possibilities. There are
then objects and what objects are capable of doing. What objects are capable of may be often
referred to as dispositions, powers, capacities, or tendencies.1 We need make no distinction here
between the various ways in which an object does what it can do, only between what an object is
currently manifesting and what else an object can do or could have done. To say that X is
possible, metaphysically speaking, is then to assert that there are some objects or some powers
that could bring X about, whether one can specify those conditions or not. This X could be an
object, event, or anything else we may want to say is possible. In other words, while talk of
possible objects and possible events is common, it should not be taken literally. Instead, such talk
of possibilities should be understood as referring to the conditions which could bring about the
possibility described. These conditions need not currently exist as long as these conditions
themselves are possible, which is to say that these conditions are themselves within existing
powers in some way.
Grounding truths about possibility implies the attempt to ground modal truths in general.
From a formal point of view, possibility and necessity are co-defined,2 and are generally taken to

1

These different terms each find their proponents. Capacities are defended primarily by Nancy Cartwright (see
Cartwright 1999), powers by Stephen Mumford and Ran Lill Anjum (Mumford 2003, Mumford and Anjum 2011),
and DeLanda 2015 argues for a central ontological role for tendencies. Dispositionalism is perhaps the widest label
(see Vetter 2011 for an overview). While there are important distinctions, I take it that the level of metaphysical
discussion here ranges over these terms equally despite their important distinctions. I will go on to argue that
Deleuze’s concepts of the actual, virtual, and intensive aspects of objects provide a unique alternative to these
competing accounts of what objects can do, with these terms (capacity, power, disposition, tendency) being loose
ways to refer to this tripartite structure of the object.
2
In modal logic, possibility and necessity are generally co-defined as □p ≡ ¬♢¬p and ♢p ≡ ¬□¬p (where □p is read
as “it is necessarily the case that p”, and ♢p as “it is possibly the case that p.”
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be the two species of non-actual, modal truths. What then of the necessary, that which is nevernot-possible? If, as I maintain, there exist only this-worldly objects and all objects are
contingent, then how is it that necessary truths can be grounded? The traditional methods for
grounding necessary truths generally make use of some fundamental, necessary object or objects
(e.g. the mind of god), some otherworldly objects (e.g. Platonic forms or real possible worlds
distinct from this world), or they posit some fundamental necessity which cannot itself be said to
be an object (e.g. the god of negative theology). Each of these paths are barred to an ontology
which affirms only contingent, this-worldly objects and their powers. What, then, must the world
be like such that while nothing is necessary, where all that is has a birthdate and an expiration
date, there are nevertheless truths that could never fail to obtain?
This question betrays three unwarranted metaphysical presuppositions: first, that absolute
necessity is required for such an account. Absolute necessity is that which is taken to be
necessary no matter what, or necessary simpliciter. Whatever else may be the case, an absolute
necessity remains what it is. This presupposition is clearly at work in accounts which posit
something fundamental and simple as the grounds of necessary truths. However, when we look
carefully at the necessary truths of mathematics and logics, it is clear that these truths are
necessary relative to certain axioms and rules of inference. There is no absolute fact of the matter
of whether or not parallel lines meet unless we first specify the axioms of the geometry we are
working in. Once we specify, for example, Euclid’s axioms, then, try as we might, we cannot
make it the case the lines are both parallel and intersecting. That parallel and intersecting are
exclusive collections of lines is necessary relative to Euclid’s axioms, but not of other
geometries. Given this, there is no need to seek absolute necessities for the grounds of
mathematical truths; we only need relative necessities. As mathematical and logical truths are
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taken to be the paradigmatic examples of necessary truths, there is then also no reason to assume
there must be truths which are somehow ‘more’ necessary who would require absolute
metaphysical necessities to be grounded.
Second is the presupposition that a truthmaker must share something with what it makes
true, that the proposition somehow ‘re-presents’ the states of affairs3 to which it refers. This is
most obvious in the case of possibilia. If a proposition represents a state of affairs, then talk of a
possible object suggests that there really is a possible object which that proposition must be
about. This is the same with necessity: if the truth is necessary, it is assumed that which makes it
true must be necessary in the same way. This presupposition leads some to collapse the
distinction between logical possibility and metaphysical possibility in that the possibility of the
proposition being true is taken to imply the possibility of the states of affairs that proposition is
about. This is most common in accounts which take the sine qua non of metaphysical possibility
to be conceivability (e.g. Chalmers 2002). However, that the truth or falsity of propositions is
something which gets made by states of affairs implies that the product is different from the
process of production. How and in what ways this difference between states of affairs and the
truths they make must be worked out in detail.
Third is the presupposition that differences are explained by reference to a prior identity
or commonality held between the differing things. This is the assumption that the similarities
between states of affairs and language, or between the domain of a model and propositions4,
must be posited because difference is grounded in identity. In the history of Western

The phrase ‘state of affairs’ is used in this dissertation in the ontologically neutral sense of ‘the way things are or
could be.’ In his account of truthmakers, Armstrong uses ‘state of affairs’ to refer to collections of particular facts.
The account that will be offered here argues for objects and difference, not facts per se, as foundational truthmakers,
and so the ‘states of affairs’ should not be read in Armstrong’s more limited sense.
4
Here I mean in the technical, formal logic sense where a model plays the role of making propositions true or false
and propositions may be operated on using syntactical rules.
3
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metaphysics, there is assumed a primary identity, similarity, or adequation between what is
spoken and that which is spoken of. The assumed adequation between language and states of
affairs or proposition and model leads to a presumed reversibility between the two. Under this
assumed adequation, one may take a proposition which is made true by a state of affairs, or may
say something true about the world, operate on that proposition by way of an accepted, truth
preserving syntactical rule which produces a new proposition, and then project the truth of the
new proposition back onto the model or world. This implicitly assumes that something like or
adequate to the truth-preserving rule used to operate on the proposition obtains among the states
of affairs. However, were there such a fundamental adequation, we would have no need for a
difference between the semantics of the domain of a model and states of affairs, on the one side,
and propositions and languages on the other. Propositions can be operated on; this makes them
meaningfully different from the domain of a model. This difference provides the possibility that
the two may diverge radically.
It is the navigation of this difference between propositions and states of affairs which
separates formal logics from other sorts of reasoning. Formal logics establish this adequation by
way of Completeness and Soundness Proofs (and there are of course logics which can fail to
have such proofs, and so no such adequation can be assumed), and there is no issue here.5 The
issue is in the movement from work within a purely formal context to the application of such
logical tools to metaphysics. In such an application, the cosmos is substituted for the domain and
the adequation is assumed to hold just as well as with the formal tool (e.g. the model whose

5

Completeness and Soundness Proofs establish an adequation between be the syntax and semantics of a logic. If a
logic has a Soundness Proof relative to a given semantics, it is proven that every valid deduction in the logic will
respect semantic entailment in the model. A Completeness Proof, on the other hand, establishes that a logic can
provide a proof for every truth in the model.
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adequation is established through completeness and soundness proofs). This assumed adequation
underlies (what I take to be) the misguided search for the “correct” logic.” A correct logic would
be one which not all guarantees validity and formalizes all possible valid inferences, but also
does so in a way which is somehow isomorphic with the ontological structure of the world. If
such were a logic were possible, then its proper use would guarantee that our valid inferences
from true propositions would necessarily track what is true in the world. That most logics have
operations which allow for the production of truths about infinities, yet we find no infinities
obtaining in the world should be reasoning enough to doubt such an adequation.
Deleuze’s work provides the concepts for an account of truthmakers for necessary truths
which rejects these presuppositions, and thereby open a new path for understanding what is
possible and what is necessary through powers and the metaphysical primacy of difference. The
goal of this chapter is to give the broad strokes of the grounding of modal truths in a dynamic
metaphysics of difference. This metaphysic’s fundamental ontology consists only of contingent
objects and their three aspects: the virtual, intensive, and actual. What this aims to establish is
that it is in principle possible for this metaphysics to ground necessary truths. In doing so, such
truths are brought into the purview of metaphysics itself. If successful, then this shows that the
relation between truth and truthmaker is not first one of representation and similarity, but of
expression and emergence. Therefore, the truthmaker-truthmade relation is one of expression
from objects and their powers. The rest of the dissertation is then the filling in of this system, or
working through the grounding of necessary truths in contingent objects through processes of
emergence and real abstraction.
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A. Truthmakers Against Representation
Truthmaker theories aim to provide an ontologically grounded account of how
propositions get the truth-value they have. Truthmaker theories are more a set of common
commitments than a set of definite dogmas. The central commitment, which this work shares, is
that what truths there are is to be explained, in the last instance, by what there is (Mulligan et al,
1984). That is, there are truthmakers (usually states of affairs) which provide the grounding for
the truth of truthbearers (propositions), and that what truthmakers there are is what distinguishes
which truthbearers are true and which are not. Truthmaker theory itself does not tell us what
truthmakers there are, only how truthmaker and truthbearer relate. The relation between
truthmaker and truthbearer is ontologically neutral unless tied to a wider metaphysics (Mulligan
et al, 1984, 287). This work does not aim to defend truthmaker theories, but to make use of them.
This requires some qualifications and explications.
Discussing only truthmakers and truthbearers seems to me to get ahead of itself. There
must be an intermediary step. If, by their mere existence, certain states of affairs make some
truths, then unless we have said all things about all (and all possible) states of affairs, then we
should expect there to be truths which are made but which have not yet been borne. That is, there
are things which are true, but which have yet to be expressed by a proposition. Nothing which
could express a proposition existed at during the event of abiogenesis, yet surely this event made
certain truths. This intermediary between truthmaker and truthbearer I will call a ‘made-truth.’ I
propose this distinction for two reasons. First, to clarify the scope of this project. It is the relation
between the truthmaker and the made-truth that I am concerned with here. Anything further
requires moving beyond the question of metaphysical grounding and into the relation between

41

that grounding and the specific languages which express them.6 How it is that a proposition can
bear truth at all is itself an important and difficult question, but one which will be left to the side
for this work.7 Second, the intermediary of the made-truth prevents us from reading in a naïve
correspondence theory of truth that simply pairs propositions 1-to-1 with states of affairs with
which they share some similarity or identity. While truthmaker theory has its roots in “the
correspondence intuition” (Caputo, 2007, 276) that truths correspond to states of affairs, the
relation between states of affairs and truths, the ontological and the logical, can indeed be a
complex one. To see this, it is first necessary to understand what truthmaker accounts respond to
in order to explicate how they will be used in this project.
Truthmaker accounts arise out of a rejection of Tarski’s semantic notion of truth (Bell,
2016, 131-2). Tarski argues for a notion of formal truth where a statement is true in an object
language in virtue of its relation to a statement in some meta-language (the famous ‘“snow is
white” iff ‘snow is white’) (Tarski, 1936). This allows for the analysis of the logical structure of
a language through the use of a metalanguage. This account is then extended into model theory
where a mathematical structure is used to provide a model of the non-logical or extra-logical
relations between terms in the language being studied. The model used is frequently a SetTheoretical construct (though topological models, Category-Theoretic models, and so on are
possible) with some rules of quantification internal to it (Tarski and Vaught, 1956). As the tools
of a formal logic, there is no issue here. The problem, according to truthmaker theorists, arises
when “philosophers and logicians… turned their attentions away from the complex and

6

This issue will be broached in Chapters 3 and 4 where an account of the grounding of logical closure will be
explicated. Logical closure is a condition for specific languages, and so is a condition for the ways in which a
proposition comes to bear truth as well, but the account will remain at the general level.
7

I take Picazo 2014 to be a paradigm example of what is required for such an account, that is, an explanation of how
truthbearers come to be through the complex interaction of linguistic communities, the cognitive structures of the
agents of those communities, and the environments within which such agents evolved and operate.
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bewildering difficulties of the relations between language and the real world, turning instead to
the investigation of more tractable set-theoretic surrogates,” (Mulligan et al, 1984, 288). It is then
only a short step to the often implicit sleight of hand that substitutes the cosmos for the intended
domain of the model in work on metaphysics which makes use of such a notion of truth. If done
explicitly, arguments for this substitution generally follow a best systems account where it is
argued that we are justified in believing in those entities posited by our most successful (usually
scientific) theories (Bell, 2016, 132). Doing so then smuggles in an implicit constraint on our
metaphysics: that it is isomorphic with Set Theory.
Again, there is nothing wrong or flawed in a Set-Theoretic approach to models for logics.
However, they cannot be enough to do metaphysics without either embracing Platonism or
providing some non-logical grounding of numbers or mathematical constructs in what there is.
There is required some relation between model and universe. If one takes that relationship to be
unproblematically one of similarity or identity, then one must be committed to mathematics
being both real and fundamental to reality in some way.
Beyond engendering the problems of Platonism, mathematical models and their relations
are already too abstract to ground specific truths in specific states of affairs. Since models are
built on mathematical tools, they can be laid over any quantificationally adequate state of affairs
whatsoever. This is because, as Kaplan argues, the construction of such models separates
completely objects from what is predicated of those objects (Kaplan, 1967, 97). In other words,
if we read from the logical to the metaphysical, the world gets split into two kinds of entities:
qualities which have a general character and bare particulars, where a ‘bare particular’ designates
a blank thisness of an individual which can only be said to be self-identical (since to say
anything else of a bare particular would be to predicate a quality of it). Such a metaphysics
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cannot make sense of the object as fundamental, but must split the parts of an object into either
quality or the bare particular. To see why this metaphysics arises, we must follow Kaplan in
analyzing the operation of the logic put into service to make sense. In logical models, the object
which the proposition is about is modeled by a set. Implicitly, this may be done by referring to
things which are not sets, such as the truth values T and F (or more complex intermediaries), but
these values themselves are generally modeled by a function which maps a proposition to the set
1 if true and the empty set if false. That is, even seemingly non-set components are ultimately
modeled by sets. A set is a purely extensional object; there is nothing more to being such and
such a set than to contain exactly the members it does. Predicates are then “attached” to these
objects in the model. More technically, a predicate can either be modeled as a function or a set.
In the former case, a predicate is modeled a function that (in the monadic case, that is, a
predicate that applies to only one object at a time) takes the name of object as an input and
returns True or False, depending on the object. In the latter, a predicate is (again, in the monadic
case) a set of objects of which the predicate is taken to be true, along with a valuation function.
When logic is used in the service of metaphysics, this feature cannot help but influence the
metaphysician. As Kaplan argues:
In fact, the use of models as representatives of possible worlds has become so natural to logicians that they
sometimes take seriously what are really only artifacts of the model. In particular, they are led almost
unconsciously to adopt a metaphysics of bare particulars. Why? Because the model so nicely separates the
bare particular from its clothing… Suppose we want a model for the sentence of L which asserts that there
is exactly one thing and it is a unicorn. A model for such a sentence must have a universe with only one
element, and the extension assigned to the predicate “is a unicorn.” And that is all that is required of the
model. It is certainly not required that the single element of the universe of the model really be a unicorn.
(Kaplan, 1967, 97, original emphasis).

This difference between the assigned extension, on the one hand, and the elements of the
universe of the model, on the other, is an artifact of the use of set theoretical objects in the
construction of models. All that is required is a set with a single element which can be assigned,
by the model, the predicate “is a unicorn.” The set of 1 will do just nicely, and, to use Kaplan’s
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example, the set containing only the logician Jaakko Hintikka will work equally well. This issue
does not simply result from our chosen proposition being about a non-existent object. Since
formal models work on the material provided by Set Theory, even if we had a unicorn in front of
us, the unicorn itself would not make the proposition true. Only the set containing that unicorn
would, and the set containing exactly one unicorn is not itself a unicorn regardless of what our
predications say about it. Kaplan attributes this oddity to the success and naturalness of Tarski’s
semantic notion of truth (Kaplan, 1967, 97). Again, the issue here is not so much the logical
tools, which work perfectly well for their tasks, but with the (often implicit) metaphysical
assumptions incurred by taking the tools themselves to somehow ‘get at’ or represent reality.
Here we see that this leaves an implicit metaphysics of qualities which are exemplified by bare
particulars (Allaire, 1963, 1). However, we cannot accept bare particulars any more than
Platonism since objects with powers are not bare; their different powers and whatever qualities
follow from them are not indistinguishably interchangeable, metaphysically speaking, with any
other, and so they cannot take on just any predicates and still be adequately described or
individuated.
This issue of artifacts of models becoming a part of one’s metaphysics persists in more
contemporary work on modal metaphysics. For example, Cameron 2008 concludes that there
exist modal truthmakers, and that they are possible worlds themselves. By the existence of
possible worlds, Cameron means ‘world’ in the sense of a collection of propositions, not in the
modal realist sense of worlds equally real to our own. Cameron claims both that possible worlds
are nothing more than collections of propositions (Cameron, 2008, 276), and “So w makes true
both that p is true according to it and that it itself is a possible world; since the possibility of <p>
simply amounts to <p>’s being true at some possible worlds, it follows that w makes true the
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proposition <Possibly, p>” (Cameron, 2008, 278). For example, the proposition ‘it is possible
that the stock market is predictable’ is made true by there being some possible world in which
‘the stock market is predictable’ is true. A proposition about something being possible is made
true by it being true at some possible world. However, a possible world is what it is due to the
propositions true at it. If worlds are collections of propositions,8 then the proposition is making
itself true. This circularity does not arise if we restrict ourselves to formal contexts,9 but
Cameron’s account is proposed as an alternative to metaphysical theses (such as Pruss’s proposal
that the truthmaker for modal propositions is a divine mind), and so is a metaphysical claim.10
While formally acceptable, Cameron’s proposal strikes me as the modal equivalent of thinking a
thermometer heats and cools the body. A thermometer reports the temperature of the body, it
does not generate the body’s heat; possible world semantics is a tool used to report the logical
properties of the types of propositions being studied, not to establish their truth. Possible worlds
(barring Lewis’s modal realism, temporarily) are logical tools used to provide semantics for
various intensional logics. If we hold to the aim of truthmaker theories, that is, the barring of
inference from logical structure to ontological structure, then claims such that ‘P is true in some
possible world’ are precisely the sorts of claims which demand grounding and thereby cannot
stand as their own truthmakers. Any account, such as Cameron’s, which grounds the truth of

8

One could also reverse the order and define propositions as sets of worlds, which both Stalnaker and Lewis do.
This choice of order does not affect the arguments here as the results are formally equivalent, and so result in the
same problems when relating the formalism to metaphysics.
9

This is a technical point: sets contain their members essentially. What it is to be such and such a set is just to have
the members it has. Worlds are sets of propositions, so what it is to be a particular world is just to contain the
propositions it does. The truth of the possibility of propositions is then modeled by which accessibility relations
exist between worlds. Propositions about possibility then refer to accessibility relations, not back to the worlds of
which they are apart, and so no circularity obtains. For a somewhat related issue in the formalism itself, see the
footnote below on Kaplan’s Paradox.
10

Cameron takes himself to be dissolving the problem of truthmakers for modal propositions. However, to dissolve
such a problem would be to prove reasons to reject the need of truthmakers for modal propositions. As said above,
Cameron does not reject that such truthmakers exist, but that worlds serve that role.
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modal propositions in some formal machinery is then an insufficient account of modal
truthmakers. And so, we ask: what is it to make such claims true?11
The connection between Deleuze and truthmaker accounts of the relationship between
language and world has already been explored by Bell 2016. We must take a moment to say what
a Deleuzian truthmaker theory may look like before making use of truthmakers in grounding
modal facts. Classical truthmaker theory (which Bell takes from Armstrong 2004) is taken to
have three central principles, only two of which the Deleuzian (I argue) can take onboard without
further qualification. These three conditions are Truthmaker Necessitarianism, Truthmaker
Maximalism, and the Heterogeneity of the Logical and the Ontological. The principle in need of
qualification for a Deleuzian is Truthmaker Necessitarianism. Truthmaker Necessitarianism is
the claim that there is a necessary relation between a true proposition and its truthmaker (i.e. it is
not possible that the truthmaker exist and the proposition not be true, and vice versa). This must
be a non-logical necessity, because logical necessities only hold between propositions, and some
truthmakers are not propositions (Armstrong, 2004, 5-6). While this is a standard part of
truthmaker theory, I will avoid making use of this principle. Necessity is a modal concept, and
part of the goal of this work is to provide an account of necessity. Therefore, I take it that
assuming a necessary relation in a principle risks begging the question. If Truthmaker
Necessitarianism is the case, it must be established, not assumed. If this principle cannot be
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These are, of course metaphysical arguments, but there are also formal difficulties which count against this
approach of possible worlds as truthmakers for modal propositions. Most notably, if the truthmaker relation is
simply the relation between worlds and propositions on Cameron’s view, this raises Kaplan’s Paradox. Kaplan’s
Paradox in brief is that if there exists a possible world for each possible combinations of possible propositions, then
the set of worlds is the cardinality of the power set of the set of propositions. This entails that the set of worlds is a
higher cardinality than the set of propositions. However, each world can be specified by a proposition (e.g. “world w
exists”), then worlds and propositions have a 1 to 1 correspondence and so have the same cardinality. The set of
worlds cannot have both the same and a higher cardinality than the set of propositions, and so we have a
contradiction. It is unclear how Cameron’s proposal for grounding the truth of propositions in the existence of
worlds could handles this paradoxical relationship between worlds and sets.
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established, then its lack must be accepted and reckoned with. To explore this principle, we must
establish the relation between the dispositional metaphysics of objects and powers and their role
as truthmakers for modal propositions. In other words, if the relationship between a truthmaker
and a truth-bearer is necessary, it is so by the nature of objects and powers (this question will not
be fully addressed until Chapter 4).
The first of the uncontroversial conditions (for a Deleuzian) discussed by Bell and
derived from Armstrong are Truthmaker Maximalism, namely, the claim that every truth has a
truthmaker. Truthmaker Maximalism, we may say in several ways which are equivalent for this
project: there are no metaphysically fundamental truths (though there are truths about
metaphysical foundations), no truths exist which do not depend on some objects or difference
itself, and every truth implies that there is some state of affairs which can give rise to it.12 This is
consistent with the commitment to a non-reductive materialism defended in the Introduction
because to reject truthmaker maximalism would be to accept that some truths could exist
independently of any grounds. Such an independence would then imply that there are truths
which are not materially grounded. There would then exist at least one thing which was not
grounded in the material, and so materialism would be false.
The second uncontroversial (for the Deleuzian) condition is that every truth must
eventually trace back to non-propositional reality. Some truths are made true by other
propositions, but eventually, the chain of truthmakers must be grounded in non-propositional
truthmakers. This implies the lack of an isomorphism between logic and ontology argued for by
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Here it appears an infinite regress would obtain if we ask about truths about truthmakers, which we certainly
should be about to do. I take it that this regress is blocked by the fact that truths about truthmakers are grounded in
the truthmaking relation itself. The existence of a truthmaker then does not imply another truthmaker which makes
true truths about it qua truthmaker. This grounding prevents a downward regress. We may, however, continue to
iterate truths about the truthmaking relation, but this would be no different from the rule that affirming “A” means
we can affirm “A&A,” then “A&A&A,” and so on.
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Mulligan et al, 1984. Here, a clear harmony with Deleuze arises, in that he argues that what
appears does not have the same structure as that which makes it appear, or that an expression
differs from what is expressed (Deleuze also puts this in Kantian terms13: the transcendental is
not a mirror or a tracing of the empirical14). Therefore, to uphold the distinction between the
logical and the ontological (the expression and the expressed, respectively), we must avoid this
mirroring and doubling. This means that in the case of modal claims, we must ground the
possible and the necessary not in possibilia but in conditions of possibility. The conditions of
possibility must not themselves be possibilities or possibilia on pains of Platonism or begging the
question. To ground a modal claim in possibilia would be to be committed to the existence of
non-actual objects, that is, a mirror image of a real object lacking only the predicate existence, or
a possible bundle of qualities without its underlying particular. Conditions of possibility are
instead the powers which can do the work of bringing about the possibility described. A
possibility’s conditions are neither a mirror nor an image of it. The truthmakers for propositions
about possible states of affairs must be that which makes the truth of the proposition possible.
Bell argues that, following Deleuze, difference itself provides us with a ground for both nonpropositional truthmakers (because difference, in the last instance, cannot be represented without
being ‘cancelled’ or covered over by an identity) and as conditions of possibility (because
difference in itself is generative).15 It is this claim that must be worked out.

13

Deleuze, 1994, 135-144.

Those familiar with Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism will no doubt see the obvious resonances here as both
the mirroring of the logical into the ontological and the empirical into the transcendental, through either model
theory or experience, are specific examples of the wider critique. Cf. Meillassoux 2010. Meillassoux’s longing for
the ‘great outdoors’ barred by taking a given correlation as necessary is shared by this project, though the manner in
which they are sought is fundamentally different.
14
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Bell, 2016, 143.
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To say with Tarski that “’it is possible that there is a rose that is red’ is true if and only if
there is an actual red rose somewhere or that it is possible that there be a red rose somewhere” is
to cover over what it takes to make it possible that there be a red rose at all. That it be
metaphysically possible that there be a red rose is for there to be certain refraction patterns of
light, certain genetic codes, various gardening practices, beings with certain optical receptors,
and so on. None of these conditions of the possibility of the red rose are themselves red, nor
(with perhaps the exception of genetic conditions) are a rose themselves. It is not obvious prima
facie which of these are essential to the red rose, if any, and which are accidental and not
necessary for the rose to be what it is and to be possible in the first place. Certain similarities
obtain; the rose and the gardener both grow, but to say that the growing of a red rose is possible
because it is grounded in the gardener’s growth is an obvious sophism. Nor is the red rose
possible in itself because of the existence of the genetic code in a seed alone because nothing has
the power to bring itself about on its own. Much soil is inhospitable.
This is the distinction I aim to support between metaphysical and logical accounts of
modality. Logical modality studies the relations between modal propositions, models, truth
conditions, etc. Logic can be said to study possibilities themselves, whereas metaphysics must
seek the conditions of possibility. The greater difficulty arises when we take those logical
relations themselves as a part of our metaphysics, and they therefore must themselves have
conditions of possibility. Again, to avoid Platonism or begging the question, these conditions
must not themselves be possibilities. That is, what grounds these logical relations must be those
entities already found to be metaphysically acceptable, here contingent objects. As the entailment
relations between a logic or a set of axioms and its theorems do not change; those relations are
necessary. We are then faced with the issue of grounding necessary truths in contingent objects.
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B. Grounding Necessary Truths on Objects
To work out a solution to the problem of grounding necessary truths in objects alone, let
us begin simply with the claim that there are objects which have powers that can be manifested
in degrees (e.g. lungs that can take in more or less air, combustible chemicals which can burn
more or less brightly, democracies that are more or less just, and so on). This starting point is
directly in line with the position of Dispositionalism in analytic modal metaphysics,16 and so we
may begin there, both making use of some of their tools but also entering into debates of how
dispositions may ground necessary truths. There is no shortage of different accounts of
dispositions for the use of modality. For the sake of avoiding side debates, let us take a general
account, one which can accommodate the main features which will be found in the work of
various different Dispositionalists. Vetter 2015 gives an admirably succinct account of
dispositions in terms of potentiality: dispositions are individuated by their manifestation (a
disposition is what it manifests) and a disposition is best understood as a possibility to do
something.17 I would like to make a modification to this account as a starting point. We should
not take a disposition to be what it is based on its manifestation, but that the manifestation is
evidence of a disposition. As Deleuze and Guattari put it “a state of affairs cannot be separated
from the potential through which it takes effect and without which it would have no activity or
development,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 153). In other words, a potential or a disposition does
not share an identity or similarity with what it manifests, but is the power through which a
manifestation or state of affairs comes about. It is also worth stressing here, that if propositions
are made true by states of affairs, then the truth of propositions is equally inseparable from the
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See Vetter 2011.

17

Vetter, 2015, 35.
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powers which bring it about. Seemingly identical states of affairs which differ in the powers
which bring them about will make true different propositions.
If we do not make this modification, we risk understanding a disposition as a sort of
possible copy of the manifestation, as a collection of possible properties or qualities rather than
as a positive conception of a power to do something. This would be to understand a power
representationally based on its manifestations. Whatever my disposition to jump is, it is not to be
confused with any particular manifestation of jumping, nor with the set of all jumps I actually
take (this would be the actual series of jumps made). This disposition is also not the same as the
set of all possible jumps I could take, though the disposition does delimit that set; that is, a jump
is either possible or impossible based on if that disposition can be manifested in a way which
achieves that specific possible jump or not. On the other hand, my jumping should be taken as
evidence of the existence of a disposition or power to jump.
The reality of dispositions requires we posit an excess to them over their manifestations.
For instance, a disposition does not need to ever be manifest to be affirmed as real, nor, as we
will see, does it need to be manifested to have an effect, at least indirectly, on other objects. We
affirm dispositions as equally as real as their manifestations, but were the disposition to only
have effects on other objects by way of its manifestations, there would be no reason to posit
them. Nor does something need to be manifestable to be a disposition.18 In other words, there
might exist a disposition which we somehow know about, but which we do not know what its
manifestation would be like. Debates over what exactly spin qua property of quantum particles is
may be an example of this, and we will see below how something like a center of gravity is an
unmanifestable disposition. An object may have powers that could be manifested only were it in
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For general arguments in defense of this, see Jenkins and Nola, 2009. I will defend a version of this claim below
as a particularly useful feature of the virtual.
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a radically different world with different laws of physics.19 This claim that there are dispositions
which cannot be manifested may seem odd given that dispositions are to ground possibility, but
it clearly follows from a truthmaker account of dispositions that there need not be (nor should we
expect there to be) a 1-to-1 correspondence between potential manifestations of a disposition and
possible states of affairs. We will see how this oddity is useful for grounding in hyperintensional
contexts below.
The reader familiar with Dispositionalism will notice that this lacks one of the common
features of such accounts: Vetter’s account of potentiality does not assume that dispositions have
stimulus conditions. A stimulus condition is a specification of the state(s) of affairs under which
the disposition will manifest. If a song has the disposition ‘catchy’, then when heard by a listener
(stimulus condition), the song will be stuck in the listener’s head well after the recording has
finished (manifestation of the disposition ‘catchy’). On accounts with stimulus conditions,
dispositions take on the structure of a counterfactual conditional (‘if this were the case, then this
possibility would have followed’). Vetter argues that this leaves the connection between
dispositions as a metaphysical category and conditionals as a syntactical structure mysterious.
This mystery would be a major problem as explaining how counterfactual claims have a certain
truth value is one of the central motivations for adopting a Dispositionalist account.20 While
there are more questions about the grounding of specific types of claims about possibilities in
objects and their dispositions, it is at least prima facie plausible given the connection between a
disposition as what something can do and possibility as grounded in what can bring a thing or
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As many dispositionalists, myself included, hold that the laws of physics depend on the conjunction of the
dispositions of objects in this universe, and so were the cosmos arranged differently with different objects, its laws
would be different, this possibility of manifesting powers only under other sets of physical laws can be earnestly
said to depend on thoroughly this-worldly properties.
20

Vetter, 2015, 33-5.
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event about. We should first ask whether this account can plausibly ground claims of necessity
since this is much less obvious.
C. Dispositions and Necessity
I argue that while no object itself can ground necessary truths, difference itself can
ground such truths. I will also argue that such a notion of difference itself is already implicitly
assumed in the claim that there are objects with dispositions. This requires the explication of a
notion of positive difference, rather than difference as lack, dissimilarity, or other such negative
or dependent notions of difference. We are then led to ask what sorts of differences are there?
Though we will later on explore the existence of abstract objects, we have begun by positing
only concrete objects with powers. Therefore, we can only ask what differences are there relative
to these objects and powers. There are at least three: the differences between objects (actuality),
the difference(s) between an object’s dispositions (intensity), and the differences between
dispositions themselves (virtuality). We will see in chapter 3 why it might be preferable to add a
fourth: the difference between an object and its powers (multiplicity). As we are seeking positive
difference, it will become clear that difference is not “between” at all, but rather underneath,
making these objects and powers what they are and covering over itself by generating objects,
qualities, extensive magnitudes, etc. The inherent dynamism of objects will then raise questions
of change, emergence, and generation as well as questions of stability, reduction, and sterility.
Finally, since we cannot accept metaphysical necessity as simply ‘true in all possible worlds’ (as
this would be to ignore the logical/ontological gap), we are led to seek more specific truthmakers
for modal and mathematical propositions among the ineliminable or unchanging aspects of this
metaphysics of fundamental difference. This will be the work of the rest of the dissertation.
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First, we must set up the problem to be addressed: the grounding of necessary truths in
dispositions. This will be approached through a recent debate between Yates, who argues
dispositions cannot ground necessary truths in a way which is adequate to the demands of formal
modal logics, and Vetter, who provides a justification to reject Yates’s criticism. I will then
argue that Vetter’s response already implicitly includes a commitment to a positive account of
difference. I will then draw out the consequences of accepting positive difference for the
Dispositionalist grounding of necessary truths in objects and powers.
Let us turn to the debate. An object alone does not make true all the true statements that
can be said of it. Some truths implicate other objects, and some statements, while true, say more
about the speaker than the object spoken of. A necessary truth can be said of any object at all,
and yet those particular objects do not make it true. Yates 2014 charges Dispositionalists with
failing to make precisely this distinction. If we are to ground modality on objects and their
powers, then in order to say that claims like those of arithmetic (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4) are necessarily
true, then there must be some sort of power to make it the case that 2 + 2 equals 4, and this
power must always be manifested. Ideally, the power is not only always manifested, but
necessarily always manifested. It doesn’t just happen to be the case that some object somewhere
made 2 + 2 equal 4 for all time. There must also be an explanation for why it could not just as
easily made it the case that 2 + 2 = 4 is false. Yates claims that no such powers exist, and that, in
principle, mathematical truths are not the sorts of things that are made true by powers. If this is
the case, then it is not just a problem for Dispositionalist metaphysics in that it could not ground
necessary truths of a certain sort, but also for Dispositionalism as a semantics for modal logic
because certain valid entailment relations would have counterexamples in the model. For
example, if it is possible that the power which makes it true that 2+2=4 could stop manifesting,
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then it is possible that 2 + 2 = 4 is false. However, if 2 + 2 = 4 is a necessary truth, then it is not
possible that it be false. We then have a contradiction. Therefore, Yates charges,
Dispositionalism leads to a contradiction where there should be none, and so fails as a semantics
for modal logic. I leave aside the formal details here because it follows trivially that if powers
can do what Yates claims they cannot, then the issues of entailment can be solved.
To defeat this requires an account of dispositions which explains both how there can
indeed be a power that makes it true, continuing with Yates’s example, that 2 + 2 = 4, but also
makes it necessarily true; in other words, how can there be a power which cannot fail to make it
the case that 2 + 2 = 4. Vetter (2018) responds to Yates’s charge of the formal inadequacy of
Dispositionalism by embracing and strengthening a position which Yates entertains as a possible
objection to his criticism: the plenitude of powers. This position, roughly, is the claim that
powers which can be necessarily always manifested can exist. Yates rejects this position as either
excessive (every power then becomes a truthmaker for necessary truths) or ad hoc (the positing
of powers or objects for no reason other than to fill out the metaphysical grounds and make the
books look nice, as it were). The plenitude of powers position as envisioned by Yates is one in
which there does indeed exist the power of 2 + 2 = 4 and that it is necessary because everything
is always manifesting such a power. Both Vetter and Yates accept that this would be an
unacceptable modal bloat. Adding a power for each necessary truth to our ontology, predicating
that power of all objects, and adding that each object is always manifesting all of those powers
would demand extraordinary justification to accept. In taking up the plenitude of powers
position, Vetter sharpens the position by arguing that it would be enough to defeat Yates’s
criticism if any one object has an always manifested disposition which makes it the case that
2 + 2 = 4 (and that nothing exists which has the power to make it such that ¬(2 + 2 = 4)). Here
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Vetter splits the objection in two: can there be powers which are necessarily always manifesting
(the ‘necessary manifestation’ challenge) and what objects could be the bearers of such powers
(the ‘whose powers’ challenge), (Vetter, 2018, 5)? Vetter argues that such powers are in
principle possible, but remains agnostic as to what sorts of objects or powers actually fit the bill
of grounding necessary truths like those of mathematics.
If Yates’s challenge is that the objects proposed to have the powers in question are ad
hoc, then abstract objects would fail to answer this charge because positing abstract objects with
no justification other than filling out one’s ontology is blatantly ad hoc. The ad hoc charge
revolves around the epistemic access to modal grounds that Dispositionalists, as a species of
Actualist, claim as a virtue. Actualists argue that modal facts (that is, things which are true in
some possible world) are grounded in the actual world. Dispositionalists take this a step further
and argue that it is not just the actual world, but more specifically in the dispositions of things
which exist in the actual world. Furthermore, Dispositionalists hold that modal claims can (or
must) be empirically investigated by examining actual objects. Dispositionalists cite this as a
virtue of their position versus fictionalist and realist positions which investigate modality by way
of a priori reflection or via conceivability criteria (Williamson 2016, Contessa 2010). If recourse
is made to objects which are empirically inaccessible, such as the abstract objects in question,
then the Dispositionalist betrays one of their cardinal virtues. One might here embrace an
empiricism about numbers or other such entities in response. However, on these empiricist
accounts, numbers are not generally thought of as the sorts of things that have powers. Therefore,
unless given independent reasons for proposing the existence of abstract objects with powers,
proposing such objects as the truthmakers for necessary truths remains ad hoc.
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The ontological restrictions on this claim of grounding in objects and dispositions must
be made explicit. I maintain that no actual, concrete object is itself necessary. These restrictions
are meant to specify the constraints on the fundamental ontology of Dispositionalism so as to be
clear about what would and would not be ad hoc. Put simply, anything that exists can be
otherwise than it is, or it could not be at all. This position bars two sorts of oft-proposed bearers
of dispositions. First, it bars god or any other necessary existent which would then ground all
necessary and possible truths (such a divine proposal is supported by Pruss 2002). Second, it bars
abstract objects such as the numbers 2 and 4, the infinite Euclidean plane, or the Platonic Form
of justice, from grounding necessary truths of mathematics that refer to or are about these
objects. I have no qualms with calling these abstract entities objects, nor claims that they may
exist (especially as this work claims to account for their genesis), but we cannot use them to
ground necessary truths without begging the question or raising Yates’s charge of ‘adhocery.’ In
rejecting a fundamental role for these objects, we must also see what ontological leak they were
meant to patch. In Dispositionalist accounts which posit something like the abstract object 4 and
its power of equaling 2+2, they do so only because of the implicit requirement that a power must
be the power of an object. If we reject this assumption, a new range of powers is made available
for explanation: powers which exist due to there being different objects. A power of this sort is
only possible given several different objects. In other words, in order for such a power to exist, it
requires the existence of different objects, and so therefore it cannot be said to be the power of
any one object. In what follows, I will argue from powers which exist only so long as there is a
difference between objects (that is, they are not powers of an object) to powers which exist due
to any difference at all (i.e., they are not powers of any object). Since these powers only depend
on difference, they can rightfully be called powers of difference itself.
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Certain dispositions require more than being the disposition of an object in order to exist.
Consider a heatsink. A heatsink regulates a device’s temperature by passively conducting heat
away from where it is generated. To be able to act as a heatsink (to be an object with the right
dispositions to serve as a heatsink, for example, in a computer) requires that the object have a
certain thermal conductivity and other such properties which are indeed properties of that object.
However, this is not enough. The dispositions which make something a good or bad heatsink for
a specific environment also depend on that object’s difference from the system of which it is a
part. For example, is it hotter than the external environment? Is it significantly better at
dissipating heat than the object for which it is a heatsink? “Cooler than” and “better at dissipating
heat than” are not dispositions that can be said of an object in itself, nor are these mere
comparisons made by a human observer. If these and other specifications do not obtain, then the
object will not have the power to act as a heatsink by cooling the part it is connected to by
dissipating heat to the wider environment. In order to predicate a real disposition of an object, we
cannot simply rest on an ungrounded hypothetical either: to say of something that it could be a
potential heatsink in such and such an environment which does not actually obtain would be only
to predicate a mere Cambridge property of that object.21 We could, of course, through
understanding the dispositions of an object say that it can, counterfactually, operate as a heatsink
in such and such an environment, but that is not to say it has a particular power, only that it could
acquire it given certain circumstances. Nor is it the specific differences the heatsink actually has,
as it may still function as a heatsink were the parts of the computer replaced with parts of
different materials (as long as they remain within a certain threshold of specific heat). There are

The distinction between Cambridge and ‘proper’ properties is a hazy one, but has intuitive examples. If Einstein
thought about a sink on a Tuesday in 1912, the property ‘being thought by such and such on such a day’ is only a
Cambridge property of the sink; it is not a real property of the sink itself. However, the sink is presumable concave,
and so concavity is a proper or real property of the sink.
21
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then dispositions which exist only insofar as the difference between an object and its
environment is maintained.
These dispositions are not yet grounds of necessary truths nor are these powers of
difference itself. The powers such as that of the heatsink still depend in no small part on what the
object is itself, on what are called dispositional essences. A dispositional essence is the collection
of dispositions which are necessary to be the specific thing that something is. However, we see
how accepting certain differences as essential for the existence of some powers suggests a
spectrum of the degrees to which a power depends on difference. This spectrum would shade
from powers dependent on identity to those grounded in pure difference. By a power grounded in
identity, I mean a power said of the dispositional essence of the object or any such criteria for
identity alone, such as an electron’s charge (this will be explicated in Chapter 4). By a power
grounded in pure difference, I mean a power that is said to exist on the mere fact of there being
difference at all. We will not say that something is a dispositional essence of difference for two
reasons: (1) essence is tied to identity and difference itself does not have an identity, and (2)
essences are predicated of objects and difference itself is not an object. The identity pole is
already generally accepted by Actualists: there are powers which are essential to what a thing is,
to be that thing is to have a certain power or powers. The object has those powers in virtue of it
being the thing that it is.
Let us continue working our way across this spectrum from identity towards powers of
pure difference. In addition to dispositional essences, there are also powers of identity which are
not themselves essential. Let us call these powers of aggregates, and let us distinguish powers of
aggregates from powers of difference in terms of truthmakers. We can separate these two types
of powers by taking the aggregate objects as if they were a single object. If the aggregate taken
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as a single object remains a truthmaker for the possibility in question, then the power(s) that
make it possible are not powers of difference but of identity or similarity. For instance, if we
want to know whether a certain weight of sand can break a wooden plank when dropped on it, it
does not matter whether the power to break the plank is the power of many objects or of one to
make true the proposition “this weight can break that plank.” Nothing here depends directly on
the differences between the grains of sand and so either the individual objects or the collective
whole can stand equally well as truthmaker for that proposition.
Taking something as a whole versus taking it as an aggregate of parts does, however,
affect whether the object(s) can stand as truthmaker(s) for propositions which require a
difference between objects. This is not to say that the way we mentally carve up the world grants
these powers, much the reverse. It is to say that were these objects to fuse into a single object
with no real, positive difference between them, then there would be no way for certain truths to
be true. For instance, a single object cannot stand as a truthmaker for “2 + 2 = 4” even though its
unfused parts could have. That is, the way the world is carved up, or as we will see in more detail
next chapter, the processes by which the cosmos carves itself up, constrains what truths there can
be. With the erasure of difference then comes the loss of certain powers, those powers which are
lost when parts fuse into the whole. These powers which depend on there being differences
between objects are not free-floating; they still depend on there being concrete existing objects.
We have, by example of the heatsink above, seen that these powers of identity are not all the
powers there are. This is, I think, already implicitly accepted by essentialists. Essentialists accept
this since were there no such powers essential to an object, such as an electron’s charge, there
would not exist any ‘accidental’ properties which could be separated from essential ones. Such a
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separation between accidental and essential properties is one of the major motivations for
essentialist approaches in the first place, (see Fine 1994).
Let us set aside this language of the accidental and the essential for now and instead refer
to the powers like those of the heatsink as powers of qualitative difference. That is, these are
powers which exist due to a difference in qualities among the objects grouped together. Given
this movement from powers of identity to powers which require some particular difference in
qualities, we can begin to see what the other pole of this spectrum must be like. These would be
powers which exist only due to the existence of difference, irrespective of the objects which
differ. These can be said to be powers of numerical difference. By powers of numerical
difference, I mean these powers which do not depend on the specific differences between any
specific objects, but instead result from the difference in number of objects. They arise from
objects, but not the qualities or specific properties of those objects. Take two sets of two apples.
Nothing of appleness (their qualitative difference) makes them 4, nothing of their individual
particularity or haecceity makes them 4, nor any other beings’ powers to group them closer
together, not even each apple’s unity as one thing makes them four. To say that this is the
difference of any one of the apples itself would be absurd. Instead, the existence of numerical
difference between the apples stands as the truthmaker for the proposition “two apples plus two
apples is equal to four apples.”
We have not yet reached the far pole of the spectrum of powers which depend on identity
and those which depend on difference. We began at essential identity, what could be called pure
identity, but we have not yet reached pure difference. Here we must show that neither qualitative
nor numerical difference capture all of what differences there are. Furthermore, we must show
how this pure difference demands that we understand difference as primary to identity. This
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dependence of identity on difference implies the inadequacy of our metaphor of a spectrum of
identity and difference. Identity and difference are not co-primordial principles giving rise to the
shades between them. Instead, once we have explicated difference in itself, it will be shown how
even ‘pure’ identity is metaphysically dependent on difference.
D. Powers, Intensity and the Argument for Difference in Itself
The idea of difference itself, a pure difference, positive difference, difference prior to
identity, whatever one may call it, is admittedly obscure, as it is to say difference is the sort of
thing which itself has or gives rise to powers. It is especially strange to say as well that
difference itself is not an object, despite giving rise to powers. Doing so breaks with the
Dispositionalist and Actualist strands of analytic metaphysics because difference itself is not an
object, it is not itself a power, and (here we have to be careful of equivocations) difference
exceeds what is actual. However, by making use of some of Deleuze’s arguments, we can see
this positive notion of difference lurking implicitly though unnoticed already in these accounts.
Let us first show how numerical and qualitative difference fail to be difference itself.
Take the case of numerical difference first. Numerical difference depends on numerical identity.
Everything is numerically identical to itself (it is counted as one, as that one thing it is, and so
assumes the Law of Identity). Numerical difference exists between things which cannot be
counted as the same one thing. The truths which arise from numerical difference then require that
first moment of self-identity.
Let’s now consider whether qualitative difference could be difference itself. Qualitative
difference depends on qualitative identity. Things are said to be qualitatively identical when they
share the same quality. The stop sign and the cardinal are qualitatively identical in terms the
quality of redness they share. They are qualitatively different in terms of the qualities they do not
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share (e.g. ‘metalness’ or ‘birdness’). Qualitative differences then obtain between things which
already have their own identities, and so qualitative differences cannot be a fundamental
difference. Since both qualitative and numerical difference depend on a prior identity, neither
qualitative nor numerical difference can be said be difference in itself (Moore, 2012, 554).
Given our ontology of contingent objects and their powers, it is only objects and powers
which can be said to be identical. This entails that any identity is as contingent as the objects of
which it can be said. Therefore, identity cannot ground necessary truths. It does not matter for
arithmetic if any particular object is necessarily self-identical because that necessity ceases to be
along with its object. Therefore, self-identity is not a strong enough relative necessity to firmly
ground the truths of mathematics. The specific truths of arithmetic may be grounded in
numerical difference and the structures implied by it, but if we stop there, we cannot ground how
such truths are necessary. Numerical difference depends on the existence of objects which differ;
that is, it is a secondary difference like qualitative difference, not the difference metaphysically
prior to identity that we follow Deleuze in arguing for. Since numerical difference depends on
the identity of objects, and objects are contingent, they alone cannot ground a necessary truth
because they both could be otherwise. There must then be something more primary to both
numerical difference and the objects which depends on it. It is this primary difference that we
call pure difference or difference in itself, and it is the powers which depend on this difference
for their existence which can provide the grounds for necessary truth. Powers of pure difference,
then, depend only on the sort of positive difference which we are arguing is metaphysically
primary. They are not the powers of objects at all.
Here one may object that either difference is not the sort of thing that can have powers or
difference itself must be reified into an object which then has the powers claimed. If the former
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claim in the disjunct holds, then the proposal is thrown right out. If the second holds, then this
proposal breaks its promise to account for necessary truths without inflating the
Dispositionalist’s ontology beyond concrete, actual objects. The object ‘difference itself’ of
which can be predicated all the powers of arithmetic (at least) would clearly be as abstract and
non-actual an object as could be (to say nothing of being ad hoc!).
I take this objection to be the result of an ill-formed notion of difference as only the
differences between individual objects, that is, as reducible to either qualitative or numerical
difference. This follows from misreading claims that two objects are different as claims about the
differences between two objects. This misreading implies a relative notion of difference (as any
difference will only be the difference between some two or more things and so will depend
entirely on what those two or more differing things are). We may also call this the negative
conception of difference because difference, on this account, is understood as a ‘not that.’ While
I used this sort of difference above as a steppingstone to difference itself, it was shown that
difference in itself is different in kind from the difference between specific objects. If one takes
difference to be purely negative, formal adequacy cannot be recovered as we could only establish
that the differences between objects do not allow for the power to make it such that ¬(2 + 2 = 4),
but we could not establish powers which make 2 + 2 = 4 true. Yates’s objection would still stand.
In fact, negative difference might even lose the material adequacy the Dispositionalist seeks as
whether or not the difference between any objects is such that it makes ¬(2 + 2 = 4) true becomes
an empirical matter of comparing every object with every other to see if their differences gives
rise to such a power or not. A positive notion of difference which is not an object itself is then
required for the Dispositionalist to make sense of necessary truths without inflating their
fundamental ontology (as any Dispositionalist with more than one object in their ontology will
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have already implicitly assumed difference exists), and it must be established how it can meet the
objection above.
Deleuze’s metaphysics stands on a notion of fundamental, positive, and productive
difference: “everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of
level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity” (Deleuze, 1994, 222).
Here we have an obvious point of contact with a feature of objects to which many
Dispositionalists are committed: degrees of the manifestation of dispositions. It is useful to begin
here both because it does not require positing anything beyond actual objects and their
dispositions, and it avoids the pitfalls of reducing difference in general to the difference between
specific objects. Focusing on objects alone risks making talk of difference itself sound like talk
of negative difference. We can more easily see this positive notion of difference already at work
in the difference of degrees in powers. These degrees of a power are central to Vetter’s argument
for powers which can ground necessary truths (Vetter, 2018, 6-10). The power itself is, in some
strong sense, these differences of degrees. Heating up is the disposition to increase in degrees of
temperature, and so is a power to undergo this difference from one degree to another due to a
certain input of energy. Moore’s overview of Deleuze’s metaphysics of positive difference
begins with these same sorts of degrees (Moore, 2012, 557). Deleuze’s term for this positive
difference which makes such degrees possible is “intensity.” The following argument aims to
establish that understanding such degrees of manifestation requires the positive notion of
difference argued for above.
The Dispositionalist accepts that degrees of a disposition exist, or else they could not
ground modal claims without then positing a specific disposition for each potential degree (e.g.
“it is possible that if x amount of energy is added to substance y it will raise z degrees in
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temperature”). This falls to Occam’s Razor as it would be an obvious modal bloat which merely
doubles the terms of the theory and explains nothing. The question is then in what way do these
degrees exist? Generally, they are conceived of as degrees of a power ordered by relationships of
more or less (e.g. hotter or colder, more or less combustible) and so exist in potential, in some
sense. It is precisely this point (i.e. what it is to exist as an ordered potential) that must be worked
out. It is a truism to say that degrees both differ (it is different to have a temperature of 100
degrees Kelvin vs 101 degrees Kelvin), and are similar (they are both degrees of a disposition of
the same object). What is under question is which grounds which. The Deleuzian approach is to
ground similarity on that which differs. This is in opposition to the majority of the history of
Western philosophy which attempts to ground difference on similarity and rejects the idea that
difference is the sort of thing which could exist positively. To say difference is only ever
negative, or is only ever the differences between specific objects, is to say identity grounds
difference (what something is explains how it is different), or that only similars can be said to
differ (Deleuze, 1994, 116). To say difference is positive is to claim that something’s identity is
grounded in difference, or that it is only differences which can be similar. That this is the case for
degrees is easily shown.
Let us start with a reductio. If one rejects the grounding of degrees in difference, then one
is positing the existence of those degrees simultaneously. Dispositions with degrees involve the
way in which an object moves from one degree to another. If difference is grounded in identity,
then in order for there to be a difference between, say, an object at 95F and that same object at
96F, then those degrees must exist first in order to give rise to the difference between them. This
is because if it is only similars that differ, we must first have the similars. This is clearly
mistaken as it treats the different degrees as if actual. One might then try to save a grounding in

67

identity by saying each degree is a different power. This is clearly both formally problematic and
materially false in that we do not find an object containing all its potential degrees of
temperature, but rather as having a specific heat22 which describes its disposition to be heated or
cooled alongside whatever particular temperature is currently manifest. Were each degree its
own power, we should expect discontinuities; now an object actualizes its power of 95K and then
a moment later immediately actualizes its power of 80K. This is clearly absurd as such change is
continuous in any real case. And again, both would raise the problem of modal bloat without any
gain in explanatory power.
One might respond that this does not make the case that degrees of a power imply a
grounding in difference itself, but only establishes that degrees of a power cannot themselves be
fundamental. For the sake of argument, let us propose that there is some other way of grounding
degrees. Grant the existence of a dispositional essence of the object. We then must still ask what
makes the degree what it is, what is it to actualize 100 degrees Kelvin rather than 101 degrees
Kelvin? If we cannot make use of difference positively, say, here a difference within the
dispositional essence of an object or of its material parts, then we are forced to again posit an
identity for each individual degree. Therefore, every degree of a power would require its own
essence which makes it the degree that it is. There would be an essence of 100 degrees Kelvin,
of 101 degrees Kelvin, and so on. We would then be in a similar problem as that of the above,
namely that inferring from our formalism to our ontology inflates our ontology greatly. Such a
mistake would only arise from taking the quantified presentation of temperature as degrees rather
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I mean specific heat in the thermodynamic sense of a property of a material that describes the energy it takes to
raise an amount of a given substance a degree of temperature, not in the sense of having a particular temperature or
other possible colloquial reading.
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than the phenomenon of temperature itself as existing.23 Instead, we may say with Deleuze that
what it is to be any degree is to be different than the previous degree (and so something is first
different before it can be expressed as differences of degree of some quality), and be so ordered
as more or less. Therefore, the Dispositionalist who makes use of degrees is already implicitly
using positive difference to ground modal facts.
Furthermore, it is precisely the unique form of change that we see in the movement from
one degree to another that historically gives rise to the notion of intensity as a Medieval concept
with Aristotelean roots (Mader 2014). When an object’s temperature raises, a new degree is not
“added on,” rather the object’s temperature has intensified to the next degree. Since there is no
degree waiting somewhere to be added, it is rather the change itself, the difference from degree
to degree which constitutes the degrees in the first place. All of this, I claim, is implied if we
accept the existence of degrees of manifestation of a power.
The above defeats the first part of the objection: the claim that powers cannot or should
not be said of difference itself. However, it risks falling into the second part of the disjunction.
To avoid this, it must then be established that positive difference cannot be an object. This is
simple if abstract. An object must be individuated to be an object, but difference itself cannot be
individuated. To individuate difference is to claim to have an identity of difference. If that
identity is taken as primary, then we fall into the problems of negative difference explicated
above, that is, difference only understood as being different from something else (here difference
from the identity of difference). If, on the other hand, there is a primary difference which has its
own identity, then it could not account for anything which is different from it. And so, whatever
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As Mader 2017 argues, this confusion is a common mistake even among Deleuze scholars as it presents intensive
properties in extensive terms, which, while useful for scientific endeavors, we should be careful to not let this lead
us astray metaphysically.

69

else it may be, difference itself cannot be an object. Because of this, it is equally appropriate to
talk of difference in either the singular or the plural (‘difference makes possible…’, ‘the
differences of degrees…’).
We can then make use of this type of power, that is powers of pure difference or
difference itself, without adding anything to the Dispositionalist’s ontology. In other words,
“difference” itself is not added to our ontology; difference is already implied as long as we either
have more than one object (I do not know of any Dispositionalists who are neo-Parmenideans as
well, though surely there is one), more than one disposition, or we accept that there is a
difference between an object and its disposition(s). Difference is then ineliminable. It is only
these powers, powers which result from any difference at all, that can give rise to necessary
truths. If these powers of pure difference are rightly called dispositions, then they fit the
explanatory role of necessarily always manifesting dispositions which Vetter defends, though
with an important caveat. Difference itself is not the sort of thing which goes away, turns off and
on, has stimulus conditions, etc., and so its dispositions thereby as necessary as difference itself.
The caveat we must add is that it is mistaken to understand these powers as always manifesting.
To do so would reduce the reality of powers to their manifestations, but that would be to reduce
the efficacy of powers to the actual. This mistaken reduction results from a representational
understanding of powers as in terms of what they appear as, not as what they are. Manifestation
is how powers appear, but powers equally have an explanatory role to play qua powers,
regardless of their current manifestation. This role is the structural nature of powers, the
explication of which we leave to our account of Deleuze’s category of the virtual below.
Surprisingly, the relative necessity of difference itself is a strong enough necessity to
fully ground any necessary claim without being an absolute necessity. That is, as long as there is
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a cosmos, there will be difference, and so there will be the necessary truths of mathematics. Yet
this is a relative or dependent necessity. If there is no cosmos, if there is no difference, there will
be no necessary truths. This is a glimpse of a robust realism beyond Platonism. Those who want
the truths of mathematics to be absolutely necessary will find this lacking, but for a materialist,
this is clearly the strongest form of necessity that can be expected. We have then answered
Vetter’s “whose powers’?” question: in an ontology of contingent objects and their powers,
necessary truths can be grounded on difference itself. This must be explicated.
E. The Intensive as a Modal Notion
We have so far established two important theses: truthmakers need not ‘resemble’ the
truths made (which entails that true propositions need not ‘represent’ what grounds their truth),
and that, in principle, an ontology of contingent objects can ground some necessary truths as
long as we recognize the positive powers of difference itself. What must be done now is
explicate the various ways in which such differences act as truthmakers for modal propositions.
Difference in general is found at three levels: intensive, actual, and virtual. Let us begin with the
intensive as it has already been established, and then derive the other two.
As seen above, the intensive aspect of objects allows us to ground claims of possibility in
explicitly well-ordered ways because intensities are structured, ordered differences of degrees.
These are the differences that underlie dispositions, and so can be made use of modally. That is,
intensity gives grounds for possibility. That these differences are ineliminable (a quality can
always be more or less intense) means that the order between degrees are preserved such that
intensity can play a grounding role not for ‘atomic’ or isolated possibilities, but for possibilities
in their nearness and closeness. In formal terms, intensity provides grounds for the accessibility
relations between worlds. There is not an immediate bridge from the intensive to intensional
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logics, but Williamson 2016 has provided a mediate bridge. As DeLanda 2002 points out,
intensities in the sciences are often rendered through the use of state spaces, and Deleuze makes
use of terms from the mathematics of state spaces in his metaphysics.24 A state space is a
mathematical description of the potential arrangements of the parts of a system, the possible
speeds of the parts, and other such relevant information. There are a number of dimensions to the
state space equal to the number of degrees of freedom of the system, and each point on the state
space represents a possible arrangement with each value at that point describing a value for the
corresponding degree of freedom. If the values of each degree of freedom are correlated to the
truth values of propositions, then each point can be seen as a world in the formal semantics sense
(each point is a state of affairs, and is maximal in that it has a value for each proposition).
Williamson 2016 then shows that state spaces provide a complete semantics for modal logics
(again, the details of this logic are unimportant, but the connection is made through the temporal
aspects of state spaces and temporal logics).25 In other words, intensity can ground state space
descriptions, and state spaces can provide a semantics for canonical modal logic. This connection
also reinforces the Dispositionalist’s claim that modality can and should be studied empirically.
This is because we have a bridge from a metaphysical category (intensity), through its physical
manifestations (e.g. thermodynamics) and attendant scientific tools (state spaces), to modal logic
(through taking state spaces as its semantics).

DeLanda, 2002, 27. Deleuze’s explication of his concept of a multiplicity makes use of terms such as
‘singularity,’ ‘ordinary points,’ ‘dimensions of freedom’, and so on, which are central to the mathematics of state
spaces. DeLanda 2002 argues that such mathematics are necessary to understanding Deleuze’s concept of
multiplicity. Furthermore, ‘multiplicity’ is one of the few terms that Deleuze maintains across his oeuvre, from
Bergonism to his late work, What is Philosophy?, and so has a central place in Deleuze’s metaphysics.
24
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As a second piece of evidence for this, there is a longer traditional of topological semantics for modal logics
began by McKinsey and Tarski (1944), in which logicians and mathematicians continue to work today despite it not
enjoying success comparable to the widespread adoption of Kripke semantics (for example, see Awody and Kishida,
2008, or Coniglio and Prieto-Sanabria, 2017).
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This is hardly enough to ground all of the modal information potentially available. It is
not clear that intensity alone can ground the entirety of logical possibility, and this approach even
risks collapsing metaphysical possibility into physical possibility. Looking from the other
direction, certainly necessary truths differ (“2 + 2 = 4” is different from “profit is unpaid labor”
even if both can be expressed purely mathematically), yet possible worlds semantics cannot
distinguish these claims. It is different to be a truth of arithmetic and to be a truth of economics,
but possible worlds semantics is formally incapable of expressing this difference in a way that
maintains it as a difference. In Kripke semantics for formal modal logic, to be necessarily true is
to be true in all possible worlds, and identity is modeled as substitution salva veritate (that is,
either proposition can be substituted for the other in any context without changing truth values).
Since these mathematical truths are both true in all possible worlds, then either can be exchanged
for the other without affecting which worlds they are true in. Therefore, they are formally
identical, and thereby indistinguishable within the logical structure. It is also not clear that such
distinctions can be made in intensive terms. The difference between these truths is not one of
greater or lesser intensity. Rather, these differences insist as what must be in what is. These are,
in Dispositionalist terms, not just the difference of degrees of manifestation of a power (the
intensive for Deleuze), but the differences between powers and the objects of which they are the
powers. In Deleuzian terms, this is the virtual aspect of objects.
F. The Virtual – Reality without Actuality
Accepting the intensive raises the issue of where else do differences make differences
and how do these differences give rise to identities and similarities? The various degrees of
qualities of an object are not isolated; the very work of the sciences is finding their coordinations. Changing the pressure of a container may not only heat up or cool down an object, it
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may change that object’s boiling and freezing points. Such co-ordinations bring us from
difference as constituting the order of degrees to difference as constituting structure and
singularities. Structure here means the totality of relations of differences (differential relations)
internal to some system or object. Singularities are unique points of change or ‘interesting’
points (these are often cashed out in mathematical examples such as changes in inflection in
differential equations (often zeros in second derivatives) or attractors in topological spaces).26
Singularity and Structure are the twin aspects of the virtual. That water has a boiling point of 100
C at roughly one atmosphere of pressure is a matter of intensities. It is an intensive co-ordination.
That water will have a boiling point whose determination is related to pressure, volume, etc. is
virtual. One could think of the virtual as the intensive abstracted from all information of the
initial conditions of a system. The virtual is then a truthmaker for a claim such as “any substance
will necessarily have a boiling point.” We must clarify this to make sure that we do not
mistakenly understand the virtual in terms of identity, because not only would this be an
exegetical mistake in relation to Deleuze, it would make the virtual unfit to ground necessary
truths, let alone to ground the possibility of distinguishing them for the reasons offered above.
Only difference can ground necessity.
The structure of an object is what it is because of the differential relations between its
dispositions. A boiling point is a singularity because what it is to be such a point is to be the
difference between the liquid and gaseous state of a material. In other words, it is a threshold
between two ways in which what the object can do is organized (e.g. water has different
dispositions than ice, even if both are H2O). Since this is a relation of powers, and powers are
grounded in difference, structure must be understood as these relations before it is understood as
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DeLanda, 2002, 29-30.
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any sort of identity. Since structure is a collection of differential relations, it is then also a
potential ground for necessary truths and other such modal information.
The question of the modal status of the virtual is a contentious issue. DeLanda 2002 asks
precisely this question and argues that the virtual is an independent modal category (i.e. it is
conceptually distinct from actuality, possibility, and necessity). I argue in the opposite direction.
If we take the virtual as grounding certain necessary truths, then we must reconceptualize our
understanding of necessity. To start, let us accept DeLanda's account of the virtual as adequately
expressed by the use of state spaces in that they express the ways in which the system can change
over time. 27 This leads us into an immediate dispute with the claim that intensity grounds
accessibility relations made above. To repeat, accessibility relations are relations between
possible worlds. If two worlds have an accessibility relation between them, that means what is
true at one world is true or possible in the other, and vice versa.28 That is, possibility is modeled
as truth in an accessible world. Worlds can be ordered by accessibility relations as “nearer” or
“farther,” where “nearness” means being more similar (having more of the true same
propositions in common) than farther worlds. Necessity is modeled as truth in all accessible
worlds (including the world one starts at, which is usually referred to as the actual world). The
truth of possibility and necessity then depends on which worlds are accessible.
On DeLanda's account, the virtual grounds the accessibility relation between possible
worlds.29 That is, if we know the virtual aspect of the system or object(s) we are discussing, then
each actualizable state of affairs of that virtuality can be modeled as a world, and that world has
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DeLanda, Manuel, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, (London: Continuum, 2002), 13-15.
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This is assuming symmetric accessibility relations, though one could use a model with asymmetric relations.
Doing so would not change the details of this argument.
29
DeLanda, 2002, 99-100, n59
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an accessibility relation with every other actualization. It can be shown explicitly that this is not
compatible with Deleuze’s own account of the modal character of the virtual. DeLanda's account
should be split into two claims: virtuality grounds accessibility, and compossible series link
accessible worlds and incompossible series imply the lack of an accessibility relation between
worlds.30 The first claim is a general grounding claim, and it is certainly a viable interpretation
linking the virtual with a modal formalism, as in Williamson 2016. As there is a connection
between intensive order and virtual structure, this is certainly possible. However, since the
intensive is ‘closer’ to the actual than the virtual, we might expect that it cannot explain the
wider ranges of possibilities, and so cannot ground all facts about what is and is not possible.
While I roughly agree with this claim, working out its details requires getting into some
ontological thickets. For example, if we say a unicorn is possible, we have no real intensities to
ground any claims about that, but we may be able to specify its conditions of possibility by way
of certain virtualities. If a unicorn’s proportions obey the square-cube law, if a viable genetic
code can be reverse engineered from the desired phenotype, etc., then we may say it is possible,
but these would be on virtual, not on intensive grounds. However, this would only raise an issue
if the virtual and intensive were in some strong sense metaphysically separable. Instead, what
matters here is whether or not the virtual alone can ground accessibility relations between
possible worlds.
DeLanda's second claim, that compossible series correspond to accessible worlds and
incompossible series correspond to inaccessible worlds, is in direct contradiction to Deleuze's
explication of these categories. In explicating this, there is first the (informal) semantic point.
Deleuze takes the notions of compossibility and incompossibility from Leibniz's theodicean use

30

DeLanda, 2002, 100, n59

76

of possible worlds. For Leibniz, god is the divine calculator who enumerates all conceivable
possible worlds and selects the best world from among them. The calculus available to Leibniz's
god is more restrictive than modern modal logic as certain truths exclude others (some are
'incompossible' with others) and so cannot be included in the same world. This exclusion is more
restrictive than the law of non-contradiction; that is, a possibility p can be excluded from a world
by the existence of another possibility q, where q is not equivalent to the negation of p.31 A world
is then a consistent set of possibilities (each fact in a possible world is maximally compossible
with every other fact).
Here we find a confounding equivocation which DeLanda does not address: what
Deleuze means by ‘world’ cannot be what the analytic metaphysician means by ‘world,’ though
both are heirs to Leibniz’s notion. For the analytic metaphysician, world is taken either to refer to
real existing states of affairs, or to the model theoretical entities which are sets of propositions or
some other (usually) set-theoretical construct which serves a semantic role in formal logics.
More importantly here is the accessibility relation between worlds in that worlds which are
‘incompossible’ on this account do not ‘see’ each other; they do not provide information on what

Interestingly, a similar intuition seems to animate Wittgenstein’ 1929’s rejection of the dominant model of the
proposition. In this short paper, Wittgenstein argues that degrees of intensity are internal relations, and that these
internal relations cannot be captured by the atomic propositional form of a relation between a subject and a
predicate. The reason for this is, so he argues, that degrees exclude other degrees, but do not do so by contradiction.
The subject-predicate form, on the other hand, is only capable of modeling exclusion by contradiction. This leads to
a proposal for including number within the propositional form in the case of degrees. It is not clear how this would
work formally, and the article does not compare this proposal with the more common use of formal quantification.
Wittgenstein’s proposal is offered explicitly to attempt to save an isomorphism between world and language. The
modern modal logics which would be used today to handle this issue sacrifices the intuition that intensity has a noncontradictory form of exclusion in that possible worlds semantics models such exclusions as formal contradictions.
It thereby preserves the form of the proposition which Wittgenstein challenges. Hence, the isomorphism with the
cosmos offered by possible world semantics is one with no room for the notions of compossibility and
incompossibility. We instead reject the isomorphism and aim to show how the cosmos gives rise to such diverse
models via covering over different differences.
31
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is or isn’t possible for the other. For Deleuze, however, ‘worlds’ exist here, in this cosmos.32 An
example is helpful. Deleuze describes the playing of two different scales within the same song
such that it produces dissonance as moving from one world to another world which is
incompossible with it (Deleuze, 1992b, 137). This obviously cannot be the same notion as
‘world’ in modal logic as moving between incompossible worlds is a possible occurrence for
Deleuze (anyone can play dissonant notes), but is impossible in modal logic. A ‘world’, in
Deleuze’s usage,33 is more like a type in logic or a group in mathematics. It is a collection of
things which have some common principle, symmetry, or other identifying relation (e.g. in
music, a scale is the ‘world’ of notes which are consonant, and scales are incompossible if
playing them together produces dissonance), (Deleuze, 1993, 137). In general, I will maintain the
modal logic use of ‘world’, and will instead refer to the collection of what there is as the
“cosmos” or “universe,” in distinction from “world” to attempt to avoid such equivocations.
somewhat infelicitously, I will use “this-worldly” more in line with “cosmos” and “universe.” I
will avoid using the word “world” in Deleuze’s sense unless required for exegetical reasons, and
this usage will be explicitly qualified as such. It is, however, worth a short excursion into
Deleuze’s use of “world” to understand the modal dimension of his metaphysics more clearly.
Deleuze arrives at this notion of world by altering Leibniz’s picture somewhat. Deleuze
rejects worlds as separable or isolated, and thereby rejects the possibility of the selection
procedure of god. Instead, Deleuze makes worlds dependent on the objects, and objects express
worlds in incompossible (divergent) or compossible (convergent) series (Deleuze, 1993, 137).
A similar notion of world is found in Blais’s On the Plurality of Actual Worlds where it is argued that there are a
number of ‘actual worlds’ equivalent to the different, goal-oriented ways of representing states of affairs. While
similar, Deleuze’s notion is decidedly less anthropocentric.
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The terms ‘world’ and ‘possible world’ generally appear in Deleuze’s work in reference to Leibniz rather than any
20th century thinkers. Deleuze explicates what he means by ‘possible worlds’ most fully in the Conclusion to
Difference and Repetition, Series 16 of Logic of Sense, and throughout The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.
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This brings us to the semantic point that “worlds” here should be not be understood in Leibniz's
exact sense. Worlds, in Deleuze’s sense, correspond to commonalities which identify certain
series, not the cosmos those series unfold in. A series then expresses a world; there are, say 8
notes (scale qua world) which can be played in infinite combinations (each combination a
different series). Those 8 notes can be played in different orders, but each order will express the
same world. A scale which contains a note that would be dissonant in another scale is
incompossible with that other scale. More importantly, a series does not necessarily express just
one world. The series of dissonant notes must express at least two different, incompossible
worlds.
If we hold to DeLanda's claim that incompossible worlds are inaccessible to each other,
then it is unclear how to make sense of the example of playing a dissonant note. If each scale is a
different world, and playing a dissonant note is a world incompossible with that scale, then there
is no accessibility relation between the worlds of each scale. Accessibility relations allow us to
infer possibility. Therefore, on DeLanda's account, it is not even possible to play a dissonant
note. Yet, any novice can play dissonant notes on a guitar, and a good composer can make use of
them to great emotional effect. There must then be accessibility relations between some
incompossible worlds as well as compossible ones.
We are then left with a daunting question: if the worlds of compossible and
incompossible series both have accessibility relations, then how do we distinguish compossible
and incompossible worlds formally? Answering this begins with asking why it is important for
Deleuze's metaphysics to distinguish compossible from incompossible series in the first place.
“When the monad is in tune with dissonant series that belong to incompossible worlds, then... it
can be said that the monad, astride over several worlds, is held open, as if by a pair of pliers,”
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(Deleuze, 1993, 137, translation modified to reflect the original text ). This opening of the monad
makes possible the folding in of other portions of other worlds by way of encountering other
monads. “To be sure, no monad contains others, but my intrinsic possessions bear the mark of
those foreign ones whose shadow I discover in me,” (Deleuze, 1993, 107). This inclusion of the
outside then alters the world expressed by the monad. The interaction of incompossible series is
then the generation of a new world, a world which expresses the novel consistency of the series
resulting from the interaction. This is then in tension with possible world semantics as the field
of possibilities is laid out ahead of time. One might turn to a temporal logic here, but that too
would not quite capture it as this is not a simple developmental account in which possibilities are
indexed to a chronological time. We will return to the issues of the generation of worlds and the
relation to time in chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
We must return to the question of whether or not the virtual is conceptually distinct from
the traditional modal notions of possibility or necessity. From the point of view of analytic modal
metaphysics, this question is difficult to answer as the virtual does not appear in worlds (at least
when worlds are taken as sets of propositions since the virtual is non- or pre-propositional), and
so it must be conceptually distinct from possibility (as it does not appear in a world), necessity (it
does not appear in all worlds), and it is certainly not impossible (the virtual is not excluded by
any worlds). We should not be surprised by this. The traditional modal categories and their
logics are conceived of in static terms. The idea of all possible situations spread out as
independent snapshots of static sets of propositions linked by abstract relations is precisely the
way of viewing reality Deleuze rejects. There is, however, a modal concept which it most closely
resembles: modal base. A modal base is that which organizes which worlds are accessible from
which (Kratzer, 1981). Most commonly, it is simply the set of worlds in a model and functions
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which models the accessibility relations between those worlds. The virtual contains series which
either can or cannot interact, and those that can interact are accessible (whether compossible or
incompossible), those that cannot, are not accessible. A modal base, however, is not a
metaphysical category. It is a formal designation which tells us its role in setting out our formal
descriptions. The relevant metaphysical category would then be that of a ground. Insofar as this
ground is such that it describes the ways in which a system can be otherwise, the virtual can fill
the role of necessity in metaphysical accounts. It is, however, a strange sort of necessity as the
virtual is in flux, and allows for the coming into being of new possibilities and the destruction of
old ones.
DeLanda is certainly correct on this account: accepting the virtual makes the other modal
categories appear suspect. If the virtual defines accessibility relations, and the virtual is dynamic,
then what is possible can change. What was once necessary may be downgraded to possible, and
vice versa. Given this, if we were to hold onto the traditional analytic accounts which conceives
metaphysical necessity as a mirror of logical necessity (i.e. necessity is being true in all
accessible possible worlds34) or even more classical metaphysical notions (e.g. absolute necessity
as whatever must be the case no matter what else), then the virtual certainly does not fall into
either of these because the virtual does not appear in any worlds, but rather grounds their
relations. The virtual then grounds the relations of possibility and necessity. Here a technical
point is required. From the point of view of formal logics, notions are either extensional,
intensional, or hyperintensional. Extensional notions are ones which require only sets of objects
in order to model. The meaning of extensional notions depends only on the things to which they
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This claim does not challenge this method for modeling necessity in modal logic. Rather, it is the claim that this
method is not isomorphic with what it represents in metaphysical contexts because metaphysical necessity can
change, whereas accessibility relations are modeled as static. Even if dynamic accessibility relations were used in a
model, the general issue of logical/ontological mirror would persist.
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refer, and set theory is extensional. Set is what is grounded only on its members. Intensional
notions require extra-logical relations in order to evaluate the meaning of terms because
extensional logics cannot distinguish between different senses with the same referent.35 Possible
worlds semantics for modal logic is the most common example. Hyperintensional notions are
any which require further structure than intensional notions to model their meaning. Usually, this
further structure is something that provides a way to distinguish necessary truths from each other
. As noted above, all necessary truths are logically equivalent and so substitutable for each other
in intensional logics. If the virtual plays the role of ground, then the virtual is not an intensional
notion but a hyperintensional one. This is because grounding is taken to be hyperintensional
since it potentially makes distinctions between necessary truths (Nolan, 2014, 157).36
While there is currently some debate over the scope of hyperintensionality, if a
hyperintensional metaphysics is possible (and I think it is the case), then the virtual stands as the
only candidate in the ontology we are setting out for truthmakers of hyperintensional truths.
Properly hyperintensional semantics allow us to separate necessary truths by way of impossible
worlds. In classic, intensional modal semantics, only possible worlds are admitted, and necessary
truths are those which are ‘true in all possible worlds.’ The role of a semantics is to give meaning
(usually in the form of truth values) to propositions in a formal logic, and so the worlds in which
a proposition is true or false stand in as a formal surrogate for the actual meaning of propositions

The most well-known version of this is Frege’s example that “the Evening Star” and “the Morning Star” both
refer to the planet Venus and so share the same referent. However, both phrases have different senses, in that not
everyone true of one is true of the other. For example, one can see the Morning Star in the morning, but not the
Evening Star.
35

Given the minimal sense of “ground” endorsed above, one should not read too much constraint in this account of
the virtual as hyperintensional. By this, I mean merely that metaphysical explanation requires relations stronger than
those of necessity and possibility, and that the various forms of grounding we will explore will all involve the virtual
in some way.
36
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and their terms. If we stop there, then all necessary truths are indistinguishable from each other.
“2 + 2 = 4” is then logically equivalent to “all triangles have 3 sides.” This is especially a
problem if we take possible worlds to be not just a formal tool for semantics, but real
metaphysical grounds which bestow meaning on propositions. There are two common
alternatives: either (1) place qualifications on all possible worlds such that one is only ever
quantifying over some subset of worlds given some specific accessibility conditions or otherwise
restricted set of worlds,37 or (2) admit impossible worlds. Impossible worlds are, like possible
worlds, sets of propositions. What make a world ‘impossible’ is that some necessary truths are
modeled as false within that world. This formulation provides a way to distinguish necessary
truths formally, i.e. as true in these impossible worlds, but not those. For example, if we wanted
to model the claim that the theorems of Peano arithmetic are grounded in the axioms of Peano
arithmetic, then this requires, among other things, the impossible world where Peano arithmetic
is true but its theorems are all false and the impossible world where the reverse is the case so as
to meaningfully distinguish axioms from theorems (in the formal model), even though both will
always be true together. Following the ecumenical approach to formalisms I outline in the
Introduction (that a proper metaphysical grounding should not pick and choose which logics or
mathematics are ‘acceptable’ or ‘true’, but rather seek to explain, for as many as possible, why
they work when they do work and why their entailment relations hold), I take the former strategy
to already be groundable in the intensive and the latter, hyperintensional option to be the more
difficult case which requires us to move to the virtual. For the former, the metaphysical category
of the intensive is already more restrictive than the relations of logical possibility, and so
provides extra-logical structure required for intensive logics for reasonable restrictions on

This is Kripke’s response to Kaplan’s paradox discussed above. If one restricts the scope of quantification so that
they cannot speak of all possible worlds simpliciter, the paradox can be blocked.
37
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quantifying over the set of all possible worlds. For the latter, the virtual as a metaphysical
category relates ground to grounded as well as contains unactualizable dispositions, and so
provides in principle grounds for hyperintensional relations.
The difficulty for the metaphysician is to answer the question “how can this universe tell
us anything about impossible worlds?” For instance, can all necessary truths be separated, or do
some imply each other such that distinguishing between them falls into nonsense? How could
there be any grounding clarity for impossible worlds as strange as, for example, the world in
which the axioms of Peano Arithmetic hold but all its usual theorems are false? Furthermore,
where is the line to be drawn between possible and impossible worlds? Deleuze’s concept of the
virtual is not only of hyperintensional interest, but it is extremely well-suited to these issues. For
instance, it is useful in examining the difference between the ‘merely’ or logically possible and
the metaphysically possible (i.e. those possibilities beyond the scope of what can be grounded in
this universe’s intensities and actualities38). To see this, we must explore how it is that, for
Deleuze’s metaphysics, it makes sense to say that an object differs in itself.
That a certain substance has a boiling point is metaphysically inseparable from the fact
that it has a freezing point. However, these points are virtually distinct. This is not the same thing
as saying that if an object is at its boiling point it will be different than when it is at its freezing
point (though this follows from the previous statement). Rather, regardless of its current
temperature, pressure, or state, the boiling point and freezing point remain virtually distinct.
These points are singularities which exist as a part of the substances’ structure. In fact, they
cannot exist in any other way. A substance is never “at its melting point,” rather, it is in the
process of melting or freezing (a difference determined only by where it starts and finishes).

38

I say intensities and actualities here rather than objects simpliciter since objects would also include their virtual
aspects, and virtualities may contain unmanifestable and perhaps impossible dispositions.
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Thermodynamically speaking, what it is to be a certain substance is to change in various ways
relative to temperature, pressure, etc., and so these differences within a substance’s structure
make it what it is to be that substance. It is these differences which both ground the necessary
status of truths such as “this substance has a boiling point” as well as its difference from the
claim that “this substance has a freezing point.” Claims about the difference between the two are
hyperintensional because they require greater structure over and beyond that of possible worlds
to specify their meaning. Therefore, hyperintensional claims can be grounded in virtually
distinct, though never really separable, features of objects and powers. Furthermore, this explains
the strange case of necessary truths being indistinguishable in intensional contexts. Any
metaphysically possible state of affairs will include the powers of difference itself. Necessary
truths are grounded in the powers of difference itself. Therefore, necessary truths cannot be
individuated by way of states of affairs, but only by distinctions in the powers inherent any state
of affairs at all.
Again, even the virtual and intensive together are not enough to give us all modal
information. Possibilities need not be considered in their ordered relations, but can be abstracted
as isolated or atomic possibilities. More importantly, modal reasoning requires picking out the
possibilities which we are reasoning about, and the indeterminate nature of the virtual and the
ordered differences of the intensive are not yet enough to do this. We then require what Deleuze
calls the actual.
G. The Actual and the Cancellation of Difference
If the virtual and the intensive have been well established, then we should find ourselves
in a sort of ontological vertigo where the actual aspect of objects appears to be the strangest of
all. What is it, in a metaphysics of difference and flux, to be currently manifested, and to give
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rise to similarity and stasis? First, we must avoid another potential equivocation. By “actual,” the
analytic metaphysician usually means something close to “existing” or “this-worldly,” depending
on their ontological commitments. If the metaphysician is committed to modal realism, then
“actual” picks out this world that we are in along with its objects and propositions, and separates
it from other real, existing possible worlds. If one is not committed to modal realism, then
“actual” generally means the concrete or otherwise non-imaginary existents of the world where
this world is taken to be the only “real” world in some sense. Temporally, it can be used to refer
to things which currently are not but were objects of this world. Truths about Genghis Khan’s
first horse that obtained in this world are actually true. Although, if one is a traditional Presentist,
it may be used only to describe what is currently the case. Quine complained that the embrace of
the word “actual” has followed from the spoiling of the good word “exists” (Quine, 1961, 3), but
we face an even worse confusion if we read “actual” in Deleuze in the same way. For Deleuze,
all his terms are meant to refer to this-worldly things. The actual, the virtual, and the intensive all
exist, and they all exist “here.”39 “Actual” is Deleuze’s term for the currently determined,
manifested aspect of what there is. In other words, there are no “actual potentials” for Deleuze,
and “actual virtuality” or “actual intensity” are both equally confused. There are actualized
virtualities, but this implies a process and a changing in kind from virtual to actual, rather than
something which exists as both virtual and actual simultaneously. Furthermore, this has a
temporal connotation. Genghis Khan’s horse was actually fast in battle; it is not now. When his
horse slept, it still could have been fast (having a virtual power which could become actual), and
now it cannot even potentially become actually fast because it does not exist any longer. I will
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Since these three aspects of things are not separable (see below), Deleuze will occasionally refer to these aspects
as “insisting.” That is, they insist as differences within the brute fact of what there is. I take ‘insist’ to roughly track
the longer phrase ‘is inseparable but formally distinct from… .’
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maintain the Deleuzian use of “actual” unless otherwise specified, using “real” or “this-worldly”
instead of the common analytic use.
The making of the actual from the virtual and the intensive is a process of what Deleuze
calls “covering over” or “cancelling differences.” Cancelling differences is picked up by Deleuze
from Nietzsche’s criticism of scientific quantification, (Deleuze, 2006, 43-46). Consider Ohm’s
law: I = V/R, current equals voltage divided by resistance.40 This equation, when specific
quantities replace the variables, describes actual states of affairs, and it does so by covering over
certain differences. It is different to be a current than it is to be a voltage or a resistance.
Nietzsche’s account seems to be aimed first at the scientist as a sort of critique of the
quantification of nature, (Nietzsche, 1967, 303-4). Deleuze pushes this idea, making it into an
ontological principle: things become actual, extensive, and determinate by the cancelling of
differences, by the arising of identities and equalities which cover over the fundamental
differences at work. To speak qualitatively of the phenomena described by Ohm’s law, to
become a more intense current is different than to become a more intense voltage or a less
intense resistance even if they are all coordinated in the ways described by the equation. Perhaps
it is even qualitatively different to be a relation of a voltage to resistance than to be a current.
And yet, these differences make no difference in the actual quantities and their relation. Their
mutual determination (e.g. increasing resistance decreases current) covers over the intensive
differences at work. This production of an indifference is the heart of the actual for Deleuze, and
the mutual determination of differences is the process of actualization. Such an indifference is
the production of extension and qualities (Deleuze, 1994, 239). Certainly, this has similar

Often the equals sign will be rendered as “is directly proportional to” rather than “is equivalent to.” Nietzsche
would find this more honest.
40
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epistemological implications to Nietzsche’s account, but it is not (or not only) the human activity
of the quantification of nature that covers over difference; it is the process of actualization itself.
Since measuring extensive properties requires comparison with other extensive properties, such
human measurement would be impossible without the ontological production of extension in the
first place. There would be nothing to measure with.41
Since only difference can ground necessary truths a specific actuality cannot ground
necessary truths, nor can any actuality itself be necessary. Because difference is the only always
and ineliminable source of dispositions, all other sources are contingent. Some differences,
however, exist by the mere fact of there being different actualities at all can, and these
differences may ground necessary truths. Any given actuality is contingent because it is a
particular cancellation of difference, but formal or mathematical identity is necessary because it
is grounded in the cancellation of difference itself, not in any particular occurrence of it. Such
identities are grounded in the difference which is produced in activity of covering over itself (we
return to this in Chapters 2 and 4). The aspect of actuality itself will be necessary insofar as it is
grounded on a difference from the virtual and intensive, but any specific actualization will be
contingent. This is both favorable and surprising. Favorable in that were it not for this result,
then this modal account would ground necessity, but possibility and contingency would remain a
mystery. It is surprising in that what is contingent is not the absence of necessity, but rather its
excess. What is actual and contingent is a temporary stabilization amid the constantly ‘can be
otherwise’ of the virtual, within and covering over pure difference. It is only in the gathering of
differences together where moments of indifference, similarity, or even identity take place that a
sort of modal glut forms, giving rise to contingency. A Greek cosmogony is inverted: Ananke is
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This situation becomes more complicated in the cases in which intensities are measured through extensive means,
see Mader 2017.
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the mother of Chaos, though Chronos remains her consort. Put bluntly, there is always more to
necessity than can ever be made actual at any given time, or even for all time. There are always
differences beyond and under identity. All necessities can be actualized all together no more than
one could give birth to themselves. Here we see the first glimpse of a ground for the more
surprising necessary truths of mathematics and logic, truths of infinity and the eternal which are
unphysical (and more specifically, unactualizable), but are nevertheless true of this cosmos. They
find their grounds virtually, and we see the need for the rejection of Platonic grounding in
likeness: the virtual is not like anything. All relations of similarity, identity, analogy, and so on
are actual and contingent. The virtual is not infinite, yet it gives rise to truths about infinity (this
will be argued for in detail in Chapter 5).
Interestingly, we see a commonality here with David Lewis in that what is actual is
contingent, and specifically, contingent on top of some structuring necessity. For Lewis, all
things exist necessarily because all possible worlds exist and are equally real, but what is true of
‘our world’, the actual world, is entirely contingent as nothing necessitates this being the actual
world rather than any other. In what I’ve argued from Deleuzian resources, something similar
obtains. The intensive and the virtual have, among other things, necessary relations. What is
actualized is a contingent result of such relations. What is actual can always be otherwise, but
what it is that actualizes it is strictly entailed by its actualization. In an important sense, what is
contingent depends on a sort of modal glut, on there being more necessity than can be actualized
a given moment or in a given place. For Lewis, there is a necessary excess of possible worlds
that makes the actual world possible (and contingent) in the first place. If there were only one
world on Lewis’s picture, everything would be necessary because everything true in the actual
world would be true in all worlds. And so, contingency is a necessary result of the existence of
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difference. For Deleuze, it is the already necessary relations of the intensive and the virtual
which, through the cancelling of differences, give rise to contingent actualities.
Here we can return to clarify the distinction between representation and expression as
regards logic and mathematics along with the question of inference versus evidence.
Representation at its height tries to produce an infinite representation (Hegel’s Absolute
Knowing, Borges’s map that co-extends with the territory). This infinite representation always
seeks an isomorphism which is transparent to and complete with respect to what is represented.
Yet the relation between a representation and what is represented is precisely what both needs to
be explained and yet cannot itself be represented. Expression, on the other hand, is a more direct
relation than representation, yet it does not claim either transparency or completeness. An
expression is always exceeded by that which it expresses. This is true even though a new
expression adds something to reality which was not there in that which is expressed. One speaks
an English sentence; no one speaks English all at once. And yet, one may speak a new sentence
which is added to and changes English (say, by defining a neologism or establishing a new
translation). I claimed above that holding to objects with powers and what they entail (pure
difference, the intensive, the virtual, and the actual) means that a certain formal structure cannot
be taken to imply or entail any specific metaphysical structure, but nevertheless may be evidence
of it. The actual provides us with a simple and proper example. What is actual is a perfectly
acceptable collection of truthmakers for classical first order logic. The actual is determinate, an
object is actually either this or that, it is this and not that, it is self-identical and so on. We find
correlative properties for binary truth values, the three classical laws of logic (excluded middle,
non-contradiction, identity), and even, in so far as objects are distinct in their actual aspects,
logical atomism. To see this and say that the structure of first order logic represents or references
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some aspect of state of affairs is not wrong, but it is to leave mysterious the question of how this
representing comes about.
The claim is not that representations do not exist, but rather that any representation relies
upon, and draws its efficacy from, a prior expression. Thereby, representation will always be
partial as it functions on similarity, identity, analogy, etc. Representation is a two-stage process:
something is first expressed, and then it is correlated to something (through whatever criteria or
relations) which it then represents. Differences may be without being represented, but differences
cannot be represented without being subsumed under some likeness or identity. Therefore,
understanding expression is the proper metaphysical task, or at least the metaphysical priority. If
difference is metaphysically prior to identity, then expression is first in relation to representation;
expression is the condition for the possibility of representation. The existence of a formal system
is then only evidence in that its existence and efficacy is a sign of some objects and powers
which give rise to it. The existence of a child is only evidence that it has parents, not proof for
who its parents are. And in both cases, similarities can be deceiving. However, in expression,
what is expressed is different in kind from the expression itself. A person expresses a proposition
by speaking it; this is the expression. That expression is different from both what expresses it
(the person) and what it itself expresses (the state of affairs it is about). Returning to the
connection between logic and metaphysics, it is not that the actual itself ‘obeys’ the law of noncontradiction, but that, with a certain process of abstraction, its determinate nature provides the
conditions for a formal structure with such and such a property. This dissertation, then, aims to
uncover the modal structure of the cosmos of which apparently unphysical mathematical truths
are expressions, so that we do not make the mistake of believing such truths veridically represent
real features of the cosmos.
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Were there no actuality, no determination, were reality simply intensity and virtuality,
classical FOL could not be formulated, or if it could, it would appear no more than a fantasy with
no efficacy in this world. FOL is an extensional, truth functional logic. It requires a model of
individual objects and ways of attributing predicates truly or falsely to them. Were there no
determinate aspect of individuals in reality in any qualified sense (as a process metaphysician
might claim), then there would be nothing for FOL to usefully model. Nor could any part of
reality be abstracted or expressed in such a way as to provide a formal model for FOL. I would
go so far as to say it would lack completeness as it would find no ground on which to rest a
semantics.
I do not expect the reader to agree with the above claim just yet, but I do want to point
out that thinking it absurd or impossible that a metaphysics could make a logic impossible entails
a commitment to Platonism. Were it metaphysically impossible for a logic that has a
completeness proof in this universe to lack such a proof in some world, this would be enough to
prove that formal systems somehow do not depend on the universe of which they are a part.
Formal systems would then either have to be fundamental to the universe or transcend it in some
way because something must make it that case that these logics are necessarily constructible
within the universe. If so, then that implies formal systems are outside the scope of grounding in
contingent objects or any other this-worldly entities one may prefer. Therefore, either it must be
logically possible that certain logics could not arise in certain worlds, or we must accept full
blown Platonic realism. Here relations of strength and weakness between logics and the
possibilities and impossibilities of embedding some formal systems within others are interesting
pieces of evidence, but this would take us too far afield now.
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H. Real Distinction or Formal Distinction?
There are debates within Deleuze scholarship over whether only the intensive truly exists
and the virtual and actual are only poles thereof. I take the three aspects to be equally real and
formally distinct insofar as each does what the others cannot. There is a sort of continuity
established by the process of actualization which moves from the virtual through the intensive to
the actual, but this cannot be a reduction because each stage of actualization involves a change in
kind. All objects have these three aspects, and being is said univocally, (Deleuze, 1994, 35). If
we discuss a virtuality, it always maintains some connection to intensities and actualities,
obscure and distant though it may be. Hence, we may say that none of these aspects is
fundamental, but rather, that there are only objects and their powers, both of which are founded
atop difference. Hence the one voice that speaks being is difference, each being’s excess over
what it is, (Deleuze, 1994, 304). It is not surprising that Deleuze’s metaphysics is also often
reduced to the binary distinction between the virtual and the actual. Once these two aspects are
specified, it is difficult to see what remains of the intensive. On the other hand, once the
intensive is understood, a process metaphysics in which the virtual and actual are merely
abstractions from the reality of intensive differences seems equally viable. However, seeing the
differences which each aspect accounts for, it is clear that any reduction of one of the three
aspects to another is destructive to the system set out.
As far as they stand as truthmakers, these three aspects are not separable, by which I
mean different modal claims, different formal structures, or even branches of mathematics will
not necessarily be grounded in one and only one aspect. For instance, this investigation into
difference was sparked by the claim that the difference between objects (which we now call
actual difference) could ground arithmetical claims. This is obviously not enough to get us all
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truths about arithmetic as there are arithmetical propositions about numbers larger than the
number of objects in the universe, and so the potential reordering of objects found in intensity,
and the potential generation of the new found in the virtual must be marshalled to fill out the
grounds. This, as it stands, can at least provides truthmakers for propositions about numbers
larger than can be possibly counted by the objects in the universe. It is not clear that this gets us
to countably infinite claims, let alone claims about larger transfinite sets, the universe of sets V,
and other such mathematical objects. This relies on the power of intensive order to exceed that
which is ordered and the power of virtual structures to provide consistency to unactualizable
dispositions, both of which remain to be established. Such is the work of chapter 5.
I. Conclusion: Objects and Grounds
What, then, is an object? It is a structure of different powers (virtual aspect), each of
which has some ordered relation of degrees (intensive aspect), of which, some degrees are
currently manifested through a canceling or covering over of their differences into qualities and
extensions (actual aspect). It would equally be true and more succinct to call an object a real
collection of powers; however, this risks being misunderstood as saying that an object is nothing
more than a bundle of its powers and so implying that powers are more “real” or more
fundamental than objects. Any real bundling or real collection of powers requires something
which does the collecting and maintains the bundle. There is then a clear metaphysical
distinction between a material and an ideal collecting of powers: a material collection is always
fecund. This leads us to discuss a fourth aspect of the object, its multiplicity. This cannot be
discussed adequately without first an explanation of the genesis of a new object, as this genesis is
tantamount to the construction of a multiplicity. To do so requires rectifying an implicit fiction
which this chapter has employed: the stability and sterility of differences. This allows us to
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weave together two loose threads of this chapter: that difference itself can be said to have powers
and that all there are, are objects. It will be shown that the existence of any object entails a prior
difference which has a power that cannot be said to be a power of any object.
What then, is it to ground? This has not yet been shown; it has only in principle been
gestured towards. If we remained here, we would quickly fall back into the error we wish to
resolve in that we have merely shown structural isomorphisms between the actual, the intensive,
and the virtual, and extensional, intensional, and hyperintensional formal systems. We will not
find, for example, the tautologies of some formal modal logics simply waiting in the intensive
slide from darkness to infinitely bright light, and if there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between a
logic and a spectrum of intensive differences somehow, it is only after the fact. We can,
however, say something about grounding here to move into the next chapter.
Grounding itself is a virtual relation. The relation between ground and grounded is, of
course, a relation between differences, and so we may ask if such a relation is actual, intensive,
or virtual difference. The intensive can be ruled out immediately as the difference between
ground and grounded is not one of degree: the ground is not more or less (nor equally) intense
than the grounded. We might mistake the relation between ground and grounded as a relation of
actual difference,42 or even of actualization; however, neither would hold. Actual difference, or
difference between actualities, is only ever external difference, but grounding is a relation to the
internal relations or internal differences of another object. The virtual is then the aspect through
which grounding is to be understood. This also follows from the virtual being able to account for
hyperintensionality since grounding is generally taken to be hyperintensional in some way
(Duncan et al, 2017). Here, we can specify two features of what it is to ground if grounding is

The phrase “actual difference” is quite infelicitous due to the common conflation of the actual with the real. Here I
mean the differences that exist between actualities, not the wider notion of real differences.
42
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virtual: first, grounding is a relation to the internal relations of another thing (in other words, it is
somehow a structural relation), and second, things are grounded on powers (either the powers of
other things or of difference itself). This will be further explicated in chapter 2. This allows us to
justify the potentially question begging condition of truthmaker theory. The virtual is shown to
ground claims about necessity as it provides the limits of what can be otherwise. Grounding is
also virtual. So, to ground something is to do so necessarily. However, we must be careful once
again not to confuse the virtual with either the actual or the object itself. If grounding is virtual,
then it is also structural in some sense; it does not ground a specific thing on another specific
thing, but rather a generality on another generality. This involves showing that a whole is in
some ways independent of its parts and vice versa. In other words, grounding is only ever a
relative necessity. There are then structural isomorphisms between the aspects of objects and the
requirements of formal systems which provide evidence that, in principle, they can stand in the
truthmaker-truthmade relation. What remains to be shown is the specific details of this process as
well as how it is that the truths made can become so radically different than their truthmakers as
to give us truths about necessity and infinity in a contingent, finite cosmos.
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Logical Addendum:
Schrödinger Logics
A materialist metaphysics of expression is followed in this text. Holding to this means
that inference from a logical structure to a metaphysical structure is barred. However, it would be
evidence for such a metaphysics that some of its more unusual features have already found
logical expression. Here, I want to investigate the ways in which accepting that there are positive
differences which cannot be meaningfully said to be self-identical is played out in a specific
family of logics: Schrödinger Logics as formulated by Da Costa and Krause.
The law of identity (A = A) is the least challenged of the classical laws of logic, and this,
I imagine, may provide some resistance to the acceptance of a metaphysics of difference. One
might agree with Quine that it is absurd to discuss something which cannot be meaningfully said
to be self-identical. Admittedly, the ways in which difference itself frustrates thought is taken to
be a virtue of this system, but this does not mean that we are left with a mysticism, a land of pure
difference where reason cannot tread. We have seen reason expand its territory before.
Intuitionists and Constructivists have made notable advances in logic through rejecting the Law
of Excluded Middle, and the same can be said of para-consistent logicians and the rejecting of
the Law of Non-Contradiction.1 Nor are these insights only of logical interest, but may equally
motivate metaphysical and epistemological stances such as dialethism. Varying and inventing
logical structures is one way in which we seek new expressions of difference itself, and so it is
not surprising that producing systems which deny these two classical laws give ways to

1

Graham Priest 2014 provides a para-consistent account of identity in which identity is not transitive. That is, A = B
and B = C may both be true without thereby committing us to A = C on such an account. While this is fascinating
challenge to classical accounts of logical identity, it does not amount to a rejection of the Law of Identity in the way
that Schrödinger Logics do because, for Priest’s non-transitive account, all instances of A = A are still true.
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investigate previously unexpressed aspects of difference. Why should we not expect the same for
the law of identity?
We may even expect greater metaphysical rewards for this transgression in that the
motivation Da Costa and Krause 1994 cite a physical motivation for their work: the claims by
Erwin Schrödinger that in many cases in quantum mechanics, identity and sameness are empty
concepts, even when applied to indistinguishable objects. In other words, Schrödinger argues
Leibniz’s Law does not hold for quantum mechanical phenomena. Here then is a tight knot of
physical, logico-mathematical, and metaphysical motivations for and implications of admitting
pure difference, or difference with no founding identity, into our ontology. For instance, in
canonical quantum mechanics, particles have an associated wave function, and wave functions
may be in a superposition. This can lead to situations in which it is impossible to associate a
given particle with its wavefunction. If so, then there are cases where we have clearly nonidentical particles (there are more than one of them, after all) which we cannot, however,
distinguish as they occupy the same super-position.
In the spirit of taking scientists at their word, Da Costa and Krause construct a relatively
simple logic for dealing with such situations. Take classical logic and separate the objects into
two types: M and m. M-type satisfy “∀(x) x = x”. They are always identical with and
indistinguishable from themselves. On the other hand, m-objects do not satisfy “∀(x) x = x”
because to be an m-object is to make false any statement of the form x = y (x = x being a special
case of x = y). Here we see a meta-logical expression of a metaphysical argument in chapter 1.
The metaphysical argument established that a positive account of difference requires there to be
more to objects than their actual, extensional aspects. Here we are shown how in order to have a
purely extensional logic, the law of identity must be preserved, i.e. difference in itself must be
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bracketed or abstracted away. By having a general distinction within the domain of formal
objects, those of which identity can be predicated and those which it cannot, we immediately
have a type theory. In other words, building in some positive notion of difference is enough to
make a logic intensional. A quasi-Set Theory like that of Krause 1992 can serve as an adequate
semantics for Schrödinger Logics, whereas classical Set Theory cannot because of the selfidentity and extensionality of sets.
The details, however interesting, are unimportant as I am not arguing that Schrödinger
Logics are a “correct” logic nor am I adopting them as a central formal tool of this work. Rather,
I take them as evidence that denying self-identity of some things (an infelicitous expression if
there ever was one) does not lead us into pure nonsense or a vague mysticism. What matters is
that such logics have entailment relations, and so are as legitimate a logic as any other. There are
also intensional and explicitly modal formulations as well (see Da Costa and Krause 1997).
Furthermore, it is of interest that some metaphysical implications of taking difference as primary
show up in formal logics which deny the law of identity to some type of objects. This gives a
hint to how a metaphysics of difference grounds certain entailments, which we will return to in
chapter 4.
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Chapter 2:
Individuation and Becoming-Continuous
"The first principle of philosophy is that Universals
explain nothing but must themselves be explained."
-Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 7.
“What a disaster it would then be if this One were to be burned up some day. It is already an advance when a
number is viewed not as a thing but as something in a thing, where the view is that different things, despite their
difference, can have the same One, just as different leaves can all have the same Green. Now in which things do we
find the One? Don't we have the One in each and every thing?”
– Frege, Diary, March 25, 1924

In the last chapter, it was argued that the claim that something is possible must be
grounded in that which makes it possible as opposed to that which resembles it, or some actual
state of affairs in which that possibility is realized. Here I argue for a similar approach to
individuation. This becomes relevant because the issue of individuation is conceptually tied to
both identity and modality. If, as argued in the previous chapter, what is required to ground
necessary truths in an ontology of contingent objects is the metaphysical priority of difference,
then we require an account of the production of identity. Since we are searching after the
production of identity, we must begin with something metaphysically prior to identity. Given the
Deleuzian account began in Chapter 1, I will argue that the only candidate for such priority are
the powers of difference itself. This then conceptually ties the production of identity to the
production of the new, since the production of identity is the producing of something which does
not exist as a power of difference itself. That is, the production of identity from difference is the
production of something ontologically novel. Furthermore, because the production of the new is
a power of difference itself, and necessary truths can be grounded in an ineliminable difference,
we may then explore this process’s role as a truthmaker for such necessary truths. I will then
argue that the production of the new is a process of ineliminable difference which makes
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possible the grounding of the necessary truths of the mathematical continuum in contingent,
discrete objects.
A. Individuation and Modality
Individuation in modal contexts becomes a central issue in mid-20th century analytic
philosophy. The issue arises due to difficulties in how to identify what it is we are talking about
when we talk about possibility and possible objects. This problem of individuation in modal
contexts is seen by Quine as damning enough to reject talk of the possible outright and to restrict
our talk only to those entities which fall politely under existential and universal quantifiers.
Simply put, Quine takes it to be the case that if we cannot be assured of the identity of the
entities we are discussing, then we cannot be sure to which, if any, objects we refer. If the
referent of our statements is uncertain, then so is their truth value. Since the referent of
statements about possibilities cannot be distinctly identified, they cannot be meaningfully said to
be true or false, and so are meaningless (Quine, 1969). Such statements, if read literally, seem to
refer to possiblia, objects which do not exist as actual, but somehow exist as possible. Quine’s
argument then proceeds by example. Since the statement “the possible fat man and the possible
bald man in the doorway” has an ambiguous referent(s), it cannot have a specifiable truth value.
The truth value of this statement may vary depending on whether or not it refers to two possible
men or the same possible man. In response to this ambiguity, Quine maintains that “to be is to be
the value of a bound variable,” (Quine, 1961, 15). In other words, we should be, on Quine’s
account, committed to including in our ontology only the objects which are ranged over by our
true existential claims.
If it is true that a possible man is standing in the doorway, then we would be committed
to the existence of possible men. Yet, it is unclear how many possible men, and so, Quine claims,
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our claims cannot consistently range over a domain of possible objects because we cannot
consistently individuate such objects. If we cannot consistently individuate, that is, identify and
separate from other similar objects, that which we are discussing, we cannot admit that referent
in our ontology. Since statements about possibility refer to possible objects, and such objects are
not individuated by formal statements, they cannot be consistently ranged over by formal
quantification. Therefore, these possible objects cannot be admitted into our ontology. “No entity
without identity” Quine’s slogan rings out (Quine, 1969, 23). Quine then sets the general terms
of modal Nominalism: all modal talk is to be viewed with suspicion because it does not refer to
individual, actual objects and so must, in our best accounts, be replaced with talk that does not
include ambiguous reference. We will return to this below, but it is worth pointing out here how
Quine’s argument is based on an assumption that for objects which cannot be meaningfully
individuated, they do not provide an unambiguous truth value to our existentially quantified
statements, and so are not even false. This is a constraint of ontology by the structure of logic on
Quine’s part. In particular, the assumption here is that everything which exists must be capable
of being quantified over unambiguously. This is then an example of inferring ontological
structure from logical structure, an inference we rejected in chapter 1 in favor of truthmakers.
In response to Quine’s modal Nominalism, Marcus argues that modal talk is meaningful
insofar as all modal statements refer to actual objects in some way. This position is known as
Actualism, and it can be understood as a way to save modal talk without adding to the
Nominalist ontology which consists of individual, actual objects and nothing else. The Actualist
takes it to be perfectly acceptable to account for the individuation of the referent of modal
statements in terms of actual objects. This move attempts to turn the modal Nominalist’s
commitment to empiricism against them in that the Actualist claims that formal quantification
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alone cannot tell us what individuals there are; some empirical account of what there is is
required. Whereas the Nominalist intends to cut away modal talk by showing it to be empty, the
Actualist attempts to show that such talk has meaning insofar as it can be tied to an ontology of
actual objects. According to Marcus, Quine’s possible bald man in the doorway does not exist as
a free floating possibility, but as some actual bald man wandering around the hallway, or the
quad or the city, who may or may not find himself walking through the doorway. Modal claims
about objects can then be meaningfully individuated by reference to actual objects, and so the
assumed identity of actual objects is conferred on the possibilities indexed to them. Marcus’s
Actualist rejoinder to Quine maintains “no identity without entity” (Marcus, 1993, 200), leaving
us in a pithy gridlock. 1
This Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock is a particularly strange one. The position which both
the nominalist and the Actualist appear to be trying to avoid is that of Possibilism, which is the
full embrace of a class of possibilia as both real but ontologically distinct from the class of actual
things. In other words, possibilia exist but are not actual. On the nominalist (Quine’s) side of the
gridlock, we give up talking about possibility due to anxiety over the ambiguity of reference and
failures of formal individuation. If we cannot identify possibilities and distinguish them, as
Quine argues, then how can we be sure we know what we are talking about when we discuss

1

Here a reader familiar with Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy? may expect the conclusion that reference is
the issue, and the whole Nominalist/Actualist gridlock is a result of confusing philosophical questions with
questions of reference. This is not the tack I will be taking in my response. It is true that Deleuze rejects the
reduction of philosophy to the question of how to best interpret formal logics. This is a program which is common of
the Quine/Marcus era of analytic philosophy, and of which Quine himself is perhaps the obvious paragon. Deleuze
and Guattari will argue that constructing reference is a fundamental activity of science and not philosophy, and so it
is a category mistake to attempt to solve a philosophical problem through a regimenting of proper reference.
However, we are here dealing with the intersection between philosophy and science (which includes both
mathematics and formal logic in Deleuze and Guattari’s accounting), and so we can neither take reference to be a
fundamental operation which we just need to get right to settle these issues, as Quine and Marcus do, nor can we
handwave these issues away as category mistakes resulting from scientific operations intruding in the sphere of
philosophy.
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possible objects or events? It seems we are quite capable of discussing such things, both in
everyday speech and in our best scientific accounts of the cosmos, and so something seems
intuitively wrong with Quine’s account.
However, on the Actualist (Marcus’s) side, things are no less strange once we follow out
the implications that identity in a formal statement implies the existence of an actual referent.
Following Marcus leads us to a position known as Necessitism, the position that “necessarily
everything is necessarily something,” (Williamson, 2015, 2). By this it is meant that both what
objects there are and what general categories of objects there are could not have been otherwise
than what they actually are. This necessity of existing goes both from actual to possible (if it
exists in the actual world, it must exist in all possible worlds) and from possible to actual (if it
exists in a possible world, it must exist in the actual world). All worlds would then have the same
domain of objects, or in other words, worlds, whether possible or actual, would not each have
unique ontologies. For example, necessarily, tigers exist or put differently, there is no possible
world in which tigers don’t exist, or in which a specific tiger which exists in the actual world
wasn’t in that possible world. Necessitism asserts that our ontology could not be otherwise than
it actually is. This is opposed to Contingentism, which asserts that what there is could have been
otherwise in the sense that different possible worlds have different domains. According to the
Contingentist, tigers might not actually have evolved (say the Chicxulub Impactor had missed
the Earth, thereby altering Earth’s evolutionary trajectory by not causing the massive extinction
event which made enormous ecological space for mammals), or a litter of tiger cubs may have
had 6 rather than 5 cubs.
This position is motivated, in part, by the efficacy of modal logics which imply the
Barcan formula and its converse, (Marcus, 1995, 195). We have also made reference to the
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existence of Completeness Proofs as a mark of acceptable logics against the choosing of some
preferred logic. Cresswell 1995 shows the existence of complete quantified modal logics which
do not contain the Barcan formula. Therefore, a further reason to reject Necessitism is that there
is no a priori reason to choose a modal logic which contains the Barcan formula in all cases for
metaphysical reasoning. If this is the main support for Necessitism, then it is also a case of
inferring ontological structure from logical structure.
Here we enter onto a current open debate over which positions commit one to which
other positions. Marcus is explicitly an Actualist and a Necessitist insofar as she saw Actualism
as implying the Barcan formula, (Marcus, 1993, xiv and 195). Williamson, though he takes
himself to be defending Marcus’s position, rejects the distinction between Possibilism and
Actualism, and defends the distinction between Necessitism and Contingentism as the more
fundamental one, (Williamson, 2015, 22).2 For example, if tigers had not evolved they would
still, for Williamson, be a part of our ontology since all objects and classes of objects are
necessary. However, since they are necessary but not actual, they exist somehow as possible.
This need not necessarily commit one to full blown Possibilism, as the referent of claims about
possible tigers in worlds where they are not actual may still ultimately refer to actual objects (say
the combination of the right environment, unrealized potentials within DNA as class, particular
strands of DNA which could be brought together, etc.). Even given this possibility of complex
reference, it is unclear why one would maintain, in the context of modern modal metaphysics,
the commitment that the ontology of the actual world was the only possible one, other than
because it makes formal modal logic work as desired. We see this when we ask whether we can
maintain Actualism and Contingentism together. These two doctrines are certainly compatible,
2

This claim is rejected by Menzel 2020, who argues in favor of the Possibilism-Actualism Distinction as
meaningfully distinct from the Necessitism-Contingentism Distinction.
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but they fail to resolve the Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock. If we accept that all modal talk
references only actual objects, but there could have been other objects than there are, then we are
referencing objects which are not actual but could exist, namely those objects which we use to
support a commitment to Contingentism. If I say there is an object which is not a part of my
ontology, but which could be, then I am referencing a non-actual, non-existing yet possible
object. If so, then I am once again at the mercy of Quine’s criticism because it will be impossible
for me to individuate such an object in such a way as to provide unambiguous truth values to
modal propositions about such an object. To avoid Quine’s criticism, Actualism then seems to be
wedded to Necessitism. Here the Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock seems to become a tangled knot.
B. Difference and Individuation
While some tangles are worth the patient separating of various strands to set them right,
others are better resolved by undercutting the tangled strands at their roots. I will argue that the
Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock is better served by the latter. Undercutting this tangle begins as we
did in the last chapter, by showing how a metaphysics of difference avoids this dilemma
altogether. Taking difference as fundamental to identity displaces the Nominalist/Actualist
Gridlock by opening up the possibility of an account of the generation of identity in the first
place. We can do this by introducing a different understanding of individuation, one which
embraces the co-genesis of entity and identity out of the powers of difference itself, and so does
not limit our understanding of what there is by our ability to pick out an object via reference or
formal quantification. If identity can be generated with or through the entity of which it is the
identity, then we avoid the Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock while also showing once again how
difference operates beyond the bounds of identity. In particular, we can reject Quine’s worries
about reference to non-actual things by showing how the modal character of objects (powers,
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potentials, etc.) is inextricable from the process through which entities and their identities are
formed. We can also side with the Actualist in grounding much of our modal claims on already
existing objects. What we accept which falls outside the purview of the Actualist, however, is
those necessary features of the cosmos grounded in difference itself because difference itself is
not an object. In the reconstruction of Deleuze I offer here, we maintain three desirable positions:
1: modal statements have meaningful referents, 2: the referents for claims about non-actual
possibilities are the powers of current objects, objects for which exist the powers to construct, or
ideas about what can be brought into existence (these three referents will be discussed below as
the processes of actualization, metaphysical individuation, and realization, respectively), and
referents for claims about necessities are the powers of difference itself, 3: the rejection of
necessitism because what objects there are is contingent, and thereby, so is what powers are in
currently in existence. This embrace of contingency and rejection of necessitism about objects is
done by accounting for the generation of new objects, and therefore new powers which open up
new possibilities. This idea of the co-genesis of entity and identity is Deleuze’s notion of
individuation which he develops from the work of Gilbert Simondon (Deleuze, 1994, 246). Some
connection to the discussion of modality from the previous chapter is in order here as Simondon
and Deleuze mark a radical break with historical notions of identity and possibility, but these
historical notions continue prominently in the analytic tradition.3 Identity, in modal contexts, is
linked directly to possibility, in both the analytic and the Western philosophical tradition more
generally.

3

In some ways, Quine, 1961, 1-19 cements the connection between possibility and identity as the central problem of
modal metaphysics in the analytic tradition, with most responses being attempts to show how talk about possibility
can conform to the strictures of formal accounts of identity. For examples, see the connection between identifiability
and possibility in Marcus, 1993, 189-2013, or Kripke 1981, 43-55’s account of identity across possible worlds.
Lewis 2001 rejects any problem of identity in modal contexts by bluntly asserting identity as unproblematic. I know
of no work in analytic modal metaphysics which parallels the Deleuzian tack of separating identity and possibility
and taking neither as fundamental.
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As we are moving to discuss this issue more generally, let us change from the
terminology of the Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock which uses “identity” and “entity” to the
terminology employed in the positive project of this dissertation, that of “identity” and “object.”
I take it that nothing important hinges on this change in terminology, and it is rather a matter of
intellectual context.4 Specifying what it is for something to be the thing that it is involves
specifying what powers it has as well as what powers can bring it into being. Therefore, to say
that an identity comes into being alongside its object is to say that a thing comes into being with
its very possibility; the principle of individuation does not pre-exist the individual (Simondon,
2009, 4). Given the history of Western metaphysics, it is radical to claim that an object’s
possibility does not temporally precede its existence or that an object’s possibility is not already
diffused in the environment in which the object comes into being. While radical, the distinction
between the possibility of a thing and the conditions which make the thing possible prevent this
from being an outright absurdity. Justifying it, however, requires the details of Deleuze’s account
of individuation which will be presented below.
Given the radicality of this claim, it is worth summarizing its advantages up front. The
generation of an identity alongside its object provides the ground for an account of objective
abstraction or real generalities. That is, we must reject modal Nominalism in favor of the
production of real generalities. This consequence follows from the difference between identity
and object. Identity is not just the identity of a specific thing (nor is it just the thing minus the
predicate ‘exists’ as we critiqued classical accounts of possibility for in chapter 1). If this was the

4

The distinction between entity and object in analytic philosophy in the middle of the 20 th century seems to me to be
a loose distinction aimed at clarifying whether one is talking about the formal object (say, a Set-Theoretical
surrogate in a model) of which something is predicated or the existing or actual entity to which a term refers. Given
the tight bond assumed or explicitly argued for between quantification and ontology, or formal logic and
metaphysics more generally, this distinction is more due to a need of clarity in which mode one is speaking
(formally or metaphysically) rather than necessarily referring to two distinct classes of things.
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case, we would have merely doubled the number of things in our ontology, each thing plus its
corresponding identity, with no advantage; here one already imagines the Nominalist looking for
a whetstone. If, as argued in the previous chapter, identity results from the cancellation of
difference, then an object’s identity is not an ideal double of it because the object differs in itself,
whereas an identity qua identity does not differ from itself. Further, an identity is already a
generality because it is generated out of a process of cancelling difference. This implies that even
an object’s identity understood as its “self-identity” ranges over multiple things, that is, over
whatever differences it cancels. This would be opposed to just corresponding to one thing as its
identity. As this generality is the result of bringing multiple things together, generality is a
becoming-continuous of these disparate pieces, a process which I will describe and argue for in
detail below. Here it must be said that becoming-continuous is a process of real or objective
abstraction in that it is the production of a generality which does not depend on any sort of
human subjective ‘filtering out’ of specific details (or however one might understand the process
of subjective abstraction).5 That identity, that generality, is then the proper referent when
discussing possibilities which are not necessities or actualities. That is, statements about
possibilities which are neither actualities nor necessities are about the generality which comes
into existence with the object, the identity of an object and its powers. These real generalities can
be the object of such reference because they are the powers which make possible the object

5

For example, Angelleli 2004 takes abstraction as an operation which is performed on true sentences according to
some method which retains some truth of those sentences and leaves out or obscures others. The new sentences
produced then refer to some abstracta of which, if we accept the operation as valid, we would now be committed to
the existence. This makes abstraction depend on the human mind, and it makes abstraction itself a process of
ontological structure mirroring logical structure, insofar as our only access to abstracta is through abstraction.
Angelleli takes his account of “genuine abstraction” to cover an extensive history from Boethius to his analytic
contemporaries, there are several major historical accounts of abstraction which do not fit his model of an individual
logical operation performed by a subject on sentences. While referenced in Angelleli 2005’s history of abstraction,
this account does not cover the Marxist view of real abstraction, which is in many ways the precursor to the
Deleuzian account worked out here. For an overview of Marx’s concept of real abstraction and its legacy and
debates, see Toscano 2008.
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which such statements are about. Such an identity is then based on contingent objects and has
vague but determinable reference. This analysis of the relation between identity and objects thus
allows us an account of possible objects outside of the Nominalist/Actualist Gridlock. Let us first
clarify a potential equivocation on the word ‘individuation.”
C. The Priority of Metaphysical Individuation
Individuation, in its common usage in the analytic idiom, is shorthand for what allows us
to pick out, refer to, name, distinguish, or otherwise identify some object or term. Hence when
Quine gives us his meta-ontological claim that to be is to be the value of a bound variable, he
also stakes his claim against the existence of possibilia since he argues they cannot be
unambiguously individuated from each other such that they can be ranged over by quantifiers
consistently (Quine, 1961, 1-20). Kraut 1980 goes so far as to argue the question of individuation
is not about what there is, but about the relation between formal discourse and ordinary
discourse. To quote his example, the ontological question about tigers isn’t “What kind of thing
is the species tiger, and how does it relate to individual tigers?” Instead, the ontological question
should be “What is the structure of that discourse within which 'tiger' functions rigidly, and how
does it relate to ordinary discourse?” (Kraut, 1980, 134). Here, rigidly6 fixing the meaning of
“tiger” is taken to be enough to handle our ontological concerns. If such a proposal can say
anything about the cosmos at all, it would require an assumed isomorphism between the cosmos
and languages. Without such an isomorphism, individuation so understood would be a question
of coordinating a formal language to everyday speech. This then remains the same problem as
before: our logical tools are being confused for the thing they are meant to study, and

“Rigid” here is a technical term in modal semantics. A name functions rigidly when it picks out the same sort of
entities in all possible worlds.
6
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epistemology is confused with metaphysics. In a post-Kantian world, this is taken to be prudent,
but this supposedly metaphysical agnosticism (of asking only how we carve up the world, not
how it is that the world carves itself up) risks implicitly assuming that there are no distinctions
between things apart from those which we humans make in the world, or that we are capable of
unproblematically recognizing all the concrete differences between things. If possibility (rather
than conditions of possibility) is coupled with individuation, then individuation is a purely
epistemological endeavor. However, this means we will then not be able to account for all
concrete differences between things. We are limited in this account of individuation by the
differences which we are capable of recognizing, and so have limited the possible differences
between objects to the possible differences which humans can recognize (given a certain
language, a certain culture, etc.). We have already seen in chapter one that recognition itself is a
covering over of differences, and so by definition, any account of the differences between objects
limited to human recognition will prematurely exclude some real differences between objects,
that is, the differences which must be covered over to make recognition possible in the first
place.
Here the necessitist may protest that they have split the difference between Nominalism
and the full-blown acceptance of possibilia. They may hold that they do this by having all
objects be actual and necessary, but not currently realizing all of their possibilities. One result of
this ontology would be that statements about possibility may be indexed to objects that are
potentially changing, but necessarily exist. Let’s look at the necessitist central claim by asking:
what is it for everything to be necessarily something? Returning to the necessitism held by
Marcus and Williamson, this position appears at first obviously mistaken as surely each one of us
is a living counter-example: at some point we were not, and one day we won’t be again.
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However, this is not quite what the necessitist means. Instead, the view is not that all objects
exist necessarily, but that all possible worlds contain the same objects; all worlds have the same
ontology. Not every object is actual in all possible worlds; some may only be possible, but they
are possible only in reference to some actual object. That is, if we say that in some possible
world, I am a professional racecar driver, there is no really existing other world in which this is
literally true. Rather, statements about this possible object (me, the possible racecar driver) must
be indexed to some actual object (me, the actual grad student), and same for the possible world
in which I am a world renowned pastry chef. In any possible world where I am never born, there
must still be some referent for statements made about me. Perhaps in a possible world where I
am not actual, these claims are indexed to the proteins that could give rise to the strands of DNA
that could give rise to me (cf. Williamson, 2015, 35-6). And so, if any object of possible
reference necessarily has a referent in a possible world, all objects are necessary. For the
necessitist, whatever I might be in other possible worlds, I can rest assured that I will at least be
in all of them, even if it is just as scattered building blocks.
The necessitist’s account is clearly in opposition to the metaphysics of changing modality
and the generation of new objects that will be worked out in this chapter. In particular, the
necessitist’s ontology is unchanging, whereas a metaphysics of difference is firmly committed to
an ontology which changes over time due to the possibility of ontological novelty. For the
necessitist, new things do not come into reality. The collection of what there is is set for all time.
Any objects that appear to be novel are just the changing of actual objects. For a metaphysics of
difference, on the other hand, what there is is always an open question because it is committed to
claim that the cosmos can produce something ontologically novel. Taken on its own, this is a
quibble between philosophical systems without a real adjudicator, since neither account is an

112

outright contradiction. However, there is a further issue for the necessitist that leads us to reject
their position if we seek to explain the dynamism of this world. Here is the issue: If all
possibilities already exist and are already contained in the objects that can realize them, then it is
unclear how change itself is even possible on such an account. In other words, how would a
necessary, actual object which gains or loses no modal features ever change? Despite rejecting
the reality (but not the formal efficacy or usefulness of talk) of possible worlds, the necessitist’s
account still trades on the static snapshots of reality which possible world semantics describes. If
so, then the necessitist equally lacks an account of a motor which moves us between possible
states of the cosmos. This is surprising as we should expect the state-space semantics developed
in Williamson 2016 which we discussed in the last chapter to give us something like an account
of movement between possible worlds as a state-space is a mathematical tool designed to depict
dynamic states of affairs. If such a semantics did provide evidence for the necessity of objects,
this would be a problem for our account; however, this is not the case.
Williamson himself points out that his state-space semantics can only guarantee
necessitism about propositions. That is, every proposition is necessarily something. Essentially,
this means while some propositions may be contingent in the sense that they could be true or
false, their existence is not contingent. No propositions may enter or leave reality on this view.
To flesh out an example Williamson uses, take the proposition “Socrates exists.” This
proposition is true when Socrates exists, false when he does not. It is contingent relative to its
truths value. Yet, the proposition “Socrates exists” itself exists regardless of its truth value or the
existence of its object Socrates. However, he takes proposition-necessitism to be evidence for
object-necessitism (Williamson, 2016, 481-3). In other words, even if we allow the inference
from logical to ontological structure, Williamson’s state space semantics would only be evidence
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for necessitism about propositions, but not for objects. While Williamson is untroubled by this
gap between objects and propositions, it is extremely telling in light of the truthmakers account’s
rejection of the isomorphism between logical and ontological structure. If we do not read from
the logic to the ontology (which Williamson does), but instead read the relation between objects
and propositions which Williamson’s state space semantics models, we see a very different
relationship between objects and propositions than the one the necessitist proposes. Specifically,
I take the gap as evidence that even if propositions are necessary, the reference relation between
a proposition and the object(s) it is about is not necessary. This is because Williamson’s state
space semantics does not require necessitism about objects in order to derive necessitism about
propositions.7 Rejecting the inference from proposition-necessitism to object-necessitism drives
a clear wedge between metaphysical and epistemological individuation. At the level of the
metaphysical, we have contingent objects which may arise or be annihilated, and this is a
different story than the epistemological level of whether or not a proposition has a referent. The
dynamism of the state-space may shift dramatically under the stasis of the necessarily existing
set of propositions with no regard to what the terms of those propositions are attempting to pick
out. That is, if objects are contingent, the referent of a term may change without the proposition
itself altering. Alternatively, looking at the reference of a proposition as a set of worlds, which
worlds are possible and which are not can change without altering those propositions qua
propositions. This would merely change their truth values. All this means is that even if the set of
all propositions is somehow necessary, that alone says nothing about the state of objects nor
which objects exist. Take the set of all propositions, some of them will be true of the state of my

7

More technically, Williamson 2016 derives a second-order Barcan formula which ranges over the set of all
propositions. This modal formula then translates back into plain English as “necessarily, all propositions are
necessarily something.”
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yard (“the grass is green”, “it is possible there is a tree”) and others will be false (“the grass is
well taken care of”, “necessarily, there are 47 unicorns”). A particularly hot summer or
undertaking some lawncare may change the truth values of some of these propositions relative to
the yard. The grass may brown and the soil may become inhospitable, though unicorns remain
unlikely, nevertheless, changing truth values will not make any proposition no longer a
proposition.
We can maintain this without embracing a Platonism of propositions or a Fregean Third
Realm if we temper this reading with two of our other claims: first, there are only relational
necessities, and second, necessary does not imply fundamental. None of this is to imply that
propositions are otherworldly, but that their necessity does not allow us to infer any such
necessity about objects in the world generally. Since all necessity is relational, an account of how
propositions are necessary is required. This would take us too far afield to go into in detail, but I
take the necessity of propositions to be relative to the stability of the rules of a formal language
which makes those propositions possible. That is, a proposition does not get its being or its
necessity qua proposition from the states of affairs which it is about, but from the language
which produces it. A corollary of this would be that we should expect different modal logics to
be able to equally produce a second-order Barcan formula (the proposition which states that
necessarily all propositions are necessarily propositions) despite having different sets of
propositions which that formula ranges over.
If we leave the story here, we are left with an epistemological nihilism in which our
cosmos contains two separate worlds, the world of objects and the world of propositions, existing
alongside each other without any of what Sher 2016 refers to as “epistemic friction,” which is
her term for whatever it is that allows for propositions to “get a grip” on what there is. This
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would of course break with our starting condition of upholding immanence, and so we must
instead look to the productive forces which produce this situation. The production of real
generalities through the metaphysical individuation of contingent objects is the first step of this.
We begin by showing how the claim that objects8 do not exist necessarily will follows from the
metaphysical foundations here established. Doing so will provide further support for the claim
from Chapter 1 that there are only necessary relations, not necessary objects. To do so, it is not
enough to understand objects on their own, as it is the differential relations within and between
objects which is important here. The dynamism this introduces is not just between, within, and
underneath objects, but in the forging and breaking of relations with other objects. This is not the
classical dynamism of billiard balls ricocheting off each other yet remaining the same despite
their interaction. Instead, we see in the operative powers of objects and of their differences an
ever generative and destructive potential through interaction. Some of the post-Kantian prudence
of making clear our epistemic limits must be maintained. Having an account of individuation in
general does not tell us what individuals there are. That is an empirical question. Nor does such
an account ensure that the ways the world carves itself up, on the one hand, and the practical
distinctions we make, on the other, have any sort of parity or 1-to-1 correspondence with each
other. We must ask what there is to be named, referred to, picked out, etc., and this requires as its
first step a metaphysical account of individuation as the production of individuals.
D. Genesis Without Possibility
Accepting contingent objects means making sense of reference to non-existent objects
along with both the possibility of new objects coming into being and the possibility of existing
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Objects here will include propositions as well. If we are correct above that the necessity of propositions is
grounded in the language which constructs them, then their necessity is a relative one. They remain necessary only
insofar as that language continues to exist. Since languages themselves are contingent, the destruction of a language
destroys their propositions as well.
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objects ceasing to be. We are bound to this cosmos, so we cannot avail ourselves of non-existing
objects waiting in the wings of existence for their cue to take the stage. In the cases where we
refer to something which does not currently exist, we cannot be referring to objects which
already have an identity and exist as a possibility awaiting realization. Nor can we simply
distinguish existence and actuality as actuality is only one aspect of an existing object. Instead,
we must look again at conditions of possibility. A true statement about the possibility of a nonexistent object requires reference to whatever has the power(s) to bring that object about. We are
then making a claim about how powers can be organized, and what structure results. This points
us toward the intensive (organization and co-ordination) and the virtual (powers and structure).
However, it is often the case that such information is not available to us until after the thing has
come into being. We see the important lesson in Quine’s worry even if he is too cautious: any
claims about the identity of a non- or not-yet existing object can only be guesses as there is no
fact of the matter about an object’s identity before the coming into being of that object. A true
claim about a “non-existent object” is only a manner of speaking about powers which do exist,
even if there are often circumstances in which we are unsurprised, in which what will be the fact
of the matter is so virtually constrained that we have thoroughly reliable guesses. However, the
fecundity of generation is always potentially disrupting, and accounting for metaphysical
individuation should provide an explanation of both this potential foresight as well as its
partiality.
First, we must separate three forms of becoming which have been intertwined or taken as
synonymous in the history of philosophy: actualization, individuation, and realization.
Actualization is the covering over of difference, which is equivalent to the manifestation of a
virtual power or powers discussed in chapter 1. As a banana ripens, it actualizes a yellow peel.
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Individuation is the process of becoming a specific, individuated object. Birth is the last stage of
the individuation process of a human organism. Realization is the movement from possibility to
existence, (Deleuze, 1994, 211). Having a set of blueprints for a ham radio then building a device
that corresponds to those blueprints is a process of a realization. Of the three, realization diverges
most dramatically from its common usage because of Deleuze’s separation of the possible from
the virtual. Realization in Deleuze is generally understood as an epistemic relation to the world
in that possibilities are mental, and some processes can be undergone which bring the world into
accord with a set of possibilities (Deleuze, 1994, 212). Without minds, actualization and
individuation would be unchanged. However, realization as a process would not exist because
without minds, neither would possibility, and so there would be nothing to realize. What is
central to this distinction is that realization never occurs without actualization or individuation
(often both), but actualization and individuation can occur without being the realization of
anything.9 This follows from the materialist constraint that minds are not fundamental to the
cosmos. Any object at all will undergo actualization and individuation, since every object will
have an actual aspect and will need to be individuated from other objects in order to be an object
at all. Realization, on the other hand, requires the existence of a mind to take place. Since minds
themselves must be actualized and individuated but not realized in order to exist, the former two
processes are more fundamental. We will show below that actualization and individuation are
powers of difference itself. Any truth which depends on realization then cannot be a necessary
truth since realization is not a power of difference itself.10

9

We will see below that individuation takes shape through actualization, and so cannot exist as a process alone
either. Actualization requires that there be objects that have been individuated, but as a process, actualization does
not proceed through individuation. In other words, realization operates through actualization, individuation, or both.
Individuation operates through actualization, and actualization operates through the powers of objects.
10
This explicates the argument in the introduction against intuitionism in mathematics since intuitionism attempts to
ground the necessary truths of mathematics on the constructive powers of the mind, i.e. realization. Since realization
is not a power of difference itself (it is a power of minds), then it is contingent. The cosmos could exist without
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We see the prime example of these three processes being confused for one simple process
in even the greatest thinker of modality in the medieval period when Ibn Sina takes the
possibility of a contingent thing to be a property of that thing itself. “In order to exist, a thing
must be intrinsically possible; otherwise, it could never be. No agent could produce it unless it
were possible in itself.”11 On this view, a thing is individuated by its essence which pre-exists its
being, and it is then realized by something else bringing it about. An essence must pre-exist the
thing because essence is required for the judgment of intrinsic possibility, and the claim that a
thing must first be possible before it can come to be is endorsed, thereby tying identity,
possibility, and essence into a conceptual knot. This pairs nicely with a view of creation wherein
what becomes does so because its idea confirms to some unfolding of an eternal rationality of the
divine mind. If god is to make something new, the essence is already in god’s mind so god can
realize a possibility by actualizing a power, thereby individuating an object.12 Such a
metaphysics of identity is unable to provide any real separation of these processes because of the
link made between possibility, essence, identity, and power in god’s nature.
While this may seem archaic to some contemporary metaphysicians, it is obvious that this
view continues today in the analytic tradition where often the sin qua non of metaphysical

minds, therefore realization is a contingent process. Now, if realization is an essential power of minds (whether
human or more general), then realization may ground some essential truths, but these will not be the necessary
modal truths of mathematics. This account of essence and truth is explored in detail in chapter 4.
11

Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, IV, 2.

12

In the context of Medieval Islamic metaphysics, this is not an argument idiosyncratic to Ibn Sina, though he gives
the argument its recognizably modern modal formulation. A similar argument is already formulated in terms of
Qur’anic scholarship by the Mu’tazila school a century or two before Ibn Sina. Menzel 2020 briefly reconstructs
their argument as follows: “creation consists in God saying “Be!” to a thing, causing it thereby to exist, to become
an existent (Wisnovski 2003, p. 147). The apparent implication here… was that, because things are commanded to
exist, they must in some sense have been prior to God’s creative commands.” This leads to an ontology which
includes several classes of non-existent things such as “that have ceased to exist but were called into existence, those
that will be called into existence, and those that only could be, but never in fact are, called into existence,” (Menzel,
2020, 1973, original emphasis).
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possibility is conceivability without contradiction.13 This conceivability criterion is often phrased
in terms of an idealized reasoner to rule out human error or lack of imagination (Chalmers, 2002,
148), a contemporary divine mind if ever there was one. It is also clearly the same issue found in
any account that takes possible worlds or possibilia generally to be the fundamental facts about
modality. This holds even if we remove any divine minds and the conceivability criterion: a
thing has its possibility intrinsically, and so somehow remains strictly possible even if nothing
currently in the world has the power to bring it about. To shift from possibility as a property of a
thing to conditions of possibility, what is needed is an account wherein a thing’s possibility need
not pre-exist its coming into being. To do this, we must split the processes of realization,
actualization, and individuation.
We can begin with realization. As we argued above, realization is not a power of
difference itself, and therefore cannot ground necessary truths. Realization is separated from
actualization in that actualization is always the actualization of some power, of some virtuality.
The virtual is already real, and so cannot be ‘realized,’ (Deleuze, 1994, 211-2). Realization is
also not individuation because to realize a possibility requires the object to have already been
individuated as a possible object before it comes into being (usually through an essence, this is
again the classical knot along with possibility and identity). Since possibility is an
epistemological judgment, realization cannot be a fundamental process, as minds or other beings
capable of judgments of whether or not something is possible are not fundamental. This is the
source of the Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, and Avicennian confusion; each takes the divine mind
to be fundamental to the universe and its unfolding, and so to come into being is to be the

13

This is, of course, excluding views of contemporary analytic metaphysicians who based modality on an explicitly
theistic foundation such as Pruss 2002. Such accounts are already barred from us by accepting materialism as a
constraint.
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process of a thought being made real. The positing of such a fundamental mind results in
realization being indistinguishable from either actualization, individuation, or both.
Nor can the mathematical and logical tools used to study modality be fundamental. For
this reason, any account which grounds possibility in possible worlds as a formalism has
confused individuation or actualization with realization. Therefore, realization is not of
fundamental metaphysical concern. This separation between realization on the one hand and
actualization and individuation on the other allows us to clarify what we mean by the production
of the new. To do so, we must distinguish between two types of novelty: metaphysical novelty,
which is the coming into being of something new, and epistemological novelty, which is the
discovery or creation of new truth whether or not something new has come into being. These two
forms of novelty are not mutually exclusive. What matters for our task here is showing that
metaphysical novelty is independent from any recognition from a knower that it is new. Doing so
clarifies what we are rejecting when we reject necessitism about objects.
To show the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical novelty, let us look at two
examples. Kant's search for conditions of synthetic a priori judgments in the Critique of Pure
Reason gives us epistemic novelty (synthetic knowledge is constructed, so we can have novel
insights) without metaphysical novelty (as the transcendental is necessary and outside of time).14
In Kant, what there is can remain profoundly static all the while a knower can continually be
surprised by the production of new information about what there is. Alternately, one could have
absolute ontological novelty without any epistemic novelty, such as in Meillassoux’s speculative
materialism found in After Finitude. Meillassoux provides an ontology without necessity, and so
anything could become absolutely otherwise in the next moment, yet this is based on the a priori
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One could rightfully ask what is the ontological status of a new insight? This question will return with the
problem of pre-existence treated below.
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status of mathematics which remains static. Therefore, if we were ideal mathematicians, we
could have continual novel metaphysical occurrences (because there is no necessity to constrain
what and how things change) which nevertheless were not surprising to us in the least as they are
already completely mathematizable. This is not to claim that epistemic and metaphysical novelty
are opposed, as one could also reject both. The twin Platonic doctrines of the Forms and
Recollection reject both metaphysical and epistemic novelty. The Forms are taken to be eternal,
if everything that exists participates in some form, then everything that comes into being is not
novel because its being is exhaustively explained by the Form(s) in which it participates.
Thereby, there would be no metaphysical novelty. Furthermore, since learning here is not the
production of new knowledge but rather the recollection of the knowledge of the Forms already
latent within the soul, there is no epistemic novelty either. Despite the necessity of making the
distinction between metaphysical and epistemic novelty, this project is committed to both. The
point here is to show their conceptual independence, and that each can be fruitfully pursued
separately.
With these two distinguished, let us attempt to save metaphysical novelty from
epistemological concerns in order to focus primarily on the former. Pre-reflexively, we may
assume that epistemic novelty depends on metaphysical novelty in that something must first
come into being before we can produce knowledge of it. If this were the case, then anytime we
had knowledge of something, we should be able to infer that the thing exists. This follows from
our everyday understanding of the novel as something surprising or unexpected, but such a
connotation is an anthropocentrism that must be banished from the concept of metaphysical
novelty. Understanding the coming into being of something new as tied to a phenomenon of
surprise binds the metaphysical by the epistemological. Instead, we must recognize that new
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objects might come into being which are completely banal to us because we were able to see
beyond the current state of affairs. This happens most frequently in cases such as engineering or
slight technological advancements where something which was not possible before comes into
being, but one of its conditions of coming into being is the blueprint which describes it. Taking
this example, we can say that if the blueprint did not exist, then, strictly speaking, the technical
object would have been impossible. The conditions for it coming into being would not all obtain.
Yet if the blueprint does indeed succeed, if it does describe the proper ways to organize and
assemble the object such that it does what is intended, then there should be nothing surprising
about the technical object once it is constructed despite it being a true ontological novelty.
Seemingly, this happens when we have a robust scientific theory and corresponding instruments.
Perhaps the most surprising part of producing the Higgs Boson in a laboratory setting for the first
time is that we learned nothing new from it. Producing Higgs Bosons provided evidence for the
Standard Model of particle physics, but it led to no epistemic novelty precisely because of the
predictive power of the model.
If this independence of metaphysical novelty from epistemic novelty is the case, then let
us set aside fully any epistemological concerns, any concerns about how we may know a novelty
qua novelty, and instead look to questions of what the metaphysical conditions which would
allow for novelty are. With such epistemological concerns bracketed, and the anthropocentrism
of surprise rejected, we can say what we mean by the production of the new: the production of
the new (synonymous with metaphysical novelty) is the coming into being of the conditions of
possibility for an object or occurrence which was at one point impossible, or is the coming into
being of the conditions of possibility which change incompossibilities into compossibilities.
Strictly speaking, we should separate metaphysical and ontological novelty from each other as
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well. Ontological novelty is the genesis of a new object. For instance, the first butterfly, even
though it is a part of the continuous movement of life from generation to generation, was an
ontological novelty. Metaphysical novelty is the genesis of new ways of being, for instance,
cosmological accounts that explain the generation of causation itself. I will use these two
interchangeably here as, if both metaphysical and ontological novelty are the result of the
coming into being of new objects or powers from those which already exist, then individuation is
the first step for both processes of genesis. This also means that not all change or alteration is an
example of metaphysical novelty.
The relevant distinction for the question of the conditions of possibility of an object (as
opposed to the manifestation of a power) is the difference between actualization and
individuation. Actualization manifests a power (such that a difference is covered over in an
object, or the power changes in degree or kind, but the object remains the same) whereas
individuation as the production of a new object. This distinction is necessary for avoiding a
common misreading of Deleuze, one which is diagnosed and aptly riposted by Kleinherenbrink
2019. The common misreading reduces objects to the virtual. Since the virtual, on its own, has
vague and indeterminate boundaries, reducing objects to virtuality also implies that objects’
separation or their discontinuity between each other is somehow illusory, and what “there really
is” is a single, all pervasive virtual field. This is a view found both in Deleuze’s critics and in
some of his supporters.15 As we have already established the virtual and the actual (alongside the
intensive) as dimensions of objects, it is clear we must be opposed to this reading of a singular
virtual field for all existence (a sort of virtual holism, as it were). We broach this topic here
because were Deleuze to treat the virtual as a sort of holistic background of potential which gives
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Cf. Kleinherenbrink, 2019, 31-7. Examples of such accounts include Hallward 2006, Badiou 2000, Williams
2004.
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rise to everything which is, then the distinction between actualization and individuation would
not hold. There would be no difference between the two processes because everything which
occurred which simply be an actualization of this holistic virtual field. This would present two
problems for readers of Deleuze. First, if all objects were really just actualizations of a holistic
virtual field, then what sense can be made of Deleuze’s distinction between individuation and
actualization? Deleuze goes so far as to call the confusion of individuation with the processes
through which actual difference is established an “error, this time in the actual, analogous to that
made in confusing the virtual with the possible,” (Deleuze, 1994, 247). Second, and more
importantly, how could Deleuze embrace metaphysical novelty when reducing individuation to
the actualization of the virtual would mean that the potential for everything that is possible
already exists in the virtual? Novelty would be reduced to mere change. It is precisely this
distinction between actualization and individuation which allows us to separate the production of
the new from mere change as alteration of properties and qualities. This distinction cannot be
annulled without the system falling into nonsense.16
By simple alteration, I mean the change of properties, of the intensification of qualities an
object already possesses, or any other movement between actualities which it is already in the
power of an object to undergo. That is, the virtual structure of the object already contains the
potential for that actualization. The production of the new is that which brings a new identity into
being, and in doing so, alters the modal landscape. New objects bring new powers which bring
new possibilities, and perhaps erase or constrain old ones. Put simply, actualization alone does
not give rise to the ontologically or metaphysically novel (even if it may be surprising) as what is
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The necessistist also cannot make this distinction, though there it is a question of empirical adequacy rather than
consistency or nonsense as they do not promise a system in which ontological novelty is possible.
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actualized is already potential in the virtual powers of an object. In these cases, the potential of
what is actualized can already be located in the virtual. Individuation, which must still be carried
out by objects through their powers, intensities, and actualities, brings a new object into being
along with its possibility, and so brings new powers and a new identity. We can now attend to
the unfolding of the process of the individuation of new objects.
E. Producing the New
We have separated out the uniqueness of metaphysical individuation: it is the generation
of a new object from the capacities of other objects, and this new object does not share an
identity with the objects from which it is generated. It is then also the production of a new
identity. It is a process which creates not just the object, but also the possibility of that object,
and alters the modal landscape by bringing new powers into being with it. Here the issue gets
thorny: what prevents the conditions of possibility (the collection of objects, powers, and
differential relations that can bring a thing into being) from just being the pure possibility of an
object (the brute fact that it is possible)? That is, what comes into being with the object and its
identity which is not already contained in its conditions of possibility? There must be some gap
here between the powers which make an object possible and that object. Otherwise all
possibilities would currently exist as the potential product of all current conditions and whatever
else those conditions could bring about. There certainly exist conditions for possibilities yet to be
realized, but a commitment to metaphysical novelty implies that there are things which can come
to be for which the conditions to produce them do not currently obtain. The question is then what
is needed to make an object possible in addition to the existence of the various powers to bring
that object about? There must then be a further condition produced by the real interaction of the
conditions of possibility of a thing; that is, something must come about from the gathering
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together of objects that is not contained in them as a mere aggregate. Deleuze has a term for this
detail, this condition which comes about only through the real interactions of the other
conditions, yet is not contained in any of them or their mere aggregate alone: the dark precursor.
An object is possible when there exist the powers to bring it about, that is when other
objects’ virtual aspects have the powers needed to produce the object. These objects and their
powers make up what is called by Deleuze, following Simondon, the pre-individual field. The
pre-individual field in Deleuze’s rendering is a virtual field (Deleuze, 1994, 246), but it cannot
be the virtual aspect of the object to be individuated. These objects and their powers do not share
an identity with what they will produce; rather they will, through their real interaction, produce
that object and its identity. If we were to attempt to locate the identity of the object to be
produced at this point, at the level of its conditions of possibility, we would then be individuating
based on a prior identity. Such would be as if the object were already contained in the preindividual field somehow. Nor can the pre-individual field already have a sort of harmony or
order to itself before the objects that make it up enter into a real interaction. If such a pre-existing
order were the case, that would be enough to establish a pre-existing identity or principle of
individuation in the pre-individual field itself.17 Rather, the pre-individual field is the powers of
other objects which, when brought together in whatever way(s) allow them to interact, can give
rise to the process of individuation which creates the new object and its identity. This is due
partially to the struggle between different powers which can be actualized, but cannot be
actualized together (and so are incompossible). The pre-individual field is then constituted by
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This production of a common identity out of disparate elements which lack any pre-established harmony or order
can be seen as a part of clarifying the communication between impossible worlds (in Deleuze’s sense) in Chapter 1.
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difference and tension, a state of affairs Deleuze refers to as “problematic” or simply “a
problem.”18
This is not the whole story of individuation. It is necessary for the individuation of an
object that such powers which make the object possible exist, but not it is sufficient. There must
also be a real operation which selects and connects these disparate powers. There must be
something capable of linking these powers together in a way which determines what and how
those powers get actualized. Were there no gathering, the new object would be nothing more
than the mere aggregate of actualizations of these various powers, and so individuation would
fall back into actualization. If this gathering together didn’t have the character of a determining,
then this gathering of powers could only remain indeterminate. No object would be formed
because its conditions would not be brought together. It must operate through difference, such as
how the heatsink operates to move heat by first having established thermal differences. Were this
gathering to operate, select, or determine based on identity, recognition, or the like, this would be
to fall back into the pre-existence of identity to the object. Such would annul the distinction
between realization and individuation we have argued for. The dark precursor is then the
intensive connection which makes possible the production of something new by joining two or
more objects together in a process of the production of a third (Deleuze, 1994, 246). A mere
thermal difference in objects does not make a heatsink, a path which establishes a potential
thermal flow across those objects turns the objects linked by that intensive path into a heatsink.
Here we see the reverberations of Deleuze's refrain that relations are always external to their
terms, meaning that any relation produced in an interaction is not reducible to either or both
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The problem in Deleuze is an absolutely central concept with an interesting philosophical legacy (he attributes it
to both Kant and Simondon), but delving deeper here would take us too far afield. See Voss, 2018.
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relata, but rather becomes an entity in its own right.19 In the example of the simple heatsink, the
intensive relation results from the gathering together of the two objects with a thermal difference
is external to either object which it relates. This relation cannot be said to have originated in
either or to have extended from one to the other somehow, nor does it internalize one object to
the other. This intensive relation is a difference which establishes itself as different from its
relata in the act of relating them.
Let us say more to separate the pre-individual field from the dark precursor. In explaining
how something new comes to be, one may point to the milieu from which it arises. By milieu, I
mean the object’s environment, the collection of objects, their relations, and whatever vague,
contextual features one wishes to include which surround the pre-individual field. Deleuze takes
it as a particularly notable feature of Simondon’s account of individuation that it does not reduce
the new object to its environment (Deleuze, 2004, 86). Deleuze emphasizes this anti-reductionist
aspect through the role the dark precursor plays in the production of the new object. The dark
precursor is not identical with that milieu; in fact, the dark precursor lacks any meaningful
identity.20 Each object in a milieu has a virtual aspect (this is what makes the pre-individual field
possible), but the virtual alone cannot explain individuation because the powers of different
objects do not interact directly. If powers did interact directly in such a way as to bring a new
object into being, then the potential for that object would already exist in the milieu. This is
because the objects in the milieu would already contain the power to bring about the new object
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Deleuze, 2002, 55, though this claim resonates throughout Deleuze's entire oeuvre as Kleinherenbrink 2019
emphasizes.
20

Deleuze does say the dark precursor has an identity (perhaps to avoid logical traps entailed be the complete denial
of identity), but that that identity has nothing to do with how it fulfills its role of facilitating system coupling. From
the point of view of the systems which are coupling and the system produced, the dark precursor has no discernible
identity. "This is no doubt that there is an identity belonging to the precursor, and a resemblance between the series
which it causes to communicate. This 'there is,' however, remains perfectly indeterminate... [Resemblance and
identity] are only a condition of [difference’s] representation." (Deleuze, 1994, 119-120).
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as they would have the power to gather themselves. Since the power to produce the object would
already be contained in the milieu, this would annul any real production of the new. This would
then be a case of actualization, not of individuation. One might expect the dark precursor to be
virtual, that is, to be a power because the dark precursor seems to do something. This expectation
is a remnant of the confusion between actualization and individuation, and, by way of this
confusion, all generation and change are understood in terms of already existing powers, or
worse, possibilities. This confusion leads into the misreading of Deleuze in which the virtual is
fundamental, all pervasive, and already contains all potentialities within it, and it leads to
reducing the generation of the new to the actualization of an already existing virtual potential.
Instead, the dark precursor is intensive, a pure difference which makes possible an ordering or a
connection. Whatever the dark precursor does, it does so as a power of difference itself, not as a
power actualized from the virtual aspect of some object. This remedies another possible
confusion, namely, that of treating the aspects of an object as hierarchically related. This error
would be to assume that the virtual grounds the intensive, which in turn grounds the actual. Even
though the virtual plays a role of structure and characterizes grounding, in the production of the
new which instead begins with the intensive, the virtual is ungrounded.
These intensive differences between objects are not isolated within them, but rather
connect and interact with each other. As we saw in Chapter 1, intensities enter into relations and
determine each other through difference. This is the very condition for the possibility of a milieu
in the first place. Within this milieu, this collection of interacting objects, it is possible that a
novel arrangement is produced. This novel arrangement made up of the intensive differences of
various objects is not identical with, nor can it be identified as part of, any particular object.
Powers do not interact directly; they are constrained by actualities, and they are connected by
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intensities. This is the dark precursor, and we can see why it is dark: it has no identity of its own
in any meaningful sense, it cannot be located, pointed to, or discovered. However, it does not
remain dark for long, as it brings into existence a new object from those objects which it has
assembled. Once a new object has appeared, the dark precursor has disappeared, or rather, is
folded into the new object. The electric potential which traced the path of the lightning would
take is discharged in the strike itself. The individuation of lightning uses up the very potential
that makes its strike possible. Its intensive condition may come to look like any other intensity,
resultant from structure and ordering qualities, or it may disappear in a way which merely alters
the object. However, it has left evidence of itself in the new system which has been produced.
The dark precursor, as an operation of linkage or connection, is productive of a continuity which
is central to the constitution of the new object. Let us first look at the example of the lightning
strike in detail, and then explicate this continuity.
This productive role of the dark precursor is shown through Deleuze’s example of the
lightning strike. During a thunderstorm, the clouds and the ground develop a difference in
electric potential, an intensive difference at the middle of the two objects. This will result in a
lightning strike, an event which effectively couples the cloud-object and ground-object for a brief
duration, producing a new though short-lived object, the lightning bolt. What the dark precursor
picks out in this example is the moment before the strike. At that moment, a path to ground is
traced out by the electric potential gradient. It is this path that the bolt will follow, but first, it is a
potential path, spontaneously assembled from a chaotic system of differential relations between
electrical potentials which connects the clouds to the ground; a swirling pre-individual
electromagnetic field already organizing a series of actual charges which, when obtaining the
right order, give rise to a linkage of electric potentials that make possible both power of striking
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and the actual bolt which strikes. It is this connection cobbled together out of the to-be-coupled
systems themselves which leads DeLanda to characterize the dark precursor as an information
exchange channel, echoing Deleuze’s use of information theoretic language when explicating the
process in both Difference and Repetition and his summarized account in “The Method of
Dramatization.”21 The glossing of the dark precursor in information theoretical, dynamical
systems, and meteorological terms is useful both to highlight Deleuze's inheritance from the
sciences as well as to make obvious some applications of the concept of the dark precursor.
However, we risk conflating the philosophical with the scientific when we import a scientific
term into a metaphysical explanation. Leaving the definition in these terms may lead us to
misuse the dark precursor as a description of a state of affairs which serves to classify certain
referents and their relations and movements rather than as a response to a metaphysical
problem.22 For instance, when we remember the question to which the dark precursor responds
(how is something new created without a pre-existing identity?), it is clear that the example of
the lightning bolt cannot be exhaustive. While that specific strike may be new in the sense that it
is a haecceity (this bolt has never struck before, and never will again, i.e. it is an ontological
novelty), lightning bolts themselves are not particularly novel (this bolt does not bear a
metaphysical novelty). Individuation as philosophical concept is meant to equally explain both
the new haecceity and the new kind.
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DeLanda, 2002, 83-85, here DeLanda motivates the adoption of the quasi-causal operator (which he suggests is
synonymous with the dark precursor) from entirely empirical concerns. Deleuze likewise points to the empirical
sciences, but also to Proust; however, he does this specifically to motivate the problem (how to make sense
ontologically of communication between disparate series), not to motivate the dark precursor per se. ("Method of
Dramatization", 7). In other words, Deleuze is not ontologizing scientific posits or empirical discoveries. This
would violate his critique of making the transcendental a mirror of the empirical. Rather, he is first generating the
problem, and finds in science inspiration for a solution to that problem. Science does not motivate the positing of the
dark precursor, the metaphysical problem does.
22

cf. Mader, 2017 for a similar argument in regards to the concept of intensity.
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Here an earlier claim is brought to fruition: the identity of a thing cannot be one of its
conditions of possibility. The brute fact of an object’s identity comes into being with the object
itself. The possibility of an object need not precede it. A thing is identified by its powers as we
argued with the Dispositionalists in Chapter 1, and its powers do not pre-exist it. The lightning
cannot strike before the intensive order of potentials obtains. The Earth and the cloud do not
have the power to generate a lightning bolt without this order. In fact, this grounds our
distinction between epistemic and metaphysical individuation above. Epistemic individuation is
undertaken through examination of the virtual aspect of an object. This is because epistemic
individuation treats the object as already formed and so we can pick it out by way of its powers.
Metaphysical individuation, on the other hand, is the production of the object’s identity in the
first place and cannot be grounded in its own powers because the object doesn’t make itself. It is
instead an operation grounded in intensive difference. This also maintains the distinction
between individuation and actualization as well as between objects and their powers. A
manifestation of a power may be possible even if it has never obtained as long as that power
exists. An object is possible if and only if its conditions (including a way of bringing those
conditions together) exist. It also separates the conditions of the possibility of an object from the
identity of that object, as the identity of an object implies its possibility, and its possibility is not
to be found among its conditions of possibility before their coming together. This leads to a
curious implication: an object has a certain independence from that which produces it. An object
is tied to its conditions of possibility in that nothing can bring itself into existence through its
own power because those powers do not exist as the powers of that object until the object itself
exists. However, it is also independent of them in that its identity cannot be contained in
anything else. Since identity depends on difference, it is these differences between an object and
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what produces and sustains it which we must investigate to clarify the status of identity in a
metaphysics of differences. That is, we must look at how an object is different from the parts
which make it up and from the other objects to which it relates (i.e. its milieu). As long as there
are objects, there will exist the difference between themselves, their parts, and their relations.
Therefore, these are necessary differences, and so can stand as truthmakers for certain classes of
necessary truths. We will see that since the production of a new object involves the becomingcontinuous of the new object over its parts, this process can stand as a truthmaker for the
mathematical continuum.
F. The Independence of Objects
If, in the case of ontological novelty, an object’s possibility comes into being alongside it,
then we must be careful not to fall into the traps of various reductions of possibility and identity
to something else. We have already seen how this account avoids the oldest of these reductions,
Platonism, where the reduction of a thing’s identity is to some pre-existing possibility that has
always been purely possible. There are two other common ways of explaining away the
production of the new which we have already hinted at. First, there is the reduction of the new
object to its parts. In this way, a new object is treated as already having been possible simply
because its parts exist. Second, there is the exhaustion of an object by its relations. Here the
object is understood as nothing new as it was already itself a part of some wider whole, such as
when a new discovery is said to have already “been in the air.” Here we take our lead from
Graham Harman’s work criticizing what he calls “undermining” (reducing objects to something
more “fundamental”) and “overmining” (reducing objects to their effects or other “superficial”
features), collectively referred to as “duomining” (Harman, 2013). Harman’s criticisms are
aimed specifically at ontologies which do not include independent objects as fundamental in
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some way (e.g. metaphysical holism or reductive atomism). This line of thought will be here
extended to critique ontologies which do include objects, but which do not account for, or which
explain away, the production of truly novel objects. Undermining relates to the criticism of
reduction and overmining to exhaustion. While there are various counterexamples, reduction is
more common among analytic metaphysics, and exhaustion among continental.
Our account of the genesis of new objects resists reduction to more fundamental parts.
This is because a dark precursor makes possible a power or powers which did not exist in the
parts that come together to make up the new object. A dark precursor’s operation gives rise to a
new power which was not to be found in the virtual fields of any of the objects which generated
it (whether as parts or as context). New powers also imply new actualizations. The dark
precursor does this by creating a linkage, an order, or connection between disparate objects. This
linkage is not itself a continuity, but it sets the stage for one. The becoming of a new object is a
becoming-continuous of or over its parts. The linkage gives rise to an object, with its own
virtuality and actuality coalescing around the intensive order established through the dark
precursor. More precisely, what is produced through this linkage is what Deleuze and Guattari,
following the medieval Latin tradition on intensity, call the “latitude” of the object. “An
accidental form therefore has a “latitude” constituted by a certain number of composable
individuations” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 253). Furthermore, “latitude is made up of intensive
parts falling under a capacity, and longitude of extensive parts falling under a relation” (Deleuze
& Guattari, 1987, 257, emphasis removed). Therefore, the continuity of the new object is not
solely intensive, but is cut across by actualization, which is a sign of the new virtuality and
actuality which has come into being. This is necessary for a proper continuum because a
connection alone does not make a continuum. A continuum requires a robustness to potentially
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being divided. The object does not have a continuity of its own until its intensive parts fall under
its capacities, that is, until it is in the object’s own powers to be that object.
We here find ourselves at a potential contradiction: an object both depends on its parts
and is independent of them. The object is a continuity of its parts, yet it cannot be identified with
either its parts or the aggregate thereof. Let us then make a distinction following the two lines
quoted above. The parts which an object is independent of are its external parts. These are the
real objects which are brought together by the operation of the dark precursor. The parts which
the object depends on are its internal parts or its internal relations. There is a possible infelicity
which must be resolved, that of the phrase “internal relations” in a system which supports the
externality of relations thesis that relations are external to their terms. The externality of relations
thesis applies only to real distinctions between things, not to formal distinctions. The internal
relations of an object are not relations between separable terms; that is, they are only the formal
distinction between internal or intensive parts. Internal parts are only formally distinct within the
relation that is produced as external to its relata (its extensive parts). Internal parts are not
objects in their own right; they are differential relations within an object’s structure. They are
ways in which the object differs in itself, and so can only be pointed to or recognized by a
misapplication of identity to them. Hence the infelicity of calling them “parts.” It is the same for
the term “internal relations,” which we may use to refer to the linkages between internal parts,
but we must again be aware that any implication of separability is purely a misapplication of an
identity to that which operates only through difference.
When Aristotle remarks that a severed hand is only a hand homonymously, he is making
the same distinction. By “hand,” Aristotle is referring to the functional role in relation to the
body as a whole. A hand is then the internal part, which has its role in virtue of its relation to
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other parts, not to the bone, meat, blood, etc. that make up the external parts and which enter as
relata into a relation external to them. A human body is a becoming-continuous of its component
external parts, and the body itself has internal differences which only make sense in relation to
each other. To distinguish the hand from the body is not to talk about a real, discrete object, the
hand, but rather only to make a formal distinction within the body. The hand may become a
discrete object on its own. It may be severed and displayed in a museum perhaps, but then it will
have a real distinction from the body. Its powers will have changed, and the word “hand” will
have changed its sense in referring to it. To talk of internal relations and internal parts is to talk
of the differences within an identity or within an object.
This distinction between external and internal parts finds its justification in the fact that
the generation of a continuity is also the generation of a generality. It is a process of real
abstraction. Here, the work of Peirce is vital on two accounts. First, for the relation between
continuity and generality that he provides. Second, for the view that a continuum is not merely a
relation, but also requires a sort of ‘filling in’ of the discontinuity between the relata, or provides
a robustness against potential division into its parts. We will see that these are not unrelated.
First, for Peirce, continuity implies generality because a continuum cannot be made up of
individuals alone. Individuals are distinct, and so have discontinuities between them. A
generality, on the other hand, exists by way of an indistinction between its parts, by way of a
commonality which treats its parts together. These two concepts, generality and continuity, are
so hand-in-hand that, after explicating them, Peirce goes as far as to claim: “the question of
nominalism vs realism has taken shape: are any continua real?” (Peirce, 2010, 175). We then
require something which stands in between distinct individuals to make them continuous. There
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is only one option: potentiality23 (Zalamea, 2012, 11-2), that is, the virtual. Here we see the same
point as we saw in Deleuze and Guattari: the latitude of an object is formed only when its
intensive parts ‘fall under a capacity,’ that is, a relation between the virtual and the intensive
where the degrees of the intensive are not just linked but are also undergirded by or “glued
together” through the potentiality of the virtual. Interestingly, both Peirce and Deleuze call this
potential continuity an Idea: “Continuity is thus a special kind of generality, or conformity to one
Idea” (Peirce, 1958, 7.535 n6); “The Idea of fire subsumes fire in the form of a single continuous
mass capable of increase. The Idea of silver subsumes its object in the form of a liquid continuity
of fine metal.” (Deleuze, 1994, 171).24
In the production of the new object, discontinuities give rise to a generality or a
continuity. Here the whole stands to its parts as a concrete universal stands to its particulars
(Deleuze, 1994, 173) in that it is generated alongside their interactions and is as much affected
by its parts as the parts are made continuous by the whole. This is not a relation of resemblance,
nor a classical relation of genus to species. External parts do not resemble internal parts, and vice
versa. The former are separable from the object, the latter are not; the former are substances, the
latter are what they do. Therefore, the object qua continuity is a continuity of its internal parts,
and it is a generality over its external parts since the haecceity, the specificity of the external
parts, does not matter to the continuity of the object. This continuity of internal parts is Deleuze’s
answer to the classic metaphysical question “what is an object?” An object is what it is by way of
the organization of its parts into a working consistency.25 I say a “working consistency” because
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Peirce names possibility as this intermediary, and uses the term interchangeably with potentiality. This use of
possibility is obviously barred to us.
24

For Deleuze, the notion of an Idea is also directly related to that of the problem (following Kant on regulative
Ideas).
25
Readers of Deleuze will recognize this continuity as a body without organs. Due to the textual difficulties and its
hermeneutical idiosyncrasy (it a phrase taken from a play by Artaud, and given a more determinate meaning as a
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no whole can exhaust its parts (as will be argued below), and so continuity can only be
established potentially and partially. A whole cannot absorb its parts into an actual continuum.
Rather, this produced continuity is the disposition(s) which structures the object. It is by doing so
that the production of the continuity itself must be understood as an objective abstraction.
The abstraction that takes place is the abstraction from an existent object to a functional
role (Deleuze, 1994, 216). This is clear as what matters to the new object is not what the objects
producing or sustaining it are but what they are able to do. Once the object is generated, it is
indifferent to the specifics of its external parts. As long as there is any object or objects which
provide the right conditions for the continuity of the generated object, the generated object
remains the same and is sustained. Those conditions do not specify any specific objects, only
intensities capable of a certain order. Those intensities require only the manifestation of certain
virtual powers which maintain them. This in turn ‘fills in’ the latitude of the object by providing
not just the ordered degrees of intensity, but also the potential to move between them. The
generated object is then virtually robust: its structure can be maintained by any external parts
which have the right powers to play the role of its internal parts. Theseus’s ship does not become
a new ship when a plank is replaced so long as it maintains a relation among its parts such that it
remains capable of sailing, carrying its cargo without sinking, housing its sailors, etc. Among its
dispositions is the potential exchangeability of its external parts for others while itself remaining
the same. It is in this sense that a new object is a real abstraction over its parts. We see this must
be an expressive abstraction, or at least, that it is not representative abstraction. The new object
does not resemble its parts, especially as its very production of its internal parts is an operation

response the philosophy of the organism of Hegel and Whitehead, as well as through connections with other
concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s own work), I have chosen to avoid the term here. “The body without organs is
produced as a whole, but in its own particular place within the process of production, alongside the parts that it
neither unifies nor totalizes,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 43).
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made possible by difference itself. No plank “looks like” the ship or “represents” the capacity to
sail; rather, the differential tensions between the planks give rise to the identity of the ship, and
the differential relation between density and buoyancy of the ship relative to sea water gives rise
to the capacity to float.
This continuity must be understood as a result of a becoming-continuous rather than a
completed or actual (and certainly not a fundamental) continuum. That an object have external
parts is necessary; which objects play these roles is contingent, they need only be able to fulfill
the requirements of the object’s internal parts. Any object which has the right powers and is
capable of entering into a relation that establishes it as a part will do.26 Debaise distinguishes a
metaphysics of becoming-continuous from one of continuous becoming in his reading of
Whitehead (a reading in which Deleuze figures prominently27). Distinguishing these two allows
us to avoid Zeno-style paradoxes (Debaise, 2017, 110-1). Continuous becoming, that is change
which happens by tracing out an already established continuity, falls into all the well-known
paradoxes of infinite divisibility. This is because to explain how a continuous movement
happens, we must always account for the earlier fraction of that movement. Then, since that
fraction is itself a movement, we must account for the fractions of that movement, and so on ad
infinitum. These paradoxes befall only a fundamental continuum, that is, a continuum which
stands under its parts rather that one which exists as a coming together of its discrete parts.
However, we must not deflate the continuity produced to a mere aggregate of parts; that
produced continuity is, after all, its own individual which has the same metaphysical status and
the same partial independence from other objects as its parts. Instead, the process of becoming-
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We will explore this more when we turn to the Deleuzian notion of affect in later chapters.
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See especially the chapter on Individuation in White in Debaise, 2017, 43-66.
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continuous establishes a virtual aspect of the new object. Continuity must be virtual; it cannot be
actual because the continuity is not determinate. This continuity is not intensive because the
relation remains despite a change in the relata. That is, if intensity is relations of difference
which are what they are by the pure differences related (see chapter 1), then an intensive relation
is not independent of its relata as any difference related will make a difference, will make a new
relation. Rather it is a virtual structure that is continuous due to the potentiality of its powers
which relate its internal parts to each other. In other words, while external parts are discrete, they
function as internal parts only on the condition of a potential continuity between them. A water
pump is made of various mechanisms, hoses, etc., but it is a pump qua its power to turn a
stationary pool of water into a flow across itself, a continuous stream through its discrete parts.28
G. Internality and Continua
It is this difference between external and internal parts which makes possible truthmakers
for the mathematical continuum. There are many different presentations and formalizations of
the continuum. Its most common formalizations are the real number line which underlies the
construction of the real numbers through Dedekind cuts or Cauchy sequences, or geometric
descriptions such that any section of a continuous line is itself a continuous line. The specific
presentation does not matter here. What matters for our purposes is that our account of objects
and their genesis can provide truthmakers for any given presentation of mathematical continua.
The central feature of the continuum (which Dedekind cuts and other such operations formalize
in different ways) is that it is potentially infinitely divisible without changing in kind. That is,
each divided section remains a continuum; the part is isomorphic with the whole. This is
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This example is unfortunately partial as there may be parts of the pump through which the water does not flow
(say an electronic interface where the user controls the power of the pump). Including multiple flows as continuous
over one object, especially flows of kinetic energy, would greatly extend its descriptive accuracy.
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provided by the difference between an external and an internal part. As long as the role is
fulfilled, any external parts will do. We said above that a continuity is indifferent to the specific
parts which fulfill the role of an internal part. There is then no need for the relationship between
internal and external parts to be one to one. For example, 5 external parts could, if together they
have the right powers, fulfill the role of one internal part. We are also not limited to substitutions
of parts which could actually or even potentially take place. Virtually speaking, any number of
external parts could be substituted in while maintaining the continuity of the object. That there
are only finite objects in the universe does not limit this potentially infinite divisibility. Finitude
only limits what will actually occur. From the point of view of the structure of the object, we
could always make a further cut in the external parts without affecting the structure even if such
cuts are physically impossible.29 It is then this difference between internal and external parts
which is expressed as the infinite divisibility of the continuum. This account of a potential
continuum, or rather, continuum of potentiality that subtends an object is not yet enough to
provide truthmakers for robust mathematical infinity, but we will return to that in Chapter 5.
Here we can clarify our condition of immanence: everything is not already continuous
with everything else (reality contains divergent series, discreteness, and discontinuity), but
everything that exists is a product of processes of becoming-continuous. This process is an
immanent production of potentiality itself. Nothing stands transcendent to relations of
production. This is then a rejection of any sort of fundamental continuum or whole which stands
beyond or underneath its parts. We do not go as far as Peirce in proposing a fundamental
continuum in which all reality is continuous, a position he dubs “synechism.” To follow Peirce
would be to reject becoming-continuous, because synechism implies that everything is already
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This feature of the virtual aspect of an object also reinforces its role as grounding hyperintensional information
because it provides structural information beyond mere possibility and necessity.
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continuous. If everything were already continuous, and the continuum is modal, this continuum
would contain all potentialities. If this were the case, then it would then annul the possibility of
the new as anything that arose would have always already been possible as a potential of the
continuum. Furthermore, to posit a pre-existing continuum would be to deny the possibility of
discrete objects standing as truthmakers for the mathematical continuum. We have shown that
this is possible by making modality a real aspect of discrete objects.
If the production of a new object is the production of a continuity over its parts, it is also
the production of a boundary that separates it from other objects. That is, it is also the production
of a discontinuity in its milieu. This is no less important as an object is just as much individuated
by and from its milieu as its parts. Deleuze gives the example “a geographic process of isolation
may be no less formative of a species than internal genetic variations, and sometimes precedes
the latter,” (Deleuze, 1994, 217). In other words, the milieu is necessary for the production of the
new. If we are not careful with this fact, we fall into the mistake of exhaustion, that is, explaining
away the production of the new by emptying out the unique powers of an object into its context
or environment. If we fall into this mistake, we fail to explain how something produced within a
whole or structure can pass beyond it (e.g. how one language can pick up an idiomatic phrase
from another, and that phrase can function similarly without the community of speakers knowing
anything of the structure of the original language).
To have a non-exhaustive account of the production of the new is to affirm that objects
only ever enter into interactions incompletely. An object produced within a milieu may have
powers which cannot be manifested within that milieu. There is always more to it than what it
came from. Again, the operation of the dark precursor makes this possible in that a new object
will have new powers and new manifestations which may be radically incompatible with its
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context. This is in many ways the inverse of avoiding reduction: in becoming an external part, an
object does not lose the powers it has beyond those of the role of an internal part, and it may
maintain powers which, if manifested, would tear it from the object of which it is a part. If a
weightlifter tears a muscle, it is not simply the weight which causes the tear, but the muscle
fibers actualizing their capacities to extend or contract beyond the structural integrity of the
muscle itself. These powers are only at most constrained (if the containing object plays an active
role in maintaining itself, such as in autopoiesis), not removed. There is then an ineliminable
difference between an object and its milieu. The relation between the two is one of constraint; no
object can actualize all its powers in the same way in any context at all. This is a further
clarification of internal parts in that those parts and relations are not only not identical to the
objects making up the new object’s external parts, but also the object is not entirely continuous
with its milieu. An object’s internal parts are bounded from its context.
All things have their boundary conditions. This boundary is not always successful. Take
for example the element Oganesson. Oganesson has, as far as we know, never existed outside of
a laboratory. Its atomic weight is beyond the capacity of the strong nuclear force’s ability to hold
it together. Because of this, it decays almost immediately after its production. Yet it is still
something to be Oganesson beyond to be a simple aggregate of 118 protons along with the
requisite neutrons and electrons. It produces internal relations that cannot survive beyond a few
tenths of a second because its internal parts cannot maintain the organization of their relata; it
cannot maintain its boundary. It is also worth noting here how understanding the internal parts of
an object hint at unactualizable dispositions touched on in chapter 1. Oganesson was, as far as we
know, incompossible with a universe lacking certain laboratory equipment. The creation of that
equipment makes Oganesson’s production possible. There are surely capacities which
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Organesson harbors that the sheer limits of time imposed by its unstable nucleus prevent from
ever being actualized. Yet these capacities are nonetheless real dispositions resultant from its
structure.
It is common to distinguish between logical, metaphysical, and physical possibility and
impossibility. With the production of the new established, we may provide these distinctions
within this system. Logical possibility and impossibility remain the domain of the logician.
Whatever can be conceived, vaguely or determinately, or represented consistently (or at least
para-consistently) in some formalism is a possible object of logic; whatever cannot be, is not a
possible object of logic. This is grounded in the realization of the possible. What is
metaphysically possible is whatever can give rise to an internal continuity and a boundary; what
is metaphysically impossible is whatever cannot do so. This is grounded in the process of
individuation and the production of the new. What is physically possible is whatever there
currently exists a power to do; what is physically impossible is whatever there exists no power to
do. This is grounded in the process of actualization. These distinctions clarify what the
commitment to materialism means for formal semantics: the boundary between possible and
impossible worlds is at the mercy of the generative and fickle forces of the cosmos. Since
ontological novelty is possible, a new object may bring with it new powers which change what
can and cannot be done in the universe. If new powers can be brought into being, and current
powers can be destroyed, and what is possible depends on what powers there are, then possibility
itself is not a static category. There is, then, no a priori derivation of the separation between
metaphysically possible and impossible worlds. Notions like ideal conceivability or the principle
of contradiction may separate logically possible from logically impossible worlds because
logical possibility can be investigated a priori, but cannot do so for metaphysical possibility.
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Metaphysical possibility is a question what there is and what there can be, and there is no way to
provide an answer to these questions a priori in cosmos with metaphysical novelty. Furthermore,
if what is metaphysically necessary is what is true in all possible worlds, then we should expect
metaphysical necessity to be mutable as well because which worlds are possible and which are
impossible change as new powers come into being and existing powers are destroyed.
As to the question of what truthmakers this ineliminable difference between a thing and
its context offer us, we cannot yet give a complete answer. The account so far sets the stage for
truthmakers for various branches of discrete mathematics beyond those grounded on actuality
and the cancellation of differences in Chapter 1. However, constraint, along with continuity,
open up the possibility for inscription, that is, information storing, and functions. Becomingcontinuous raises the question of becoming-consistent, as well as what is to be made of the coincidence of the continuous and the discontinuous. Continuity is the production of a generality,
but such a generality cannot exist without the maintenance of difference qua discontinuity of its
external parts. This follows from the externality of relations thesis which implies that any
concrete relation between objects cannot exhaust its parts; a relation cannot fully internalize its
relata. Such an impossibility would be pure stasis. Such a purely static object has no boundary
conditions because nothing could undo it or tear it apart, making it a metaphysical impossibility
rather than a mere physical limitation.
H. Conclusion: Bounded Continua
That metaphysical novelty is possible in the first place shows us that continuity can come
into being through the interactions of discrete objects. In fact, the production of the new is not
possible otherwise. This is why we could not ground the continuum on the existence of objects
alone, but required an account of their production as well. This returns us to the issue of
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grounding. To ground is to have a relation to the internal relations of another object, to have
those internal relationships in some way depend on that which grounds it. There is always a role
played by difference, and so no thing grounded is ever synonymous with its ground. A thing may
even be ungrounded as connection and novelty happen “in the middle,” that is, intensively. In
other words, grounding is not reducing. To constrain is to block internal relations in a thing, to
prevent powers from manifesting. In the interplay between grounding and constraint, boundaries
are maintained.
We find ourselves surprisingly close to Quine when answering what there is: to be is to
be bounded. That is, whatever is has a boundary condition. This is a result of the production of
any object being the gathering together and structuring of powers, qualities, intensities, etc. of
other objects. This amounts to internalizing to this metaphysical system the presupposition of
finitude. There is no unbounded being, and it follows from the foundation of difference, the
structure of objects and their powers, and not begging the question by assuming the existence of
an infinite object. This has not hindered the aim of providing truthmakers for mathematical truths
about infinities. The ineliminable difference between an object’s internal and external parts and
the process of becoming-continuous provides grounding for truths about a potentially infinitely
divisible continuum. No object is actually infinitely divisible, but remains virtually so. Were
there ever smaller but more numerous parts, they could be substituted for the current parts. This
raises two questions: what is the nature of these counterfactual truths that exceed the reach of any
existing or perhaps even physically possible powers? And what of truthmakers for truths about
completed or actual infinities (actual not in the Deleuzian sense)? Even if there are no completed
infinities, there are non-arbitrary truths about them. Therefore, there must be some ground to
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those relations of entailment which give rise to truths about completed infinities. These will be
addressed in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
It is a common problem for metaphysics of pure mathematics to have difficulties being
extended to applied mathematics (see Hellman, 1989, 95). Is this not one more bastion of
Platonism? Mathematical Platonism may be avoided by denying that there are any such objects
as numbers, points, planes, etc., but a modal Platonism remains as long as the account of
metaphysical necessity is simply truth in all possible worlds. This drives a wedge between
applied and pure mathematics as this-worldly vs otherworldly possibility. On the account of the
genesis of structures, there is no mystery as to the source of abstract objects; they are
individuated like anything else. They exist, but are not fundamental nor do they precede the
cosmos which they describe. Nor is there a gap between pure and applied mathematics in any
metaphysical sense. They have the same grounding, one is simply more abstract, general, or selfsame (these amount to the same thing) than the other. There are, however, two new questions.
How can abstract powers be gathered into abstract objects? And how, despite the incredible
dynamism of this metaphysics of difference, do such abstract objects remain the same?
Answering these questions requires taking these processes of becoming-continuous and
constraint from the context of the production of the new and investigating what they can offer an
account of the interaction of objects in general. This leads us to the questions of inscription and
time handled in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3:
Inscription and Eternity
“Only bodies exist in space, and
only the present exists in time”
Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 7

The truths of mathematics are not just necessary, but eternal. Let us say first that to be
eternally true is to be true necessarily and to be true for all time. The “necessarily” condition in
this strict formulation is required. This is because it may well be possible that something ends up
accidentally true for all time, but that it could have failed to be true at some time. We want to
exclude such a truth from being called an “eternal truth.” Classically, the necessary and the
eternal are taken to be related if not co-implicating.1 However, we have argued that there is only
relative necessity, which is not enough on its own to ground eternal truths in the classical sense.
Since our ontology contains only contingent objects, the antecedent of a relative necessity can
potentially disappear. Necessity can then change, so further work must be done to establish the
eternal nature of eternal truths. In other words, the ‘eternal’ nature of eternal truths can rest
neither on absolute necessity, nor on necessarily unchanging objects.
There is a further connection between time and mathematics that we can then gesture
towards which follows from our search for the grounds of eternal truths in an impermanent
cosmos. This is the grounding of Hamilton’s argument for algebra as the science of pure time
(Hamilton, 1837, 298). In proposing time as the object of study in algebra, Hamilton demands
more than a formalist or fictionalist2 reading of mathematics which would treat it as a “mere Art

1

While it is common to take necessity and the stability of truth to be co-implying notions, the history of philosophy
contains many counter-examples where necessity is reconciled with the changing of truths. The most obvious
examples are perhaps Hegel and Marx.
In particular, Hamilton reproaches John Thomas Graves’s 1829 work on logarithms for being “content to prove the
symbolical necessity without showing the interpretation, or inner meaning, of his formulae,” (Hamilton, 1837, 422).
Hamilton then sees his account of algebra as the science of pure time to supply this meaning to the formulae.
2
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or Language” which does not require grounding in truth outside itself (Hamilton, 1837, 422).
Hamilton argued that algebra studies time as the pure form of intuition in the way that Kant
argued that geometry is the study of the pure spatial form of intuition. While I will argue in favor
of this relationship between algebra and time, I will oppose Hamilton’s intuitionist-like account.
I will argue that the special relationship between algebra and time remains in that the modal
structure which grounds algebra as its object of study is the powers of pure temporal difference
that make time itself possible. In other words, although the ground for this relationship is
changed in my account, the requirements for grounding algebra remain the same: algebra is the
science which studies operations made possible by time, namely, by the retention of the past and
the possibility of successive operations. Since we agreed with the structuralists that mathematics
studies modal structures, the modal structure of time itself must be explicated. I aim to show then
that mathematical truths can be said to be eternal because they are grounded in the conditions of
possibility of time itself, and that this grounding is not accidental happenstance because it is
these same temporal structures which pure mathematics studies in the case of algebra.
A. The Modal-Temporal Parallel
We have so far established only that difference can ground necessity as there cannot be
anything at all without difference. Yet we cannot move from necessity to stability so quickly
without falling into the sophism of the same difference. Let us first make clear the potential
sophism of the same difference, or difference mistaken as a fundamental identity, so as to avoid
it. One could try to answer the question of the eternity of mathematical truths by saying that it
will be an unchanging feature of the universe that difference exists and is prior to identity. It then

Formalist and fictionalist accounts such as those we criticized in the Introduction would not live up to this standard
as both take the truth or usefulness of the formulae to depend on the symbolic proof and so formulae require no
interpretation, especially not in connection some further object of study such as time which would provide its “inner
meaning.”
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stands that we will have the same difference which underlies all other things, and so whatever is
true of difference is true eternally. However, this has merely treated difference as an identity and
truths as a representation of that identity. Both of these moves are barred to us for the following
reasons. First, if we rely on the sameness of difference, we have fallen into an obvious
contradiction as we would then have identified difference itself. Second, we have rejected
representational accounts in fundamental metaphysical explanations, and so taking the truths of
mathematics as representations of this fundamental difference is also barred because difference
itself cannot be represented without being made into an identity. What is needed, rather, is an
account of how difference qua difference can express eternal truths.
The question of the unchanging amid the changing requires us to broach the issue of the
metaphysics of time. We have so far discussed issues relating directly to modal logics. To clarify
the next stage of our account of the grounding of mathematical truths, we require a shift to
questions surrounding temporal logics. This is not a large shift. Much of the formal machinery
employed in temporal logics is the same as that of modal logics, and the construction of temporal
logics based on the formal tools of modal logics has been employed since the work of Prior
1957. Moments are modeled as worlds, and accessibility relations connect moment to moment. A
moment is then modeled as a set of propositions which are true together, modeling these
propositions as all being true simultaneously. A formal ordering is added to the model in order to
provide a distinction between those moments which come before the present moment (and in
what order they preceded it) and those which come after (and the order in which they proceed).3 I
will refer to formal moment modeled as a world as a “moment-world” to distinguish it from real
moments of time. The present moment-world is understood somewhat analogously to the actual

3

For a full formal reconstruction, see (Meyer, 2014).
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world in modal logics in that it represents what is true here, now. This common formal
machinery has led to the question of the relation between the modal and the temporal in general.
Rini and Cresswell 2012 call this commonality the world-time parallel. While most
analytic metaphysicians take the similar formal logical structure used to model modality and
temporality to be a mere analogy, Rini and Cresswell reject this view. There are two reasons
why, given our commitments so far, we should follow them in rejecting this parallel as a mere
analogy. First, this is so because our commitment to a materialism of objects and their powers
demands an explanation of time since time is not, or at least not obviously, an object or a power,
nor is time difference itself. That is, since there are differences that are not temporal differences,
time must be a more specific category than difference itself. Second, and this is a paradigm
Deleuzian intuition, the analogy between modality and temporality relies on some similarity
between the two, and all similarities must be explained in terms of a prior difference. Behind
both of these reasons is also our concern that chronological time and its features are always a
representation of time. Therefore, the chronological itself also must be explained, rather than be
taken to explain time. The measurement of time in clocks and calendars nor its modelling with
moment-worlds and their accessibility relations should not be confused with time itself.
We began this chapter with the strict formulation of the eternal. This formulation gives us
a hint towards an account of time founded on difference in that if we are seeking for necessity in
time, then we must look to the conditions of the possibility of time itself. That is, if we take
chronological time to not be fundamental, then it must itself be produced by what we do take to
be fundamental, or at least more fundamental than time itself. Chronological time then must have
some ground. As this ground is the conditions of the possibility of time, it will define what must
be the case for time to exist at all. Since there is a relative necessity between a ground and what
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is grounded, this opens up the possibility of time’s mere existence implying certain necessary
truths. This is because the grounds which are necessary to the production of time itself stand as
truthmakers for propositions which are necessarily true for all time.
Rini and Cresswell 2012 argue that the world-time parallel is more than a simple analogy
or a repurposing of formal machinery. They argue instead for a more robust equivalence in
which every formulatable modal argument implies the existence of a corresponding temporal
argument, and vice versa. For example, if one argues that there are not non-actual possible
worlds, this can be converted into an argument against the existence of non-present moments.
Similarly, there is a conversion from “necessary” to “eternal” (and vice versa) by replacing “true
at all worlds” with “true at all moments.” From our perspective, this provides a step in the right
direction insofar as asking after the conditions of the possibility of time requires us to make a
connection between the temporal and the modal. However, what Rini and Cresswell’s point
amounts to is a relationship between propositions in arguments. “If you are faced with an
argument in the philosophy of modality, there ought to be a corresponding argument in the
philosophy of time which has the same structure,” (Rini & Cresswell, 2012, xiv). This relation
does not itself imply a metaphysical solution to the question of the production of time itself
While they do not offer robust metaphysical conclusions, Rini and Cresswell’s work is
not only of logical interest. The correspondence between temporal and modal arguments implies
a correspondence between metaphysical positions on those topics. Of central importance here is
the connection between Actualism about possible worlds (only one world exists) which we have
so far endorsed, and Presentism about time (only the present exists), which we will defend in this
chapter. This connection follows from the correspondence between modal and temporal
arguments: if world and moment are formally analogous in that they are formulated using the
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same logical tools, then an argument against the existence of non-actual possible worlds implies
a corresponding argument against the existence of non-present moments. To transform one into
the other only requires exchanging worlds for moments, which changes nothing of the structure
of the argument. If one argument is valid, then the other is as well. This then implies that one
risks contradiction if one denies possible worlds but accepts the reality of non-present moments,
or vice versa. I accept this correspondence, though argue that it must be explained. Furthermore,
given the world-time parallel, we can then establish on firmer ground our claim above that we
must seek the conditions of time itself. Since we have argued that possible worlds are a tool
whose efficacy needs to be explained, we must do the same for these moment-worlds.
The world-time parallel raises questions which should be familiar by now: what grounds
truths about time, especially those truths which are necessarily true at all possible moments
(eternal truths)? And, if there is parallel between modal logics and temporal logics, what is the
metaphysical grounding of such a parallel?4 I will argue that the answers to these questions are
intertwined. Specifically, I claim the world-time parallel exists because the existence of time
itself is grounded on modality. Truthmakers for the past are to be found in the powers of objects
to retain and record what happens to them (what we will call powers of inscription); truthmakers
for propositions about the future are grounded in powers in general. The world-time parallel is
then explained as time is a particular structure resulting from objects and their powers. However,
time is not modality. It is something different to be a temporal difference rather than a difference
between the virtual and actual, even if temporal differences depend on modal differences. We

4

One might reasonably ask if the world-time parallel holds, then how can the grounding of temporality in modality
be established without also implying the contradictory argument that temporality grounds modality. I admit this
implication, but hope to explain it away as misleading if read representationally. Time is real, and so has some effect
on what is possible. This implies that time grounds certain possibilities, but does not imply that time grounds
possibility itself. The apparent contradiction is the result of a cancellation of the difference in ground which makes
possible its expression in formal logic in the first place.
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then must explain what makes a truth uniquely a temporal truth. To do this, we will look at the
production of chronological time itself, and see how it first depends on objects, powers, and a
uniquely pure temporal difference.
B. The Production of Chronological Time
From the point of view of grounding, the issue of the relationship between modal logics
and temporal logics opens up the wider metaphysical question of the connection between
modality and time. Time, like everything else, is not a fundamental dimension of reality, but
something which must be generated from that which is not itself. In searching for the proper
order of production, we should take the most apparently stable sort of time, that is, the kind of
time which is the most self-same and unchanging, as the final or highest stage of the production.
This is a heuristic choice based on the priority of difference in that we should expect that the
more self-similarity something shows, the less fundamental it is. We may be mistaken about
what appears to be more similar, or what is closer or further from pure difference, but that can
only be adjudicated after we have produced an account.
Chronological time, the time of clocks and calendars, appears to be this highest stage of
self-same time. By Chronological time, I mean the account of time where moments are wellordered (each moment has an immediate, unambiguous preceding and proceeding moment)
blocks of equal duration (a second, an hour, etc.), and the difference between past, present, and
future can be taken to be merely a difference of which moment is indexed as “now.” This is the
time which is generally modeled by temporal logics. Even if we include temporal logics with
branching futures, there is still no difference between moments qua moments whether they are
denoted as future, present, or past. That is, the difference between past, present, and future has to
various degrees been cancelled or covered over. One can index any moment-world along the
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chain as “now.” This does not affect any other moment-world’s contents. The choice of which
moment-world is now only changes whether other moment-worlds are considered in the past or
future based on their relation to the now-world. Like actualization, this cancelling of difference is
not illusory as it makes for a perfectly good logic, but it does make possible the illusion of
chronological time as a fundamental time, or as fundamental to the universe. If we looked for
grounds of eternal truth at this level, we would be grounding such truths on temporal identities,
identities between moments, between past, present, and future. Since we are committed to
identities being contingently produced and so potentially mutable, we would find no necessity
here to provide stable grounds for eternal truths. Therefore, we must investigate time closer to its
grounds, closer to its production from difference itself.
The rejection of chronological time as fundamental opens up the possibility for grounding
unchanging truths because seeking such a ground means seeking the powers of difference which
make time itself possible. We must be careful not to understand the conditions of time in terms
of some identity (for example, an eternal, self-same Platonic heaven which produces time as a
pale copy of itself, such as is found in the Timaeus). Explaining the stability of and giving
meaning to the eternity of mathematical truths may seem a priori impossible for a metaphysics
of difference. Everything is always different and is always becoming different as the new is
possible at each moment, such that even identity is to be understood as a contingent thing
temporarily distinguishing itself from others. However, exploring the sophism of the same
difference gives us a clue that this is not the case: that which annuls difference qua difference is
impossible because it would become a fundamental identity. We saw this in the previous chapter.
The relative necessity of the identity of an object can be established through the individuation of
that object, because were there an object which existed but lacked a process of individuation, it

156

would be fundamentally and ineradicably self-same (thereby annulling the primacy of
difference). Therefore, every individuated object necessarily has an identity, not because of the
sameness of difference, but because individuation produces identities and to lack an
individuation would annul the primacy of difference. The necessity of A = A is established only
if it is founded in difference and individuation.5 We then need a similar account for establishing
eternal truths.
There are two identities which must be explained: First, we must explain how the
moments of past, present, and future can become identified as the same sort of thing, that is, as a
moment. This amounts to providing a metaphysical account of the cancelling of differences
between these three dimensions of time. Second, we must explain how it is that, if time depends
on objects, different objects can be said to be ‘in the same time’ meaningfully. This amounts to
the grounding of the production of time onto powers of pure difference. In particular, I will argue
that the relevant powers of pure difference here are affect and inscription, the powers of being
affected by other objects and the power of recording traces or ‘marks’ of that affection,
respectively. Affect should not be understood as limited to human sensibility. Rather, affect
should be extended to all objects as a capacity to be interacted with. This will be shown to follow
from the process of becoming-continuous argued for in chapter 2. Each object is the production
of a continuity over its parts, and one feature of that continuity is the power to act as a sort of
surface capable of recording traces. Inscription will be shown to be a power of the ‘living’ or
pure present which cannot itself pass into the past. That is, inscription cannot operate in the past
(or future), and it is necessary for the existence of the present at all. Therefore, it is the condition
of time which can be said to be eternal.

5

Hence we also have a scope for the m-terms of Schrödinger Logics (those terms of which identity cannot be
predicated) discussed in Chapter 1: those differences which have not been gathered in a process of individuation.
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C. Presence and Powers
Deleuze’s work contains at least two major accounts of time: the three syntheses of time,
which first appear in Difference and Repetition, and the two “readings” of time as Chronos and
Aion, first articulated in Logic of Sense. While there is much work on reconciling these two
accounts (i.e. the three syntheses and the two readings), as well as explaining why the two
different accounts are both recurrent in Deleuze’s work, we do not have the space to treat this
issue here.6 Instead, I will make use only of the latter account of time as Chronos and Aion.7 This
should not be read as a rejection of the three syntheses account as I take it both accounts work
together as both re-appear in later texts in reworked ways. I focus only on the Logic of Sense’s
account because it is more straightforwardly applicable here. I will maintain Deleuze’s
terminology, and so will then only use “time” to mean chronological time or the shared time of
objects (the former being the composition of all shared times, explicated below). That is, “time”
will refer to produced time, not the production of time. Before turning to Chronos and Aion
specifically, let us first take an overview of Deleuze’s philosophy of time in general.
Following the work of Williams, it would be more accurate to say “times” than time
when speaking of the more fundamental levels of production (Williams, 2011, 3), though again,
we will not find “times” at the most fundamental level of pure difference either. These times are
the result of the activities or processes of individual objects (the manifestations of their powers in
Dispositionalist terms). “The claim is not strictly about time as process, but rather about
processes making multiple times,” (Williams, 2011, 3). The unfolding of events in a shared time
between several objects, or even all objects in the universe in a shared time if such is possible,

6

For examples of such work, see Reynolds 2007 and Williams 2011.

7

Deleuze claims to find these notions in the ancient Stoics, though there is some controversy over his interpretation
of the Stoics and questions surrounding the actual provenance of Chronos and Aion. See Sellars 2007.
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must be explained as a result of objects and their powers.8 If there is something like
chronological time, or more minimally, truths about chronologically well-ordered events, then it
is only possible as the result of relations between objects of different interacting and cascading
time scales. To avoid equivocating, let us make another formal distinction. Since each object is a
collection of dispositions which manifest or fade away, let us call the temporal aspect of an
object on its own its “rhythm.” Rhythm as the temporal aspect of an object considered in
isolation from other objects is of course an idealization. Objects are always among other objects,
no object can become completely isolated from all others (Williams, 2011, 139). “Time” then
refers to what is produced by the interaction of objects, or the compositions of rhythms. This
distinction allows us to analyze the building up of time in general, of time as something that can
appear as if objects are within it even though it is a product of objects and their powers.
Next, Deleuze affirms that only the present exists, and that the past and future somehow
subsist or insist in the present. As Al-Saji describes Deleuze’s account, “the being of the past, its
conservation, draws upon its former presence and its survival is owed to the force of the new
present that intends and retains it. Without these retentional threads, the past would fade away
and be forgotten, i.e., it would fall out of existence,” (Al-Saji, 2004, 205). Were the past not
retained by the present somehow, it could not be. The present is simply the current collection of
objects and powers. What makes it the present is that powers can be manifested. This is the case
for both Chronos and Aion. “Only bodies exist in space, and only the present exists in time,”
(Deleuze, 2004, 7) is said specifically of the living present, that is Chronos. The case of Aion is

Deleuze refers to a “cosmic present” (Deleuze, 2004, 72) in which Chronos is the living present of the entire
universe which can only be surveyed by god (Ibid., 186). Here it is difficult to distinguish whether Deleuze is
providing Stoic exegesis, using a limit case explanation, or some other illustrative method. Either way, the status of
the cosmic present is unclear as the reference to a god’s eye view cannot be literally endorsed by Deleuze because if
Deleuze were actually installing god as part of his metaphysics of time, he would introduce a fundamental identity
which would contradict the rest of his metaphysics.
8
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more difficult, but amounts to the same dependence of the past and future on the present. Aion is
the time of the “infinitely subdivided present” which resolves all of time into past and future.
Deleuze here cites the Stoic example of the act of cutting; the event of cutting plays out by a
moving from about-to-cut to having-passed-through-what-is-cut (Deleuze, 2004, 8). The cutting
is never manifest in a moment or in the location of the knife, but in the movement through
moments. Note that this infinite sub-division of the Aionic present recalls the virtual infinitely
divisible continuity of the object established in the last chapter.
This does not mean that Aion lacks a present, but rather that Aion is the reading of time
where the present is only a pure difference and what happens only happens as a weaving together
of past and future. This implies that the only powers which can act in the time of Aion, in the
pure instant, are powers of difference itself. Deleuze will refer to this movement as “sidestepping” or eluding the present, but this should not be understood as a time where the past and
future exist with a subsisting present, as if it were the mere inverse of Chronos. “Briefly, there
are two times, one of which is composed only of interlocking presents; the other is constantly
decomposed into elongated pasts and futures,” (Deleuze, 2004, 76). In this quotation, the former
is Chronos, the latter is Aion. Neither time implies the independent existence of the past and
future from the present, but rather specifies different ways in which the past and future subsist in
the present. In the first, various presents are composed into durational moments; in the second,
the present as an instant is decomposed into the past and future. Both temporalities then depend
first on the existence of the present, which is either composed or decomposed (or rather, both
processes happen at once, but must be thought separately). Here we only focus on Chronos and
Aion’s similarities to explicate Deleuze’s general account of time; their differences will become
paramount as we delve into the details.
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In analytic terms, Deleuze should be understood as a sort of Presentist, though one with
extra ontological machinery. This extra machinery are those powers which make possible the
inscription of the past. “The constitution of a past and the present of which this past is the past
are strictly contemporary,” (Deleuze, 2020, 220). The future equally insists in the present as the
structured potential of the virtual. We can see the insistence of the past and future as a response
to a common problem posed to Presentists: the problem of cross-temporal relations (Vetter,
2015, 293). Specifically, the problem of cross-temporal relations is the question of how to
account for the meaning of relations between objects which never exist at the same time (e.g.
“Vetter admires Socrates,” “I am the descendent of my great-great-great father,” “were Caesar
not inspired by Alexander, he would not have invaded Gaul,” etc.). Intentional relations are
easily explicable as not actually requiring the existence of one of the objects of the relation. “I
am disgusted by Iago” does not require the existence of Iago as a concrete human actually
carrying out his schemes, but rather the existence of a performance or script of Othello. More
substantial relations than intentional relations such as the descendent relation or relations of
historical dependence still provide a problem for Presentist accounts, though they will be shown
below to have a similar solution. That is, the truth of these relations will depend not on the
existence of the object referenced, but on its inscriptions.
Vetter takes this to be a particularly difficult problem for one who holds both
Dispositionalism and Presentism, and Vetter herself cautiously endorses Eternalism (Vetter,
2015, 299). Eternalism posits that all objects exist eternally somehow. This need not mean
outside of time (though it may), but could also be understood as the permanent existence of the
past and future. For instance, a 4D “block” universe where spacetime exists as a complete 4
dimensional hypercube where time is treated like a spatial dimension is one common version of
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Eternalism. In addition to the block, Eternalists either then provide an account in which the
present does not “move” and so there is no real passage of time, or an account of the “now” as a
sort of spotlight that moves across moments in a linear, continuous fashion (Miller, 2013, 346-7).
A moment then has a temporal position or a temporal extension in analogy with a spatial position
or extension. Objects then remain in their temporal position. Cross-temporal relations are then be
made sense by Eternalist of as real relations between objects which exist, but exist at different
temporal locations. The descendant relation is then no different from the relation between
cousins who exist at the same time but live thousands of miles apart.
Despite arguing that there are grounds for eternal truths, we cannot accept Eternalism
about objects. This would contradict our starting commitment that all objects are contingent.
Since to be eternal is to both exist for all time, and to do so necessarily, accepting eternal objects
into our ontology would be tantamount to smuggling in necessary objects. In the block universe
variant, we are left with a different problem in that objects do not exist for all time in a block
universe, but they do occupy their temporal position necessarily since their temporal position
cannot be changed. If so, then such temporally locked objects are not contingent. All of this is to
say nothing about how these positions also treat chronological time as a fundamental constituent
of reality, which we have also rejected above. Eternalism in either form must then be rejected for
the same reasons as Necessitism about objects which was rejected in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, Eternalism, which takes the past and future as the same in kind as the present
moment, must be rejected for the reason that this takes time as fundamental to objects, i.e. time is
something that objects are “in” rather than time being something which results from objects and
their powers.
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The “extra machinery” of Deleuze’s account of the present alluded to above makes
possible the theoretical efficacy of Eternalism while maintaining only the ontological
commitments of Dispositionalism and Presentism. This machinery follows from the process of
individuation as becoming-continuous. We established that the production of a new object
requires two features: (1) the production of a continuity over the parts which make up the new
object, and (2) that this continuity also serves to distinguish the object from its environment (or
that of which it is an external part). We also argued that this continuity over its external parts
allows for the object’s robustness to certain changes (e.g. the substitution of parts, the
transportation to a new environment, etc.). Once we have introduced the features of potentiality
to change and robustness to change, we have the beginnings of an account of temporality. The
manifestation of powers over time is played out by the individuation of new objects, the
contraction of objects into other objects (that is, a process of becoming-continuous which does
not individuate a new object, but rather maintains an existing object), or the inscription of traces
in objects. These will be explicated in detail below, but a brief description here will help to see
this account as a solution to the Presentist’s problem of cross-temporal relations. Contraction
results from an object being brought into the continuity of another as an external part. This may
lead to a deep change in the object, which would be seen in the addition, subtraction, or
alteration of internal parts or internal relations. It is equally possible that something new is
contracted into an object, but the contracting object’s internal parts and relations remain the
same. One contracts the nutrients of an apple into themselves by eating it, but this does not
change the relations between one’s organs. Contracting a poison into oneself, on the other hand,
may destroy an internal relation, thereby destroying oneself qua becoming-discontinuous and
dis-integrating. Inscription is the leaving of a trace of an encounter with another object in that
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continuity of the first object. Here the continuity of an object works as a recording surface. An
object cannot record anything at all in the same sense that an object cannot interact with anything
at all, but rather it does so concretely only according to what that object’s powers make possible.
This account will focus primarily on the process of inscription as it may be seen as the more
general of the two processes. Inscription is more primary because something can be inscribed
without being contracted into another object, but every contraction into an object leaves some
trace or some inscription.9
We are now able to respond to the problem of cross-temporal relations. The future
subsists in the present as that towards which the present is moving, as a sort of impulse and
inertia of present powers in their unfolding. This is accounted for already by the existence of
powers themselves. The future is what may happen given what powers exist, what is currently
actually manifested, and the individuations that intensities are undergoing. Let us formally call
the constituents of the future “tendencies,” as the future is not determined already, but is signaled
by what powers exist and the ways they have been, how they manifest, and where they are
headed.10 The past, on the other hand, exists as the result of contractions and inscriptions of what
has happened or been undergone. The present literally passes into the past through the processes
of contraction and inscription. The past and future then subsist in the present objects, and so to
have cross-temporal relations is to have some relation with such inscriptions and tendencies. In
this way, although we have maintained the existence of the present only, we have accounted for

Here there are obvious echoes of Derrida’s account of the trace and of differance as ‘spacing’ which makes
possible the leaving of the trace. I take Derrida and Deleuze to be quite in agreement with this point, though Derrida
would not give his account in terms of objects and their powers, and any Derridean would find issue with the focus
on the present (though I take it that Deleuze’s account of the present should not be confused with the target of
Derrida’s critique of presence). The parallel is potentially constructive, but its investigation would take us too far
afield. For more, see Derrida, 1981, 27-9, and 1985, 9-13, and Hagglund’s reconstruction in Hagglund 2008.
10
In the terms of dynamic systems and phase-space diagrams, these tendencies are modeled as attractors. Such
attractors are the points which systems are organized around. The future then subsists, in these terms, as the paths
objects can follow as organized by attractors.
9
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cross-temporal relations as relations between present objects and that which subsists in them.
The past and future then subsist in the present as a difference in kind from the present. The past
as inscriptions, the future as tendencies. This insight reconciles Presentism and Dispositionalism
through its solution to the problem of cross-temporal relations: all cross temporal relations take
place in the present, though they may take place between that which exists as an object in the
present, and that which subsists in objects as inscriptions or tendencies. The descendent relation
does not depend on the present existence of one’s great-great-grandparents in the past, but of the
inscription of them as past in the present. They subsist as past in present DNA as much as in
family genealogies, in the habits and memories of their descendants as much as in the marks
from their habit of evening pacing left on the floor of the family home, in the engraving of their
tombstone as much as in the survival of organisms nourished by their bodily remains, but they do
not exist as they did when they were living objects of the living present. Since the past and future
subsist, they should be understood as in some way virtual, and the present as in some way
actual,11 though this will be complicated below as we see just how long the present may persist.
D. Pure Temporal Difference
We may now return to the more general problem of grounding the production of time, of
the present as well as the past and future, in order to establish the connection between modality
and temporality, as well as the truthmakers for eternal truths. To do so, we must turn to a
fundamental difference at the heart of time itself: the difference between the present as an
extended duration or moment and the present as an unextended instant of pure temporal
difference, what we above called, following Deleuze, Chronos and Aion, respectively. It is the

This resonance is in Deleuze’s use of the term as the French actuel has temporal connotations of the now or the
current.
11
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difference between these two aspects of the present which makes possible both time and eternal
truths.
Both readings are necessary to account for time. Chronos is time extended, with the past
and future as subsisting within the present moment only as relations between composed presents
(Deleuze, 2004, 186). The instant, referred to as “Aion,” is the pure temporal difference, the
present as the infinitesimally small difference between the past and future, where the insistence
of the past and future makes possible an “eluding” or “sidestepping” of the present. These two
aspects must be understood as functioning together; they are not opposed or competing
descriptions of time. Chronos and Aion are only formally separable. This can be related to the
formal distinctions within the object, between the actual, the intensive, and the virtual.
Specifically, Chronos is the time of actualization of the virtual,12 whereas Aion is the time of
intensity and its process of individuation.
What I intend to show below is that it is the difference between Chronos and Aion that
makes possible eternal truths in a contingent universe. Specifically, it will be argued that this
difference grounds the powers of the pure present, that is, powers which produce the passing of
what is present into the past but do not themselves pass. Time, then, is the result of the
productive difference between Chronos and Aion. Only the present exists, and it is the living
present of objects and their powers (Chronos). However, the past and future insist or inhere in
the present in such a way that they divide the present infinitely in an instant of pure temporal
difference (Aion) (Deleuze, 2004, 188-9). As Aion is the pure form of temporal difference, let us

12

In the Twenty-Third Series of Logic of Sense, Deleuze further distinguishes between two aspects of Chronos, one
of which could be called the time of the actual (the “good” Chronos of fully formed objects and their qualities in a
living present) and the time of the virtual (the “bad” Chronos of the upsetting of identity by the “becoming-mad” of
the depths). This distinction is used by Deleuze to further distinguish Aion from Chronos so as to understand Aion
as something other than a reading of time where it is split into a time of identity and a time of difference. This
furthers implies that Chronos is not reducible or groundable in Aion or vice versa since neither is a time only of
identity founded on a prior difference, (Deleuze, 2004, 186-92).
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explicate Aion first, beginning with clarifying what is meant by dividing infinitely. Here the
reference to infinity is acceptable even though we have not yet fully grounded the transfinite. We
can accept this infinite divisibility because time is a product of the continuity of surfaces, and so
it only requires a potential infinity of the kind established in the previous chapter. Deleuze
explicitly delimits this infinity as a potential divisibility, not a completed infinity: “what is this
time which need not be infinite but only “infinitely subdivisible?” it is the Aion,” (Deleuze,
2004, 72).
“Subdivisibility” is clarified by Deleuze’s use of mathematical references in explaining
Aion. Deleuze describes this dividing up of the present by the past and future as a “cut” in
explicit reference to Dedekind Cuts (Deleuze, 1994, 172). Dedekind Cuts are a mathematical
procedure for constructing irrational numbers on the Real line. This procedure operates by
splitting the line in two, that is, into an infinite set of numbers less than or equal to a chosen the
point (the point of the cut), and the set of numbers greater than that point. This produces two
infinite sets, one of all that comes before the cut, and the other of all that comes after. Irrational
numbers are constructed when the point cannot be shown to be included in either set.13 This is
meant to establish, by Deleuze, the difference in kind of the instant from the whole of the past
and future. In Dedekind Cuts, the number represented by the point at which the cut takes place is
irrational, and so cannot be included in either infinite set. The cut is different in kind in some
meaningful sense. The instant escapes the infinite even though it is the smallest difference
possible. This establishes that there are unique powers of the present even in the instant. Even in
the conception of the present which does not have a duration, does not extend “over time,” the
fact of pure temporal difference in the instant points to powers of the temporal difference to both

13

For a reconstruction of Dedekind cuts and their importance to Deleuze, see Widder, 2019
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elude the past and future as it is, and to operate in the production of time, of adding to the past
and opening up the future. Furthermore, this account provides insight into the temporal grounds
of the new; an instant can occur which is untotalizable by the infinity of the past and the future.
We should not read too deeply into the analogy between Aion and Dedekind Cuts by
making the mistake of inferring the ontological structure of time from this mathematical
structure. In particular, we have a central difference between the two as the set of lesser numbers
(analogous to the past) and the set of greater numbers (analogous to the future) do not change
relative to the point of the cut. There are at least two reasons to respect this difference between
the metaphysics of time and the mathematics Deleuze references. First, we may mistakenly take
the past and future to be completed, ordered, and fully enumerable sets, but this would be to
understand past and future as actual (i.e. with their differences cancelled) rather than as virtual.
That would be chronological time, not Aion. In other words, we cannot read this as a block
universe where the past and the future exist in the same way as the present. The past and future
are somehow virtual and different in kind from the present, and so we should not expect either to
be characterized by a linearly ordered relation such as the Real line (at least, not at the level of
Aion).14 Second, if the time of Aion is at all like the Real line with its cuts, we must imagine the
instant of the cut as a point which moves along the Real line, continually altering the sets of the
past and future. While we can readily imagine such a thing, the mathematical analogy breaks
down because cuts do not move. The Dedekind Cut is a static mathematical procedure. Aion, on
the other hand, is pure movement.

14

The analogy here is perhaps not entirely misleading as the Real Line itself does not have a definable WellOrdering, and a locally undefinable order which can be coarse-grained in a Well-Ordered set at the cost of continuity
does have a certain resonance with Deleuze’s view of time, it would still be too strict of a model to treat as a formal
analogy.
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Aion is called eternal and unchanging because it avoids the present and is simultaneously
past and future (Deleuze, 2004, 188). One may say it is simultaneously becoming-past and
becoming-future. Furthermore, as pure temporal difference, Aion can be understood as the time
of the intensive, or time as understood intensively. This should be unsurprising as the only thing
which can be a priori established as unchanging in a metaphysics of difference is the brute
existence of difference itself. Therefore, as long as there is time, it must imply the existence of a
pure temporal difference which makes time itself possible. Specifying the nature of this pure
temporal difference is the difficulty. We must be careful not to place too much “into” Aion. Aion
is not a place. It is not a replacement for the classical ideas of eternity, e.g. as the Platonic heaven
of unchanging forms, even if Deleuze does refer to it as eternity. Time depends on objects; it is
not a substratum which objects are in.
When an object manifests a power, it involves a splitting into past and future. As a hawk
dives and catches its prey. The catching is first a future event, becomes present, and finally is
past as the hawk ascends with its prey in its beak. The catching splits the descent and ascent into
past and future. This splitting equally takes place in the catching itself. Mid-catch, there is the
past beginning to close the beak and the future completing the closure. The more we shrink the
time scale, the more we make sense of the pure temporal difference, the more minute the change
in intensity of pressure applied to the prey by the hawk’s beak, the less any particular difference
is describable; but that this event is unfolding means a temporal difference must be taking place.
Were there no temporal difference at this infinitesimal instant then becoming itself would cease,
and Zeno could rightfully tell us it is impossible for the hawk to close its beak at all. This is what
we mean by a pure temporal difference, where no describable or isolatable difference in quality
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or extensity is possible, yet there must exist a temporal difference or else the entire event would
screech to a halt, would cease to be an event at all.
That pure temporal difference is the present as an instant which eludes or sidesteps itself
because all that is is exhausted by the past and the future. While the co-incidence of the past,
future, and present is a classical understanding of eternity, let us look at the content of each to
see the difference. The present in Aion is pure temporal difference; there are no specifiable
objects or powers in the instant. The future in Aion is every object and power understood as its
tendencies, of where it is heading and what, if nothing changes, they will bring about. Since pure
difference makes the new possible, the Aionic future does not “contain” all that could possibly
come about. It is only where everything is tending if no new objects or powers were to come
about (and the eruption of the new must, by definition, take place in the present). The Aionic past
is the entirety of objects and powers qua their inscriptions. Aion does not contain past objects
qua objects. This makes the instant an “empty” present, not in the sense of being a form which
objects and powers fill, but as a pure difference within what happens as it happens. Since it is
pure difference, Aion is always potentially productive of the radically new. Aion is then the
eternity of the new. Thereby, if we indulge in metaphor and speak of Aion as a “place,” as, with
apologies to Bergson, it is almost inevitable that one mistakenly describes time as spatial, even
then it must be understood as a place which cannot support identity or similarity in any way.
Despite Deleuze referring to Aion as eternal, it is not on its own a truthmaker for eternal
truths, but it is our first step. The truths of mathematics and logic are not so empty that they can
be said to be grounded only on this pure temporal difference. Rather, Aion makes possible pure
powers of difference which are equally necessary conditions of any time capable of
chronological ordering (either well-ordered or partially ordered as in branching models). Our
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second step, then, is to understand what Aion does. Aion makes possible the communication
between rhythms. That is, Aion is what makes possible the interaction between and composition
of the “times” of different objects into a shared time. The rhythm of a rock is radically different
from the rhythm of the human body. Yet, if these objects have their own rhythms, their own
times, how is it that they come to interact? What is the time of the scraping of one’s knee against
a coarse rock?
Like we saw with the dark precursor making possible the interaction of objects to
produce a new object with a new identity, we see here the production of a common time between
the rhythm of the rock and of the knee through Aion. First, let us say why individuation is not
enough, why we need Aion in addition to the dark precursor even if we may see the former as its
temporal analog. In the scraping of the knee against the rock, what we see is not the formation of
a new object with its own unique powers as their contiguity is not enough to succeed at their
becoming-continuous (or if it is, it is only in the moment of an exchange of kinetic energy and
matter from one to the other). Instead, we see an interaction between objects which has changed
both by altering their qualities, powers, and rhythms. The body’s metabolism alters as it
manifests powers to regrow skin and fight infection. Perhaps the rock now has more of a red
quality to it as it slowly contracts the blood from the knee into itself. There is then a common
time of the event in which the processes of the two objects unfold together. This common time
cannot be decomposed into the rhythms of both objects on their own because such a
decomposition cannot account for the change in rhythm. This commonality between the rock and
the body is not the continuity of another object, but rather a temporal continuity resulting from
their interaction through a pure temporal difference. This shared time ultimately subsists in the
continuities of objects, but it is not reducible to them. Otherwise, each object would somehow
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contain the whole of time, which, were this the case, would lead us to expect much more from
notebooks and computer hard drives. We know then from Chapter 2 that where there is a pure
difference, communication and production are possible, and so we must explicate how pure
temporal difference makes possible the production of a shared time. In order to do so, we must
move to Deleuze’s concept of Chronos and explicate the powers of the present.
E. Power of the Pure Present
Chronos is the living present, the time of the actualization of the virtual. Therefore, it is
the time of the manifestation of powers. Powers can be manifested only in the present; a power
cannot suddenly manifest 500 years ago. Now we must separate such powers into two categories.
There are present powers and powers of the pure present. Present powers are those powers which
currently exist due to whatever objects exist. There is no present power to (re)produce a
tyrannosaurus as there are no existing objects with such a power. There was once, and there may
well again be such objects, but we are without them for the moment. We will return to such
powers in Chapter 4 as the grounds of counterfactual truths. The powers which concern us here
are instead the powers of the pure present. These are the powers which must remain the case for
the passing of time to be possible itself. These are powers which do not pass away from the
present into the past the way the powers of the tyrannosaurus are now gone, leaving only their
traces. If the powers of the pure present were to pass completely, time itself would cease to be
produced. If time itself ceased, as it one day will, the past will be annulled along with the present
and future. The end of the production of time itself can only coincide with the erasure of all trace
of what was, until all is as if nothing had ever been. These powers of the pure present are then
the grounds of eternal truths because they both exist for all time and are necessary to the
production of time itself. Yet, one day eternity too will die.
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For the time being, we must ask what are these pure powers? Simply, I claim they are
temporal difference and the power of inscription. Chronos is the time of the manifestation of
powers. As a power manifests, the qualities of the object change in intensity, or new qualities are
made manifest, and what was already manifested fades away. However, the qualities that fade
away do not simply disappear, but rather de-actualizes and becomes virtual again. What an
object undergoes is not neutral to it, but rather becomes a part of its virtuality. Chronos, then, is
the duration over which this process takes place. It is the aspect of time whereby the present
passes into the past, and the future becomes the present. Again, this must not be understood as a
movement along a timeline, but as a change in kind from virtual to actual and back again.
Since Chronos is the time of the moment, it is not the time of pure difference alone. The
powers of pure temporal difference do not operate in Chronos. Inscription, then, is a necessary
feature of Chronos. Each object can only be inscribed with a trace based on its own powers of
recording, and can only possibly record what it can be affected by, again, given its own
capacities for affection. This process, of course, also requires objects with the powers to leave
such a trace and to have an effect on such an affect. Both affect and inscription are partial.
Nothing is ever “fully” inscribed, and so there is an excess of what happens in the present over
what passes from the present to be retained as past. Furthermore, what is inscribed becomes the
past, but inscription itself does not pass. The eternal is not that which stands outside of time; it is
that which does not pass within time while making the passing itself possible. Those powers
which must exist or else the inscription of the present into the past would be impossible, but
which themselves never become inscribed as past are the only viable grounds for eternal truths.
Furthermore, it is inscription itself which makes possible the chronological order. Were
there no inscription, we could not have an arrow of time. Take an hypothetical object in a
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vacuum. Let’s stipulate further that the object is not complex enough for any sort of autoaffection or self-interaction. This object has a structure, it has powers, intensities, qualities, and
extension like any other object. If it could manifest its powers in a vacuum, that is, in isolation
from any other object, then past and future would be indistinguishable from each other. This is
because there would be nothing to alter, mark, retain, or otherwise affect the object to alter how
it manifests its powers. This manifestation of powers of the isolated object would be at most a
rhythm rather than a time, though it may be just chaos. If it has a temporal order, it would be an
endlessly repeating one. There would be no extensive measure of time, no fact of the matter of
how many seconds it would take to move from one stage of that temporal order to another, nor
any way to distinguish a first from a second moment, a second from a third, and so on. It is only
in the interaction with other objects, the bare minimum of which is inscription, that past and
future take on a meaningful distinction, that rhythm can be unfolded into time and given
extensional measure.
Finally, we can move to our third step in grounding eternal truths. Here we must connect
the operation of Aion to that of Chronos. The living present is made up of only objects and their
current powers. While difference is productive, it does not produce from nothing, and it is not
productive of absolutely anything at all. What can be produced is constrained by what is. The
interaction between the rock and the knee is made possible by difference, but also by what it is
that interacts. Each object has capacities to be affected and to record these affections. Blood is
inscribed on the rock in the same way a distorted image of the rock’s coarse surface is inscribed
in the knee. The record of a particle’s interaction is preserved in its change in angular
momentum. Inscriptions are the trace of the event which took place in a time common to objects
involved.
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F. Eternity in the Inscription of Time
Chronological time is made possible by the fact that objects are constantly interacting.
Despite our thought experiment above, an isolated object is an impossibility. The person whose
knee is to be scraped and the rock already share a time through the dirt which the person walks
on and the rock sits in, though this is not yet the present moment of the scrape. The “sharing of a
time” however, may again sound too much like the modern notion of time as something which
things are somehow “in,” rather than as a relation of differences. Pure temporal differences are
everywhere and are productive; they allow for interaction and for the creation of a common
present. So, it is not that the person, the rock, and the dirt are all in the same time, but that a
common present is produced through the relations between their temporal differences which, in
turn, are produced by the actualization of their powers. Chronos and Aion are here intertwined as
this common time of the shared event and the large scale chronological time it makes possible is
a result of both pure temporal difference and the time of actualization, the rhythms of objects and
their resonances and syncopations. This furthers our account of eternity because the impossibility
of an isolated object also implies that every object has affects; that is, among any object’s
powers, there will be capacities to be affected. Inscription can also be trivially shown to be a
power of all objects because inscription is made possible by what we called a surface, or the
continuity of an object over its parts.
We have, then, the chain of grounding which makes possible the existence of eternal
truths, even in a contingent universe. First, we have our grounding relative necessity. If there is
chronological time at all, there must be pure temporal difference, that is, Aion or the instant.
There must also be objects and their powers, since time itself is not an object or a power of
objects, and so must depend on them. Specifically, time depends on the capacities of objects to
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be affected and to be inscribed upon. No object exists without such powers. These powers imply
the existence of a living present, that is Chronos or the moment, because powers can only be
manifested in the present. Furthermore, the difference between Chronos and Aion is itself an
ineradicable difference, on which the possibility of interaction between objects in a shared time
is grounded. If there were no Aionic instant, then there would be no temporal difference through
which events could unfold. Were there no moment of Chronos, then there would be no
inscriptions of the past or tendencies of the future capable of subdividing time into the instant.
Therefore, these conditions, and whatever truths they ground, can be said to be eternal in the
sense that they will never pass away in time, and in that they are necessary for the existence of
time itself. Powers of the pure present do not pass. These conditions, then, remain for all time,
and remain so necessarily. This fulfills both the conditions for qualifying as eternal we set out at
the beginning of this chapter.
G. Inscription and Structure
There is a final piece required before we can claim to have grounded the eternity of
mathematical truths. We said in the Introduction that mathematics as a practice is the study of
structure, specifically modal structure and whatever may follow from its limits. We then need to
account for the way in which these grounds of temporality are themselves structures, or at least
ground structural truths, rather than just any truths at all. In Chapter 1, it was argued that the
virtual is itself structural, and that it is specifically a modal structure in that it is the differential
relations between an object’s dispositions. Here we have argued that time itself is a differential
structure made out of a pure temporal difference and the difference between the various powers
of objects (in general, their powers to interact, to be affected, and to be inscribed upon).
Inscription as a pure power of the present, then, could be seen as the virtuality of time itself. As
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long as there is a present moment, there will be inscription. This remains true regardless of
whatever particular powers of inscription there are.
We must ground the eternality of mathematical truths not in what is actually inscribed but
in the power of inscription itself. If we attempted to ground mathematics in what is inscribed, we
could not maintain the status of eternal truth, even if the past did not change. This is because
whatever is inscribed is liable to copying error. If all instances of inscription are mediated by the
powers of objects which interact, then what gets inscribed depends on the powers of those
objects. The human mind cannot accurately record the location and relative coarseness of every
grain of sand on a mile of coastline. Cell reproduction cannot guarantee the accurate inscription
of the organism’s genetic code. Even the necessity of an unchanging past cannot ground eternal
truths as the new is always possible as long as there is a living present.
Copying error appears ubiquitous. In the transmission of messages, the mutation of
genes, the reproduction of artwork, the reboot of a movie franchise. In all of these cases, it can be
destructive or productive. The noisy medium may render a message unrecoverable, the mutated
gene may lead to a new species, the smudge on the reproduced painting may inspire a new art
style, the failure to capture the thrill of the original may doom the reboot. This is precisely why
none of these may be called eternal; they are open to both destruction and the new. Yet no matter
how poorly you may transcribe Euclid’s Elements, you will never succeed in producing an
inscription which breaks the entailment relations between its theorems and axioms. Anything
which can be called eternal must somehow avoid copying error, and so must be grounded in
inscription itself as a power rather than in any particular inscriptions. Particular inscriptions
would only be the result of the actualization of certain powers of objects, and since objects are
contingent, so are particular inscriptions. Since particular inscriptions are contingent, they cannot
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ground eternal truths. Inscription as a power in general, however, will exist as long as anything
does. This is all that is required to relate inscription and structure. Powers, we argued in chapter
one, are virtual and thereby structural. Inscription is the power of the present to be retained as the
past, it therefore implies a structure.
Let us return to Hamilton on algebra. By science of pure time, he means to ground the
foundations of algebra in the succession of moments. Time is taken as the condition of the
possibility of counting, and this is so because reference to successive moments is all that is
required to count. That is, take any moment, A. Any moment B is either the same moment, or a
different moment. In the first case, identity and equality can be established as the same moment
having several names, and so meaning is given to statements of the form A = A and A = B. If
they are different, then there is an order between the moments, for one moment either precedes
or proceeds the other. The names of moments can then be ordered from earliest to latest,
providing an isomorphism with the ordinal numbers (Hamilton, 1837, 304).15 Counting is
thereby established. Counting requires no particular content or spatial reference. However, if
time as succession is the ground of algebra, then we are in conflict with the constraints of this
project. On the side of mathematical propositions, there would, on Hamilton’s account, need to
be an actual infinity of moments to make possible the truth of transfinite mathematics. Hamilton
had died a decade before Cantor’s first published work on the transfinite, and so a potential
infinity of moments available to consciousness would have been enough for his purposes.
Grounding mathematics post-Cantor, however, demands an account of the transfinite and
completed infinities. On the side of metaphysics, we have shown that chronological succession is

There is a fascinating similarity here between Hamilton’s account and Griss’s negationless mathematics in that
fundamentally, the chain of reasoning requires a positive notion of difference which establishes identities rather than
the use of negation, though Hamilton does not develop this point.
15
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the product of time rather than its condition, and so would not be capable of grounding eternal
truths. Chronological time would require inscription to actually take place because the
production of chronological time requires inscriptions which can establish a metric or unit
measure for time such as the regular ticking of the clock or the radiation of a cesium atom.
Grounding eternal truths even on the entirety of a chronological time would mean grounding
them on inscriptions that could have been otherwise. Since these inscriptions could have been
otherwise, chronological time does not provide the necessity required for the grounding of
eternal truths. Were these truths actually grounded on chronological time, it would open math up
to the forces of history and copying error.
Contra Hamilton, we do not require succession to actually play out. If algebra is the study
of the modal structure of inscription, that is, if it studies inscription as the pure power of the
present to retain the past, then we do not require the playing out of any particular inscription at
all. Counting follows from inscription and difference, which then grounds algebra. Take
Hamilton’s grounding of counting, and replace successive moments with potential inscriptions.
Inscription as a power is the potential to retain temporal differences. As inscription and temporal
difference produce temporal succession, there is a potential ordering already in the structure of
inscription. This allows for a strict ordering, though it need not, and inscriptions which would
follow from such an ordering would be isomorphic with ordinal numbers. That is, whereas an
earlier and a later moment cannot be distinguished if a rhythm were playing out in a vacuum, the
retention of that rhythm by another object produces a common time with an ordering where a
particular inscription can be distinguished as before or after another inscription. If so, then
inscription itself has a power to order. Counting is thereby established as the potential retention
of any difference at all, and the relations between that potential inscription and any iterated
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inscriptions. Algebra is then the study of what must follow from the potential difference between
any inscriptions at all. No actual succession is required to ground algebra, even if the practice of
algebra must of course take place in time. We have then maintained Hamilton’s insight into the
nature of Algebra as the science of pure time, but substituted an alternative metaphysics of time.
Modality, inscription, and difference are then tied together with algebra and time.

H. The Asymmetry Between Necessity and Eternity
As we argued in the beginning of this chapter, necessity and eternity are not equivalent.
The priority of ground established here can explain this surprising turn of events. What is eternal
is grounded in pure difference through the Aionic instant, and so is necessary, but not all
necessities are eternal since not all necessities ground the production of time itself. Necessity
may change, and this is no paradox. However, necessities do not change in time. Rather, if a
necessity changes, it must be an atemporal change. The most obvious type of atemporal change
is the ceasing to exist of an object. Certainly, every object has a death date locatable in
chronological time, but this death date is only inscription of an atemporal change which is the
object’s destruction. Just as the individuation of a new object with new internal parts is the
construction of a new necessity (the necessity of the identity of the produced object), the
destruction of an object involves the destruction of some necessity. This cannot be fully clarified
until an account of dispositional essences are given in chapter 4. Objects do not pass wholly into
the past. Such would contradict the necessary partiality or incompleteness of inscription. To exist
wholly in the past would mean an object has no excess over its inscription. But with no such
excess, the object would no longer have any powers of its own because powers cannot be
inscribed as powers. If the object lacks any powers of its own at all, it is no longer an object.
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This is like confusing a program for its code. One could inscribe the entire code of a program
flawlessly onto a boulder, but the program will not run. And so, objects existing in the past is
contradictory.
Death is always an atemporal change. The pain of losing a loved one is not at their
becoming a part of the past, but at their no longer being a part of the present, of knowing they
will leave no new traces.16 A living being is always becoming a part of the past; this is nothing to
mourn. That the dead no longer have any power to inscribe anything new is the sign that they are
no more, gone from both time and eternity. All of this is so long as time itself remains possible.
The possibility of atemporal change then establishes the asymmetry between necessity and
eternity which our starting constraints imply. Eternity may die with time while necessary
survives through pure difference.
I. Conclusion: A Moving Eternity
Ann Conway’s sublime image of eternity as the unmoving center of an ever-spinning
wheel cannot be improved upon (Conway, 1692, III.8), but we must reinterpret it. We must see
the stability of the center as a result, not the condition, of the structure of the wheel and its
movement. Moreover, the free-spinning wheel of Conway’s image is a transcendent wheel; it
makes no contact with the ground. When eternity is grounded, we see clearly that it moves along
with the wheel of time; stable and unchanging relative to its perimeter as the limit of history, yet
always moving relative to the ground even if it remains the same height from it. What is eternal

Deleuze wrote as much in a short piece in memory of Guattari. While discussing reading Guattari’s work after his
death, Deleuze writes “Perhaps the most painful aspects of remembering a dead friend are the gestures and glances
that still reach us, that still come to us long after he is gone. Felix’s work gives new substance to these gestures and
glances, like a new object capable of transmitting their power,” (Deleuze, 2007, 387). That Guattari’s work can
transmit these powers is, he says, “one of the best ways to keep Felix alive,” (ibid). I admit there is something
ghoulish about mining a lament for a lost friend for hermeneutical support, but all philosophy is for the sake of life,
and I know of no more important reason to understand the nature of atemporal change than to learn how to mourn.
16
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depends, in the last instance, on what there is. Eternity may escape movement in time, but it
cannot escape becoming.
While we have provided a grounding for eternal truths, such a grounding still is not
enough for truths about actual rather than potential infinities. The eternal is usually taken to be
infinite or unbounded in time, but we have shown here that the eternal is itself finite. It will last
as long as inscription is possible, which will be only as long as the things of the universe are
capable of holding themselves together. Even if we have the potential infinity of the real line, we
do not yet have the grounds for truths about completed infinities which Set Theory constructs. To
approach the infinite, we must first turn to that which is in excess of time. Having a grounding in
the production of time allows us to give meaning to the possibility of events beyond what
actually unfolds in history. For example, perhaps the strangest results of the study of complexity
in computer science are that there are mathematical truths about algorithms which require more
computing power than the universe itself has the resources to run. That powers are in excess of
time is the first step of explaining such a surprising state of affairs, but we must investigate what
this excess means for particular objects and their powers, rather than for the pure powers of the
present alone. The specifics of this will be the topic of Chapter 4 where we ground
counterfactual claims through Deleuze’s novel account of essence.
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Chapter 4:
Essence and Excess
“[Philosophers] invent objects (individual concepts, forms, substances)
called “essences,”… and then worry when they can’t locate
these objects by rummaging around in other possible worlds”
-Ruth Barcan Marcus, Essential Attribution, 59
“All science would be superfluous if the form of appearance
of things directly coincided with their essences,”
-Marx, Capital, vol. 3, 956

Finding that objects ground the production of time and that dispositions are then in excess
of time as it unfolds, we now must move on to exploring this excess. This will lead to an account
of essence which is required to ground necessary truths about specific objects (i.e. their essential
properties). This is done for the sake of setting the ground for chapter 5. There, the infinite truths
of mathematics will be shown to be grounded in a relation between the same powers which
ground these essential truths about specific objects. This demonstration will thereby also ensure
the status of the infinite truths of mathematics as necessary truths. To be more precise, it will
establish their relative necessity dependent on the existence of such objects. I will argue in this
chapter that what grounds essential truths about an object is the structure of capacities it
possesses to both be affected by and to affect another, and more specifically, those powers which
maintain the identity of an object. What is essential to an object (at least, insofar as it remains the
same object) are these dispositions. In Deleuze’s terms, this is an object’s virtual structure or its
multiplicity, (Deleuze, 1994, 182). However, a thing’s essence is not to be identified with its
entire virtual structure, but only those powers and capacities which make it possible for the
object to maintain its identity. This follows in part from the fact that essence is conceptually tied
to identity, but the production of an object is founded on the primacy of difference, and so the
object must equally be in excess of its own essence as it is of its own identity. Essence is not that
which makes a thing what it is, but rather what it is to preserve a thing as the thing it is. Next, I
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will explore this specifically Deleuzian notion of essence in relation to two accounts of essence
in the analytic literature: dispositional essentialism, and historical essentialism. Since both
accounts are offered in support of scientific realism, we will explore the advantages for scientific
realism offered by Deleuze’s account. Finally, this will culminate in an explanation for the
persistence of essential truths despite the fundamental mutability of objects and the production of
new essences that such mutability makes possible.
A. Essence and Infinity
We have so far shown how an ontology which includes only finite, contingent objects,
the ontology implied by our best scientific theories, can give rise to necessary and eternal truths.
In sum, necessary truths are truths about differential structure since difference itself is
necessarily implied by being, and eternal truths are truths implied by the conditions of the
production of time. Necessary and eternal truths are not unchanging because they are outside of
this world of contingent becoming as Platonists would affirm, but because they are true of the
structures of change itself. We are then left with the final feature of mathematics that we set out
to ground: the fact that mathematics is capable of producing both a potential infinity of truths and
of producing truths about higher order infinities.
Let us call “transfinite truths” any truth which is either about an infinite object (i.e. an
object which is infinite in some way or requires some infinite measure, say, god is infinite due to
its knowledge or goodness being infinite), or about a collection of an infinite number of things.
Since there are transfinite truths, they must at least be logically possible. Since these truths will
never find a referent of which they are an accurate or literal representation, the state of affairs
they describe cannot be physically possible. While infinities may occasionally appear in our best
physical models of the universe, these results are considered unphysical and the physicist’s
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response is to develop mathematical techniques which curtail the appearance of such infinities in
calculations in order to re-fit the mathematical description to the phenomenon under study.
Consider, for example, renormalization, perhaps the most well-known of these techniques, which
is applied when one level of a system’s model gives rise to infinities which are mathematically
intractable (Butterfield and Bouatta, 2016). Through a progressive “coarse-graining” of the
model, we can obtain a finite description which is once again mathematically tractable. Were the
initial, un-renormalized model correct, that is, if the lower level contained actual physical
infinities, it is unclear how a stable, finite, and predictive model of the higher level could then be
extracted from it. Since such models are possible, it seems, then, that in physical situations,
infinities arise as an artifact of our attempt to model the universe. Infinities do not await us to be
discovered, rather they are produced by our process of discovery. Given our commitment to
respecting scientific practice, we must then maintain that infinities are physically impossible.
This project is committed to the heuristic that wherever infinities appear in physical theories,
they are an artifact of incomplete description or the formal model itself, and not an accurate
modelling of some infinity in the cosmos. On this account, either there is a Peircean final
scientific account which does not give rise to infinities or any infinities which cannot be
banished from our theories will require techniques akin to renormalization in order to handle
them. In other words, infinities do not explain but must be explained.1
We can then ask whether transfinite truths are metaphysically possible. Could the
universe be or have been such that it contained either an infinite number of objects or an infinite

1

In his popular book on Loop Quantum Gravity, physicist Carlo Rovelli stakes out a similar commitment. In a
section appropriately titled “The End of Infinity,” Rovelli summarizes the history of modern physics as a series of
banishments of various infinities in physical models. He goes on to claim that “’Infinite,” ultimately, is the name the
we give to what we do not yet know. Nature appears to be telling us that there is nothing truly infinite,” (Rovelli,
2017, 233), an intuition I wholeheartedly share.
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object? If transfinite truths are metaphysically possible, they are either grounded in the powers of
objects or in the powers of difference itself. The ground of transfinite truths must be certain
powers of objects as it cannot be a power of difference itself. If difference itself could give rise
to infinite truths without the aid of the powers of certain objects, then we would have to affirm
the possibility that difference itself would have the power to give rise to an actual infinity of
objects. We have already seen in Chapter 2 that individuation, a power of difference itself, can
give rise to a virtual continuum, but that this continuum will never produce an actual infinity. A
virtual continuum’s potential infinite divisibility cannot be actually completed even if it is able to
virtually function as if it can always be further divided. We then concluded that no power of
difference itself can give rise to an actual infinity. Rather than invoking our starting commitment
to finitude, let us explore the reductio, granting only that there is no fundamental infinity with
which to begin the process of individuation because such a fundamental infinity would turn out
to be a fundamental identity as argued in Chapter 2, and so contradict the primacy of difference.
If the powers of pure difference could individuate an infinite number of objects from a
finite number of objects, it would give rise to a transfinite sorites paradox where we would have
to accept that the addition of some newly individuated object pushes the cardinality of the
universe from finite to infinite. That is, the addition of one new object to our ontology would
have to take our universe from a finite number of objects to an infinite number. This is logically
impossible since no finite addition to a finite set can produce an infinite set. Even if the process
of individuation were capable of producing all possible combinations of a finite set of elements,
this would only produce another finite set. The same holds for an infinite object, since that object
would be infinite in some quality, extension, or property, and this would imply a movement from
finitude to the transfinite by degree or by addition. The cosmos is nothing more than the
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collection of all objects and their relations, and so is itself finite. Therefore, the cosmos itself will
only ever individuate a finite number of objects, and it is incapable of individuating an infinite
object. Individuation can only produce the potential infinity of the virtual continuum, that which
can function as if it were continuous. Such a virtual continuum cannot actually be infinite
because no other objects possess the powers which would make it possible to actually infinitely
subdivide the continuum. Therefore, we cannot take transfinite truths to be referentially true of
this cosmos, even if this cosmos makes such truths true.
One may take this to imply an inherent error in our use of mathematical tools and
conclude that this is a point scored for fictionalism. However, this would forget that these
infinities are a part of the formal grounding and operation of our mathematical tools which are
necessary for the work of science. These cannot be fictional because they are implied by the
formal requirements of our mathematical tools, and therefore have the same status as any other
mathematical truths, whether what they describe is physically possible or not. We must then
discover what features of objects are necessary to ground transfinite truths.
Here we can make two postulates to begin our inquiry into the production of transfinite
truths: First, since transfinite truths exist but are not about any thing(s) which exists, they must in
some sense be counterfactual truths. That is, they are truths of the subjunctive sort: “If a process
could run forever, it would produce an infinite number of objects,” or “if we have an infinite set,
performing the power set operation on it will result in a set with a larger cardinality.” We see this
most obviously in Set Theory where the axiom of infinity asserts the existence of an infinite set,
and without this axiom, the transfinite truths so central to Set Theory cannot be produced.
Thereby, all necessary truths about transfinitude have the structure of relative necessities, and are
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relative to the posited existence of a transfinite set (more specifically, a set which contains a
subset with which it can be put into a 1-to-1 correspondence).
In chapter 1, we accepted truthmaker maximalism, the claim that all truths have some
truthmaker. As Lewis points out, truthmakers are not maximal accidentally; necessarily, if a new
truth appears it will have a truth maker, and even a hypothetical truth implies hypothetical
truthmakers (indeterminate though they may be), (Lewis, 2001, 604). Therefore, the transfinite
truths we seek, even if they do not have any possible referents among our ontology, must still
have some truthmakers. In other words, there is nothing they are representationally true of, but
they are true from the structure of the cosmos. The powers argued for in Chapter 3 which are
prior to time provide just such truthmakers. If so, then counterfactual propositions are not idle
speculation, but rather must be true or false depending on what powers there are. This is
important for metaphysical concerns, but it is also directly relevant to our more limited goal in
this work, that of providing truthmakers for mathematics and logical entailment in a materialist
cosmos. This is because many of the truths of mathematics and logic are not true about anything
in this cosmos. The most obvious are any truths about transfinite sets, but it is equally a problem
for the less exotic truths of, for example, Euclidean geometry which provides necessary truths for
ideal triangles, perfect circles, and other such physical impossibilities.2 Second, transfinite truths
only come into being with some specific relation between objects. This is required since if these
truths were independent of objects at all, that independence would imply powers of pure
difference capable of grounding them. We have already shown this leads to a contradiction.
Both of these postulates point us in the same direction: towards the concept of essence.
First, because essences are related to counterfactuals in that essences are meant to distinguish

2

I take the grounding of transfinite sets and ideal triangles to be the same issue of grounding, though they may have
different powers on which they are grounded.
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accidental properties of a thing from necessary or “essential” properties which provides sense to
counterfactual questions about how an object can act or be otherwise while yet remaining the
same object (Fine 1994). We will see below that essence is related to the dispositions of an
object, and dispositions are already generally accepted to be able to ground counterfactual truths.
We will see how essences provide a grounding for necessary counterfactual truths of the sort
needed to account for transfinite truths in a finite ontology. Second, because transfinite truths are
not accidental (they cannot be otherwise; Hilbert may rest assured we will not be banished from
Cantor’s paradise), yet do not follow from the powers of difference itself, and so must come into
being with some specific type of relation between objects and their powers. Furthermore,
essences, being collections of powers as we will argue, are in excess of time and so can ground
counterfactuals in that there is always more a power could have done than what gets weaved into
time. Essences are also not powers of difference itself, so they avoid the contradiction of
producing an infinity found above. That is, however essences ground transfinite truths, it will not
be through the process of individuation; yet we still need to account for how difference can give
rise to essences and essential truths. Exploring this will be the task of this chapter; discovering
the specific relations with an essence that must obtain to ground transfinite truths will be the task
of chapter 5.
B. Essence and Modality
We reach the question of essential properties as we approach the question of how to
ground truths about the infinite in a finite ontology. This is due to such truths being necessary
and eternal themselves, but difference and the conditions of time alone cannot ground them. We
have shown that a metaphysics of difference can produce a virtual continuum, but we have not
yet seen how this could ground infinities larger than the set of all natural numbers. Despite
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eternity, time will still remain finite and so provides us no useful grounds for infinity either. And
so, we may look to the excess of objects over their expression in time, that is, their essences.
Turning towards such an excess opens up a new way to address the question of the infinite. To
explore this, we must explicate this connection between essence and modality.
The contemporary analytic uptake of the notion of essence in relation to modality is
frequently attributed to Fine 1994. Fine argues that essence is distinct from and ultimately
grounds necessity. This is in opposition to modal accounts, which Fine traces briefly from
Aristotle through G. E. Moore to contemporary quantified modal logic, that attempt to reduce
essences to necessity by defining essences as what is necessarily true about a given object (Fine,
1994, 2-3). In other words, the modal account claims that what is essential to an object is
whatever properties it has in all possible worlds in which the object exists. This then opens up
issues of how exactly possible worlds can ground such features of objects, how is it that we can
establish the trans-world identities of objects or proper counterpart relations so that we are
certain we get the right list of properties. More simply, it grounds something concrete in
something more abstract than itself; such modal approaches all amount to attempts to ground
certain properties of objects in possible worlds.
Fine’s reversal has obvious affinities with the truthmaker account we have adopted. Our
account demands that necessary truths still be grounded in objects or difference itself, and holds
that essences are features of objects. Grounding necessary truths about objects in their essences
follows from the fact that objects themselves are produced by covering over differences.
Furthermore, it is unproblematic for contingent objects to have essences which then ground
necessary truths, since these necessary truths are relative necessities which are dependent on the
existence of the object in question. That this is a relative necessity prevents us from having to
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endorse the Necessitist view of objects critiqued in Chapter 2. However, we cannot simply agree
with Fine here because he treats essence as a primitive. Essence is a concept of identity par
excellence. So, in our metaphysics of difference we cannot retain the view that essence occupies
the fundamental position lent it by Fine. Doing so would amount to positing fundamental
identities, which the priority of difference prohibits.
For our purposes, Fine’s grounding of modality on essence needs to be further grounded
on difference and dispositions. We cannot simply posit essences as a part of the fundamental
furniture of the cosmos because this would mark essences out as fundamental identities. We
must then account for their generation. In short, we maintain Fine’s grounding of necessary
truths about particular objects as well as kinds in their essences (though below we show that this
distinction between kinds and objects is not what it first appears), but we must push further and
show how it is that contingent objects, through their powers and the powers of pure difference
alone, give rise to essences. And again, we must explore how this grounding of essence on the
virtual structure of objects and difference itself changes the very notion of essence.
C. The Essences of Objects
Given the reputation of post-structuralists as anti-essentialists, it may seem strange to
seek a notion of essence in Deleuze’s work. DeLanda claims that Deleuze explicitly rejects
essences and forges several concepts (most notably, the concept of multiplicity) in order to
oppose even the possibility of discussing essential features of objects (DeLanda, 2002, 9).
However, the concept of essence appears across Deleuze’s oeuvre in productive ways (as
opposed to only being the target of criticism). Essence plays a positive role in his reconstruction
of Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Philosophy (2006), Proust and Signs contains extended
meditations on the process of discovering and producing essences (2000), as does Expressionism
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and Philosophy: Spinoza (1992), Logic of Sense approvingly cites Avicenna’s notion of
individual essences (2004, 41), A Thousand Plateaus assigns “vague or nomad” essences to
some of its central concepts (most notably, the State and the War Machine) (1987, 408), and
Deleuze’s final work, Immanence: A Life, affirms that a3 life is an individual essence (2007,
391),4 to cite a few important references to the term. Baugh 2006 goes as far as to attribute to
Deleuze a theory of essence which nonetheless undercuts traditional essentialism and its
commonly disparaged posits of unchanging, eternal, or transcendent essences.5
The classical notion of essence as the unchanging, necessary properties capable of
identifying a thing as a certain type of thing which either pre-exists, or is somehow fundamental
to the being of that thing is in obvious contradiction with the system we have so far argued for
from Deleuze’s work. The concept of essence must first be grafted onto a metaphysics of
difference, which means that essences must be produced. Essences cannot pre-exist the object of
which they are the essence, and essences must, at first, depend on the objects of which they are
the essence, not the other way around. The classical account makes an equivocation on what it
means for an essence to be necessary for a thing to be what it is. Essence, on the Platonist
The indefinite singular is a technical way of speaking for Deleuze which indicates an haecceity. The “a” is
opposed to saying “any” in that it is intended to highlight the singularity of the chosen example, so expresses that it
cannot be substituted even with other objects of the same type.
3

As we will see below, “individual” should be understood very broadly, in that, for example, a species may be an
individual in this sense, since a species is individuated in an ecological niche.
4

Baugh’s account leans heavily on Deleuze’s readings of Spinoza which raises some interpretative questions around
what is Deleuze affirming as part of his metaphysics, and what is Spinoza exegesis. For instance, in Baugh’s
account, the individuation of an essence is an explicitly extensive process (Baugh, 2006, 33) as stated in Deleuze’s
Expressionism and Philosophy: Spinoza. However, Deleuze himself distinguishes between his works on the history
of philosophy and his works which are written in his own name (Deleuze, 1994, xv). The former works attempt to
draw out new ideas from historical figures while still remaining faithful to their work and especially their novel
ideas, and the latter works are Deleuze working out his own philosophical accounts. Understanding both are
necessary to reconstructing Deleuze’s system, but when the historical works disagree with the works written in his
own name, we have good reason to privilege the latter account. We saw in Chapter 2, that when Deleuze writes in
his own name, individuation is first an intensive process, an account indebted more to Simondon than from Spinoza.
Following from Baugh’s work, Kleinherenbrink 2019 undertakes a reconstruction of Deleuze’s account of essence
on Deleuze’s own terms alone.
5
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account, is what is necessary to an object in two senses: first, in identifying an object as the
object it is, and second, as necessary to the production of the object. This second sense is the idea
of an object “incarnating” an essence which precedes it. If one rejects Platonic realism, then this
obviously leads to an invalid retrojection in that features necessary to a thing’s identity cannot
pre-exist it as a part of its process of production. The problem is then set: how to reconcile
production and essence?
In some sense, we can see Deleuze’s metaphysics as a project of working out essences of
becoming in opposition to the classical account of static essences as a sort of unchanging being
or unchanging features of a being. Interestingly, both Fine and Deleuze cite Husserl as a
precursor to the notion of essence they employ (Fine, 1994, n. 1, Deleuze and Guattari, 1987,
367). Fine is concerned with Husserl’s grounding of necessity on essence, and Deleuze and
Guattari make use of what Husserl calls “vagabond essences,” which are vague and mutable
essences. These are not unrelated aspects, however, as it is the connection to stability despite
transformation and vagueness which makes possible such a grounding. For Deleuze and Guattari,
“A theorematic figure is a fixed essence, but its transformations, distortions, ablations, and
augmentations, all of its variations, form problematic figures that are vague yet rigorous, "lensshaped," "umbelliform," or "indented." It could be said that vague essences extract from things a
determination that is more than thinghood,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 367). We will say more
about the “problematic” nature of these essences below, but for now, what is important is the
centrality of change, transformation, construction, and in short, dispositions, to these essences.
In Book VII of The Republic, Plato claims the mathematician is wrong to speak of the
construction of the shape because the shape discussed in mathematics is not the shape which is
drawn. The shape discussed by the geometer is rather the pure form of the shape, and no earthly
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act of drawing can hope to produce the eternal and perfect form of that shape. Geometry, for
Plato, is of interest only insofar as it concerns being and not becoming. No one could reasonably
accuse Plato of a lack of philosophical creativity or intellectual courage, but it is surprising to see
so starkly here what Plato could not imagine: that there is a form or essence of the construction
of the shape as much as there is a pure form of the shape itself. If this is the case, then the drawn
circle is not the pale copy of the Platonic circle, but the form of a circle is a result of an ideal
movement of the compass on a surface. The ideal circle is the result of an abstract power of
inscription, but this implies not just a static form of a circle but also an abstract power of
producing the circle.6 Deleuze’s account is that there is as much an essence to making-round as
there is to roundness itself, and that roundness is grounded in the making-round. Furthermore, if
there are necessary truths about roundness, then they first depend on this nomad essence of
making-round.
To explore this account of essence more thoroughly, let us first look at an example of
Deleuze’s use of the term essence. The first full treatment is given in Nietzsche and Philosophy,
where Deleuze glosses a Nietzschean notion of essence as a thing’s affinity for the forces that
take it to the limit of what it can do or allow it to show the powers which are uniquely its own
(Deleuze, 2006, 9). As an example, Deleuze discusses the way the philosopher shows themself as
different from the sage.7 The figure of the sage in Deleuze’s work is the one who claims to have

In an admittedly oracular passage, Deleuze and Guattari summarize this as “The State is perpetually producing and
reproducing ideal circles, but a war machine is necessary to make something round,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987,
367). In brief, the State names forces of preservation, stability, and the powers of constraint which can maintain that
stability, whereas the war machine names the unsettling forces which overturn such stability. The war machine is on
the side of nomads, hence its connection to vagabond essences. The State captures the War Machine as a way to
preserve itself. The State does not originate war any more than stability originates movement.
6

7

Deleuze and Guattari do not say explicitly who or what they mean by the sage here, and it is not clear whether they
intend certain ancient figures or accounts of the sage. Deleuze elsewhere praises the stoic sage and that sage is an
ideal figure within stoic philosophy, and so seems an unlikely target of this critique. They does not directly mention
non-Western accounts of the sage such as in Taoism, though What is Philosophy? supports a Greek origin of

194

wisdom or knowledge, usually through some special means which establishes the sage as an
authority (claims of revelation, sanctioning by the state, etc.; these are to be distrusted). Both the
philosopher and the sage have a relationship to wisdom, and to the untrained eye, the philosopher
and sage will appear as the same, as either the wise one or even as the fool depending on their
opinion of the wisdom expressed. But the philosopher is able to relate to wisdom differently than
the sage. The philosopher loves wisdom rather than possesses it, and so can cultivate wisdom the
way one cultivates a relationship, rather than possess wisdom the way one holds property.8 The
sage can only rest its claim to wisdom on the sage’s own, usually fraudulent, authority, whereas
the philosopher can lay claim to wisdom as a friend or lover. What is essential to the philosopher
is that they show themselves as capable of doing something only they can do. Both the sage and
the philosopher can express wisdom, but only the philosopher can express the friendly
cultivation of wisdom, can produce something with wisdom. The philosopher expresses wisdom
only incidentally; it is only essential to the philosopher that they have the power to cultivate
wisdom, however that may be done. The sage only cultivates wisdom incidentally but must
express wisdom necessarily, and since so few who claim the title sage manage to do so, it is a
nearly empty essence.
While Nietzsche and Philosophy is Deleuze’s second book, this notion of essence
reappears throughout his oeuvre, and even this example is notably reiterated in his final book

philosophy and a critique of non-Western, pre-Greek thought might be the intended implication on his and
Guattari’s part. If so, this is one Deleuzian position I have no interest in defending. The sage here appears to be the
general figure of the wiseman who has the answers and is propped up as an unquestionable authority versus the
friend who seeks but does not possess wisdom. If so, it should equally describe the relationship between Heraclitus
and Socrates as between Confucius (at least in the portion of the Analects which proceed mostly by proclamation
rather than argument) and Mencius.
Deleuze’s definition of philosophy as the activity of creating concepts is well-known. I avoid that account here so
as not to get caught up in the details of it; however, I take it to be equivalent to the cultivation of wisdom insofar as
one of the great threats to good thinking is falling into cliché and creating new concepts in connection with living
problems wards off clichés.
8

195

(co-authored with Guattari), What is Philosophy? We find here two special features of Deleuze’s
notion of essence. First, it is dispositional. A thing’s unique powers define what is essential to it.
Second, essences are not unchanging or ahistorical though we will see that essences of existing
objects function as eternal in the sense developed in Chapter 3, and an essence may leave traces
which survive its object, just as an object may outlive its essence. So far, these examples have
only shown that an essence’s appearance will be historical in some sense, but all objects must be
metaphysically individuated. An essence will be tied to the identity of an object, and so is also
connected the process of individuation. Without an identity, there is no object of which to affirm
an essence. This tells us two things: Essences are produced and do not pre-exist the first object to
‘instantiate’ them, and essences do not exhaust all that is important in understanding an object;
they do not exhaust all that is ‘good’ or ‘true’ of or for an object. On the former, this implies that
essence is tied to the production of the object and the new powers which come into being with it.
This will be explicated in a comparison with the analytic position of dispositional essentialism
below. On the latter, an object is in excess of its essence, and because of this, it can change
under its essence. The classical account of essence would take this to be an aberration, but to
shrug off one’s essence may be one’s greatest triumph. In shrugging off its essence, something
may cease to be, producing something new, or it may maintain its identity while changing its
essence. For the latter, let us take a sci-fi example here for brevity. If a person were to replace
their biological body piece by piece with functionally equivalent robotic parts, they would at
some point be freed of their human essence, yet would remain the same person. As for the
former case, evolution itself implies it: the alteration of an ecological niche or some other
selection pressure demands that a species alter its essential features, to cast off its old essence
and to forge new ones. Whether this fails or succeeds, the species will no longer instantiate its
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former essence, either by adaptation or extinction. All of this results from essence still remaining
tied to the identity of an object, and so it cannot be exhaustive of that object since an essence
cannot subsume the fundamental productive powers of difference which make the object possible
in the first place. This will be explicated through a comparison with the position of historical
essentialism in analytic philosophy of biology. With this cursory sketch of essence, let us turn to
detailed treatments of dispositional and historical essences in order to bring out the details of
Deleuze’s account of essence.
D. Dispositional Essences
Dispositional essentialism is the claim that (either some or all) sparse properties are
powers or potencies (Bird 2006, 491). Sparse properties are distinguished from abundant
properties. Sparse properties are whatever properties are fundamental to the universe, whereas
abundant properties are any non-fundamental properties (with various positions holding different
accounts as to which properties are sparse and which are abundant). The dispositional essentialist
is interested in sparse properties because “sparse properties are the explanatory properties of the
type science seeks to discover,” (Bird, 2006). Here we cannot follow the dispositional essentialist
because of the positing of sparse properties as fundamental essences (and so fundamental
identities), but our focus is instead on the relation between disposition and essence that they
propose.9 Yates 2012 explains dispositional essentialism in terms of causal roles, though we need
not get into issues of causality here because by causal role he appears to mean simply what it is
that a property can be understood to do. As he puts it “The causal role R of charge isn’t just

9

It is also worth pointing out here that the dispositional essentialist will grant essences only to sparse properties,
with all higher order objects, phenomena, etc. explainable in terms of these basic essences. Deleuze, on the other
hand, has an account of essences such that they are produced, and so there are both no fundamental essences, and
essences for non-fundamental objects (and this is more than just the trivial point that there are no fundamental
objects for Deleuze).
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essential to charge, R is the individual essence of charge—in addition to having R essentially,
having R as opposed to some other causal role is what makes charge the property it is, rather
than some other property,” (Yates, 2012, 1). That is, there are no possible worlds where negative
electric charges attract each other. Simply put, a property is, essentially, what it can do.
We must ask what sorts of powers of an object can be said to be essential.10 Here we find
a connection between Fine, the dispositional essentialists, and Deleuze’ s account of
metaphysical individuation. Fine categorizes the internal relations of an object as essential (Fine,
1994, 3), the dispositional essentialist provides a way of understanding what is essential in terms
of what a thing can do (its dispositions), and we have already established the production of
internal relations of an object in terms of dispositions (metaphysical individuation) in Chapter 2.
Deleuze’s metaphysics provides a way of connecting these three pieces. For instance, he writes
in Proust and Signs that “this virtuality, is essence,” (Deleuze, 2004, 61), and then, “Combray
appears as it could not be experienced: not in reality, but in its truth; not in its external and
contingent relations, but in its internalized differences, in its essence,” (Deleuze, 2004, 61).
Connecting these pieces will make clear the distinction between accidental dispositions and the
dispositions which are central to a thing’s essence.
While essences themselves are a result of metaphysical individuation, we must be careful
not to equate individuation and essence so as not to confuse accidental and essential features of
things. As Marcus points out, “perhaps complete individuation is always a matter of… accidental
properties, accidents of circumstance,” (Marcus, 1993, 58). While Marcus’s claim is about what
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There is a further difficulty here in that dispositional essentialism is first a theory about properties, and objects are
then taken to be nothing more than the bearers of certain properties (Bird 2006). That is, the dispositional essence is
attributed to the property and then objects are collections of such properties. We have already critiqued this view in
Chapter 1 and shown there is no easy separation between properties and object-qua-bare-particular. The exploration
of the role of individuation in the production of essence should justify this extension from discussing dispositions as
essential to properties to the essential dispositions of objects because individuation accounts for the production of
objects and their properties.
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we have called epistemological individuation (that is, the way we may identify an object), it
remains true for Deleuze’s account of metaphysical individuation. A thing’s individuation is
always a contingent matter, but it bears a relative necessity to its essence.
The distinction between essential and inessential properties becomes more central in the
grounding of essences on difference. Whereas the dispositional essentialist can invoke essences
for the fundamental properties of being, we cannot. All we can assert about being at its most
fundamental is the existence of difference, and even if difference has powers all its own, it
cannot be said to have them essentially as this would lead to contradiction by giving difference
an identity. If it is dispositions that are essential to a thing being what it is, then we are dealing
with neither the intensive nor the actual aspect of objects, only the virtual. This is because both
the actual and intensive aspect of a thing can change without changing the identity of the thing. If
so, then the classical notion of essence confused the virtual with the actual by calling nondispositional properties or qualities essential. If an object’s essence is to be found in its virtual
aspect, then how is it that the confusion of the classical account was possible in the first place?
That is, how were qualities and other non-virtual features of objects taken to be a part of their
essence? If an object has an essential quality, we may account for this as the result of an always
manifesting power, like those discussed in chapter 1 in relation to Vetter 2018. In the case of a
necessary quality, the dispositional structure of an object is such that it cannot cease to manifest
a certain quality without also ceasing to maintain its identity, or without some alteration to its
virtual structure. Therefore, even what may appear to be an essential manifestation or essential
actuality of an object here depends on its virtual structure, its powers and their relations, on
maintaining that manifestation and preventing the possibility of it changing without also altering
the object as a whole. Let us look more directly at the structural aspect of these powers.
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A common question around Newton’s third law (that every action has a reaction which is
equal in magnitude but opposite in direction) is to ask if, for example, when a baseball breaks a
glass window, is it the force from the baseball which shatters the glass or is it that the glass’s
structure breaks itself by exerting a force back on the baseball which the glass itself cannot bear,
and so shatters under its own reaction? This is usually resolved by saying it depends on how the
situation is modeled (on whether we take the perspective of the ball or the glass in our force
diagram), but if we look at the latter option, we see that the very dispositions responsible for
maintaining the glass’s integrity can be manifested in such a way as to destroy that integrity
itself. It seems then that the same disposition may be counted as among an object’s essence and
yet may also among the powers which may destroy an object rather than preserve its identity,
depending on degree of manifestation. Yet this is not contradictory. Rather, it highlights a central
feature of Deleuzian multiplicities or essences. Essences are not lists of certain properties or
powers which are independent of each other; they are structures. Structures imply relations
between the powers which make up the structure. In the technical sense, it would then be
incorrect to speak of essences as sets of powers, since sets are purely extensional and do not
encode the relations between their elements.11 In other words, two objects may have the same
exact list of dispositions, yet have radically different essences depending on how their powers
are related to each other. This also implies that powers are not exhausted by the structures of
which they are apart, since they can be manifested in ways which damage or destroy that
structure. At this point, the most we can then say about the work of discovering the powers,
relations, and degrees to which those powers make up a thing’s essence is an empirical question.

11

We could, of course, specify a function capable of modeling the relationships between the elements of the set to
get a more accurate set theoretic model, but such models would be unhelpful here since we have banned the
inference from model to cosmos, cf. Chapter 1.
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Like the dispositional essentialist, Deleuzian multiplicities cannot be discovered by purely a
priori means since they depend on encounters with other objects in order to exhibit the powers
which maintain their identity in the face of possible transformations.
It is perhaps thought that the question “what makes this thing the sort of thing it is”
should only refer to the thing in question. However, whenever we look for examples, we find
always a reference to another thing, or to some difference. Take the example of electrical charge
as a dispositional essence that we saw above from Bird. Negative charge is the disposition to
repel other negative charges, with the force of the repulsion depending on the charges in question
and their distance from each other. There is no possibility of understanding such a disposition on
its own; it is a power to be affected and a power to affect (inscribe)12 another, the disposition to
repel and be repelled by a certain quality of another object. We have already seen how to trace
the production of the powers of an object to the powers of pure difference in the process of
individuation, here it is only one step further to point out that the essential features of a thing
depend on powers to maintain the identity of a thing, and so to both see the necessity of
difference for the production of essences, and how essences cannot be fundamental. Were at least
two negative charges not individuated, the essential disposition of negative charge, to repel like
charges, would not exist.
DeLanda 2002 would take issue with this proposed point of connection between
dispositional essentialism and Deleuze on exactly this point of powers implying other objects. He
argues that multiplicities are radically different from essences in that they are not intrinsic but
These powers of an object to affect others are called “desire” by Deleuze as it is what makes possible connection,
coupling, etc. with other objects possible. There is much to be said about the Deleuzian notion of desire as it is
developed specifically in opposition to an entire philosophical tradition which classically defines desire in terms of a
lack, but we cannot develop this point here. Desire should not be understood anthropomorphically but as a general
feature of all objects (see Kleinherenbrink, 2019, 150-5). However, in order to avoid such an anthropomorphism, I
will refer to these powers collectively as powers to inscribe, or to affect another. This is because I take inscription to
be the minimum degree of connection or interaction between objects.
12
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rather imply something extrinsic, namely something capable of affecting the object (DeLanda,
2002, 13). Deleuze explicitly rejects this characterization of multiplicities: “In all cases the
multiplicity is intrinsically defined, without external reference or recourse to a uniform space in
which it would be submerged,” (Deleuze, 1994, 183). While it is true that these capacities of
objects cannot be made sense of in isolation, it does not follow that something’s affects are
somehow extrinsic to it. This confuses the condition of manifestation of a power (i.e. what makes
the power appear) with the having of that power itself. We have earlier discussed the degrees of
manifestation of a disposition (Chapter 1). Deleuze inherits a notion from Nietzsche that essence
is discernable by knowing what conditions take a thing to the highest degrees of its powers.
These powers should not be confused with the relations they make possible. The capacity to be
affected is not any particular relation with another object, nor does any other object have a direct
relation with another’s power to be affected. Such interactions only take place, as we saw in
chapter 2, through intensities and actualities. Powers are virtual and objects do not directly
interact through their virtual components.
Essence is expressed when a thing shows what only it can do. We explored the example
of the philosopher above, but Deleuze also uses the example of cinema. “The essence of a thing
never appears at the outset, but in the middle, in the course of its development, when its strength
is assured… Is not cinema at the outset forced to imitate natural [human] perception?” (Deleuze,
1986, 3). At first, cinema mimics the human gaze. Movies are shot from and viewed as if from a
human point of view. Cinema distinguishes itself and shows its essence only when it ceases to
mimic the human perspective and shows that it can display radically inhuman forms of
perception (e.g. the cut from wide shot to extreme close up, slow motion, the time-freeze camera
pan made popular by The Matrix, etc.). “The evolution of cinema, the conquest of its own
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essence or novelty, was to take place through the montage, the mobile camera and the
emancipation of the point of view, which became separate from projection,” (Deleuze, 1986, 3).
Cinema always maintains these collections of powers which make possible to record and depict
non-human perspectives, and so we may retroject this essence to the invention of the film
camera, we may say this was always essential to cinema even if we cannot distinguish such
powers at the birth of cinema. If DeLanda were correct, then cinema would have gained its
essence in the showing of itself as distinct, but Deleuze is unequivocal on this point: cinema is
not lacking an essence before that moment; it is lacking the strength to show itself as it
essentially, uniquely, is.
However, DeLanda’s account of Deleuzian multiplicity is still of great importance, and
we will return to other aspects of it below. Here, first, we must remark that while critiquing the
extrinsic account of multiplicities he gives, at least one of his conclusions still follows:
multiplicities are inherently vague. Essence/multiplicity must be explored empirically, and no
object can be made to show itself fully and completely. For this would imply that we have
applied every possible power, every power which exists and every power which could come to
exists. This is not only humanly impossible but metaphysically impossible since metaphysical
novelty means it is always possible for new powers to come into being. Furthermore, since these
capacities do indeed imply other objects with other powers (our example of electrical charge),
the discrete separation of where one essence ends and another begins is at best provisional and
pragmatic.
E. Essence, Law, and Symmetry
As we said above, Deleuze’s account is similar to the dispositional essentialist account in
that what is essential to something is what it can do, of what it is capable. However, this
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similarity can only be extended so far due to different metaphysical groundings (i.e. identity vs
difference). We can, however, show an advantage to Deleuze’s account. In particular, I will
argue that grounding essences on difference is more consistent with the central goal of
dispositional essentialism: grounding the status of physical laws in this-worldly objects. We can
see that by attending to a criticism of dispositional essentialism, its inability to explain
conservation laws and their relationship to symmetry in the natural sciences. Furthermore, this
will show the way dispositional essentialism’s proponents fall back into the trap of classical
essences by responding to this criticism in terms of identity rather than by explaining what an
object is capable of that could ground such laws. I will then argue that from the accounts of
identity as the covering over of difference in chapter 1 and of metaphysical individuation in
chapter 2, an explanation which relates essences to symmetry directly follows (which, by
Noether’s theorem, then implies conservation laws, as will be explained below).
A central goal of dispositional essentialism is to provide an empirically accessible
account of essences that is capable of explaining the use of modality in the sciences (as opposed
to possible worlds accounts of modality, which are not empirically accessible). The position then
lives or dies depending on how well it delivers on this promise. Its main virtue here comes from
the account of laws which it provides: simply put, physical laws are nothing more than the
aggregate of regularities produced by what powers there are (Vetter, 2012). Laws are then
immanent to the objects with dispositions which make such laws possible rather than
transcendent entities in their own right that condition the “behavior” of objects. Laws would then
have their status as physical necessities because they follow from the necessity of essential
features of objects. Coulomb’s law is the result of electrical charges having (and necessarily
having) only certain powers of repelling and attracting each other; this law is not itself a
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transcendent entity which bestows on the category of electrically charged objects the rules by
which they repel and attract.13 Coulomb’s law may then be easily paraphrased in terms of
powers: “two objects with charges c1 and c2 will repel/attract each other with a force proportional
to their charges and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.”
However, not all physical laws lend themselves to an easy, explicit paraphrase in terms of
dispositions. Livanios 2009 argues that conservation laws, such as the law of conservation of
mass-energy or the conservation of electrical charge, cannot be adequately understood in terms
of dispositions due to their dependence on symmetry. Livanios argues that dispositional
essentialism fails to account for these laws of physics because those laws themselves describe
features of things independent of the causal roles of the things involved (Livanios, 2009, 299).
That is, conservation of charge is not what something does, and so is not a disposition, though it
is a fundamental feature of our physical descriptions. If so, then dispositional essentialism fails to
account for a type of physical law (or at least to establish it as necessary).
First, we must say that Livanios’s argument assumes the equivocation of epistemological
and metaphysical individuation we critiqued in chapter 2: it equates a way for humans to identify
a thing with what it is to be that thing. What a thing’s essence is is a metaphysical question, not
an epistemological one. However, let us grant the argument that some symmetries are essential
properties of some objects. Livanios then claims that these symmetries are independent of the
dispositions of the objects which are then identified by them, and so therefore, there are essential
features of things which are not their dispositions. If Livanios is correct, then objects may be

13

This is, in brief, the categorical account of physical laws to which dispositional essentialism is directly opposed.
The categorical account posits that there are categorical properties and laws which determine the action of such
properties. This position then implies both the existence of real universals (the categories) and laws over and above
the properties that they govern. These are then empirically accessible, unlike possible worlds accounts, but are less
parsimonious than dispositional essentialists who need only posit objects with dispositions which then give rise to
the regularities which are discovered as laws by scientific investigation. For a defense of the categorical account, see
Armstrong, 1983.
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epistemologically individuated by way of their symmetries, rather than their dispositions or
causal roles, and these symmetries are enough to imply conservation laws as well as various
features of particle physics. However, the existence of such symmetries is left unexplained, and
it is from this angle that we will show an advantage of Deleuze’s account by explaining the
generation of symmetries from dispositions.
If Deleuze does indeed share this connection between dispositions and essences, then this
is an important critique for us to consider because of our fundamental commitment to the
ontology of the sciences. If dispositional essences are incompatible with the ontology of particle
physics, then our project would be undermined. However, while this is an important objection to
the dispositional essentialists discussed above, we will show that it is not a problem for a
metaphysics of difference. This follows from the process of covering over differences which is a
necessary feature of the production of an identity, which I will argue below is equivalent to the
production of a continuous symmetry.
Let us first look at the responses offered by dispositional essentialists to see why they fail
precisely at the point in which they embrace a priority of identity. Livianos’s arguments stand
against the dispositional essentialists in large part due to the dispositional essentialist’s implicit
dependence on the primacy of identity which leads to the reification of essences. We can see this
in that various dispositional essentialist’s solution to the problem of explaining conservation laws
is to posit an essence or essences which make them possible. That is, they ground their
explanation in what essences there are, and these posits are invariably ad hoc. For example, since
conservation laws are idealizations when applied to open systems, and only the universe as a
whole can be unproblematically taken as a closed system, Bigelow et al. 1992 posit a “worldessence” which has the dispositions of the right type to ground such laws. Livanios rejects such
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solutions as ad hoc because such essences are not the results of empirical investigation or any
other reason independent of a commitment to dispositional essentialism itself. Therefore, if the
dispositional essentialist is to respond to Livanios’s challenge, then they cannot posit the
existence of dispositions which make possible conservation laws as these would merely be ad
hoc.
To respond to this from the perspective of the metaphysics of difference without resorting
to ad hoc posits, we must ground such laws not in what essences there are, and certainly not in a
1-to-1 correspondence between laws and essences which can only produce ad hoc posits through
the illusions of representational thought. Instead, we must ground such laws in what essences do
and how they are produced. Understanding an essence as the collection of powers capable of
maintaining an object’s identity, e.g. an essence of making-round rather than of roundness itself,
helps overcome this objection. There are two reasons for this, which we present here. Firstly,
conservation laws imply some form of continuous symmetry, and vice versa (Neuenschwander,
2017, 3). Symmetry here is defined as remaining identical under a possible transformation
(Livanios, 2009, 299). This account is inherited from Group Theory, which studies mathematical
objects in terms of their operations, and so establishes the symmetries of a certain mathematical
object as the group of operations under which that object is invariant. A circle has infinite
rotational symmetry around its center, a square has rotational symmetry under rotations of 90,
180, 270, and 360 degrees, and an isosceles triangle is only symmetrical under rotations of 360
degrees. A cylinder is distinguished from a circle by having, in addition to infinite symmetry
around one axis, a second axis which is symmetrical only under rotations of 180 degrees.
Focusing on transformations here highlights the role dispositions play in terms of these possible

207

transformations: dispositions just are powers to make something otherwise, and so they ground
possible transformations which can be used to evaluate symmetry.
Next, symmetry itself must be explained in terms of dispositions. Objects can only be
torn a part through the powers of objects, themselves or others. Therefore, if an object has
powers which maintain its identity, then it is always a power to maintain that identity relative to
other powers, that is, in the face of possible transformations that could be performed on it by
other objects. It is not enough to merely posit such powers of preservation as this would still be
as ad hoc as a world-essence is according to Livanios. We must explain how such powers arise
and how they fill this preservative role. We can then move past the ad hoc charge by showing
that the production of identity and the powers which preserve that identity (its essence) entail the
production of symmetries. This, following Livanios’s invocation of Noether’s Theorem, would
then imply a grounding of conservation laws.
As established in Chapter 1, an identity must be produced, and it is produced from
difference. This is the process of the covering over of difference. Noether’s theorem requires a
continuous symmetry, and we have shown that individuation is the production of continuities and
of new powers. That there is a link here should not be surprising as both Noether’s theorem as
well as the mathematical study of symmetry in general share an intellectual history with
Deleuze’s concept of multiplicity by way of Group Theory, (DeLanda, 2002, 16-7). The
continuities produced are undergirded by the virtual aspects of the object which maintain these
continuities; therefore, these continuities depend on the powers of the object individuated, as
established in chapter 2. This covering over of difference (the production of identity) and these
powers of preserving that covering are, when taken together, nothing more than the
establishment of symmetries. Deleuze himself says as much when he claims that “what matters is
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the possibility of the cause having less symmetry than the effect,” (Deleuze, 1994, 20). That is,
what is producing must have some dissymmetry, some internal difference, that is covered over in
its production as the generation of a new symmetry. What is important here is that it is not the
symmetry itself which matters, but that symmetry is given rise to by certain powers that exist
only by way of dissymmetry. This is Deleuze’s distinction between two types of repetition: bare
repetition and true repetition, or repetition of the same and of difference, respectively.
Understanding the difference between these two repetitions allows us to see how symmetry is
itself the result of dispositions, and so makes possible the grounding of conservation laws on
dispositions.
Bare repetition is the repetition of the same or of similarity. It is extensive, actual, the
repetition of the equal, the commensurate, and symmetrical (Deleuze, 1994, 24). True repetition,
on the other hand, is intensive and virtual; it is the repetition of the unequal, the incommensurate,
and the dissymmetrical (Deleuze, 1994, 24). “If [true] repetition can be found, even in nature, it
is in the name of a power which affirms itself against the law, which works underneath laws,
perhaps superior to laws. If repetition exists, it expresses at once… a universality opposed to the
particular, … and an eternity opposed to permanence,” (Deleuze, 1994, 2-3). Bare repetition is
what we normally recognize as a repetition: the same note reappearing in a song, being fined the
same amount for the same parking violation, the same logo reprinted on various t-shirts, rolling
the same number on two dice throws in a row. If identity is taken as primary to difference, there
is little mystery here: an identity reappears or is re-expressed each time in some different
circumstance. However, if we take difference to be prior to identity, then repetition becomes a
grand mystery, a “miracle” even (Deleuze, 1994, 2). This is because identity must be produced,
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the same must be reproduced by some power, but there are no “powers of the same” anywhere to
be found in our ontology.
What Deleuze calls true repetition is the unraveling of this mystery, and it begins in the
productive power of dissymmetry. The dissymmetry found in the cause or in the construction of
a thing is not a “lack” of symmetry; it is not to be understood as simply negative. Rather, it is the
productive difference that makes possible symmetry in the first place. As we saw in Chapter 2,
all communication, all production requires powers of difference to be possible at all. Such
dissymmetry in the conditions of a thing are the signs of the powers of difference at work.
We must again be careful here not to invoke phrases such as “the same difference” or
“the same dissymmetry” because such differences or dissymmetries only gain their similarity or
sameness in the process of becoming equalized, of becoming covered over by a common
identity. True repetition is, if nothing else, founded on the powers of pure difference which make
individuation possible. This is how true repetition can be affirmed as an eternity rather than a
permanence: the repetition of productive forces is on the order of pure temporal difference, of
Aion as the eternal instant, which makes true repetition not something which happens in time,
but happens as a condition of time.14 It is the condition of time which makes bare repetition
possible: “[true repetition] forms the essence of that in which every repetition consists:
difference without a concept, non-mediated difference,” (Deleuze, 1994, 25). Repetition itself is
then founded on the powers of difference itself, or rather, true repetition is one such power of
pure difference, along with individuation and the pure temporal difference of Aion. Any
particular repetition then requires not just pure difference, but also specific differences which
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The reader familiar with Deleuze will recognize here a common set of terms which tie these concepts together.
Aion and true repetition are both (along with the third synthesis of time) directly related to Deleuze’s interpretation
of Nietzsche’s eternal return as the selective instant which only returns what is different, as opposed to the more
traditional reading of the eternal return as the return of the same.
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make possible the production and the maintenance of the symmetry which is itself repeated. In
other words, it is through difference that repetition can take place, and once repetition has taken
place, it is possible to establish similarity, sameness, or symmetry.
Again, symmetries are understood as the preservation of some identity under some
possible transformation. A circle has infinite rotational symmetry because it will remain the same
object despite any rotation around its center which is applied to it. We then have a dispositional
essentialist account of symmetry. An object’s symmetry is a result of what it does; it results from
an object’s power to maintain its identity in the face of a possible transformation. This is not ad
hoc in a metaphysics of difference since the fundamental state of things is to be changed,
transformed, etc., so that which remains the same is not an ad hoc posit, but the active exercise
of powers against the fundamental becoming of all things. Furthermore, since essences are the
powers which preserve a thing’s identity, these powers can (and will eventually) fail. Therefore,
we can account not only for symmetries and conservation laws, but also explain why these laws
are idealizations in open systems: open systems can always be torn apart by something outside of
them. That is, the powers which make up a thing’s essence can fail to preserve it. The mutability
of essences is then helpful in not just explaining ideal circumstances, but also in explaining why
the idealized conservation laws can hold only at the level of the universe as a whole. Since
conservation laws depend on symmetries, and symmetries are contingent upon the structure of
objects maintaining themselves, then we should expect non-ideal situations in which, and in
some proportion to, the structure of objects are open to outside forces. Since all objects are
contingent, this is always the case, though how open and to what outside forces will depend on
the objects in question. This mutability opens up the question of time in regard to essence. Since
the cosmos itself is not open to outside forces (our commitment to immanence), then to whatever
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extent we can speak of the cosmos itself as having symmetry, we should expect it to exhibit the
ideal cases of conservation laws. Let us then turn to the second account of essence which shares
features with Deleuze’s in order to explore this connection with time: historical essences.
F. Historical Essences
In showing that symmetry is produced through the process of individuation, we now open
up the question of the relationship between essence and history. Dispositional essentialism,
which takes only sparse properties to have essences, as it is currently defended in philosophy of
science, does not have a historical dimension. This is an issue for its goal of grounding scientific
realism in that chemistry, biology, and the human sciences all propose the existence of real kinds
which would then have essences. And if we are to avoid Platonism, this account of essences must
be historical; that is, it must explain how the essence of a species does not pre-exist the species
itself. The commitment to explaining only the essence of sparse properties would then be in
conflict with a robust scientific realism, by which I mean a scientific realism that takes sciences
besides particle physics seriously.15 Furthermore, if we take seriously a finite, contingent
universe, then even if some set of fundamental particles exists for the entire span of the universe,
they will still have some historical aspect in that they come into being and will one day be
destroyed. Even if they have essences, we still maintain only an ontology of contingent objects,
and to be contingent is to be temporal. Therefore, it is only because of the sheer time span of the
existence of these particles, possibly co-extensive with the universe itself, that we mistake them
for eternal or ahistorical. If this is the case, then even the essences of sparse properties must
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One could, of course, defend the view of realism about only those fundamental properties which physics purports
to study, but to call this scientific realism would be a misnomer as it is realist about only one science, physics, and,
despite its often implicit acceptance, should enjoy no special status as a position until some reductionist program in
the sciences can provide evidence of its success. Insofar as sciences besides physics discover essential truths about
things through means not available to those working in physics, then any scientific realism worth its salt is
committed to those essences as equally real as those proposed by physics, whatever they may mean by “real.”
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themselves be historical. Deleuze’s concept of multiplicity accounts for this. In order to see how,
let us first compare it with the analytic notion of a historical essence common in the philosophy
of biology.
Whereas dispositional essentialism is intended to ground scientific realism in physics,
historical essentialism does the same for biology by positing a reality to species which does not
contradict evolution the way the classical account of unchanging essences obviously does.16
Focusing on its uptake in philosophy of biology, historical essentialism is the position that
species are meaningfully identified by their evolutionary history, and that this history constitutes
the species itself as a unique kind, in addition to the existence of its members (Godman, 2019, 7).
Historical essentialism is opposed to two classes of positions. On the one hand, historical
essentialists oppose the Nominalist about species who claims that species are simply useful
categories but only the members of a species actually exist. On the other hand, they oppose
properties essentialist accounts which identify a species through the sharing of common
properties among its members; that is, accounts that take a species as a group of living beings all
of which share the same set of essential properties. The Nominalist position is rejected because
there appear to be properties of species which are not explainable in individual terms (for
instance, reproductive isolation). The property essentialist position is rejected because it explains
what a species is in terms of some group of likenesses rather than in terms of how the species
becomes what it is. Property essentialism is potentially misleading given the possibility of
likeness without a close evolutionary lineage (analogous traits). While these debates are ongoing,
we need not wade too deeply into them as we are making use of historical essentialism to
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Here we will only be addressing a basic issue in the philosophy of biology, though there is much to be said about
the usefulness of Deleuze for a metaphysics of more technical issues in evolutionary theory, such horizontal gene
transfer and epigenetics. Such work has been undertaken in the recent Deleuze and Evolutionary Theory, 2019.
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explicate Deleuze’s notion of multiplicity as a mutable essence and to show this account’s
adequacy for scientific realism.
In contrast with the two classes of positions we have rejected, historical essentialism
claims that the essence of a species is the evolutionary path on which it depends. That is, a
species is its evolutionary lineage along with the specific encounters through which it solidifies
itself as a species. These specific encounters are critical to speciation for the historical
essentialist. In other words, it is not enough for a new mutation to appear in one member of a
species to declare it a speciation event. Nor is a mutation which leads to a speciation event
enough for the historical essentialist. Taking the speciation event alone as the criterium for
essence is a position called Origin Essentialism which is rejected by those historical essentialists
who favor a path-dependent account (Ereshefsky, 2014, 715). According to the historical
essentialist, species are path-dependent in that it is not just this new mutation or the specific
moment of a speciation event which constitutes the essence of a species, but also whatever else is
required in order to bring about the reproductive isolation of this new species from its parent
species (Ereshefsky, 2014, 717-8). This “whatever else” will be its historical path, the events
which solidify the species qua species. This introduces a forward-looking direction as well.
There are likely, at this moment, many existing mutations which can give rise to new species, but
whether or not they do so (and thereby give rise to an essence) depends on whether or not that
mutation leads to a group which becomes reproductively isolated from its parent species.
Thereby, not every mutation produces a new species essence. Which essences end up coming
into being is then a contingent matter: the same mutation may become an essential feature of a
new species (if it achieves isolation) or it may simply be an accidental feature of the organism’s
parent species (if a novel historical path is not established).
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The affinities with Deleuze’s notion of multiplicities are clear: essences are historically
produced, they depend on the “evolutionary path” taken by objects (here, the path of a species
through its members and their encounters), and because of this, the essences we find in the world
were not predestined. Our cosmos could have had different essences, and will have new essences
in the future. Yet there is a central difference between historical essences in philosophy of
biology and the mutability of multiplicities in Deleuze. The lineage or the evolutionary path of a
species may be enough to epistemologically individuate a species, but it does not explain the
metaphysical individuation of that species. It is not the evolutionary path itself which produces a
species, but rather it is speciation events which gives rise to a lineage in the first place. This is
not explaining away the path in a way a Nominalist might, but giving an account of the path’s
production. An evolutionary path is itself a thing produced along with the production of the new
species, not a part of the process of production of the species itself. Since the path produced is
not itself a collection of capacities (i.e. it is not virtual), it is not the sort of thing which could
adequately ground essential truths, even if it may function adequately for purposes of
epistemological individuation (i.e. being able to correctly recognizing the species, but not able to
explain its genesis). Once again, epistemological individuation leads to difficulties if not
supplemented by an account of a prior metaphysical individuation. Providing such a
metaphysical account of the production of historical essences (in addition to the conditions of
their recognition through historical paths) requires we return to the atemporal aspect of
production. We must recall that we have argued for powers in excess of time itself. If the essence
of an object is to be found as some structure of its powers (its affects and powers of inscription
which make possible the preservation of its identity), then essence is in excess of time as well. In
fact, a thing’s essence would describe what we called its rhythm in Chapter 3, and so is an active
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part of the construction of time. Change of essence, or rather, the production of a new essence,
then, is an example of atemporal change. The genesis of a multiplicity “is a genesis without
dynamism, evolving necessarily in the element of a supra-historicity, a static genesis,” (Deleuze,
1994, 183). The essence of a species will appear at some time, and it will have a history, but
essence is produced atemporally; it is generated without dynamism. The evolutionary path of a
species is at the level of Chronos; essence functions at the level of Aion.
There must then be something prior to the lineage of a species which explains the
production of its essence. Deleuze refers to this metaphysical priority as a “problem.” When
individuation takes place, it always takes place in response to or as the expression of a problem.
Problems, for Deleuze, are objective structures, not subjective concerns or intentionally (in the
phenomenological sense) encountered difficulties. “Problematic structure is part of the object
itself,” (Deleuze, 1994, 63). Specifically, the problem is the differential relations and genetic
conditions which give rise to a solution. The problem remains indeterminate before determined
by its solution, but determining the structure of a problem is not the same as its solution. “A
problem does not exist, apart from its solutions. Far from disappearing in this overlay, however,
it insists and persists in these solutions. A problem is determined at the same time as it is solved,
but its determination is not the same as its solution: the two elements differ in kind, the
determination amounting to the genesis of the concomitant solution,” (Deleuze, 1994, 163).
Solutions, then, may be approached as the result of determining a problem; the problem takes
priority over the solution.17 This is seen clearly if we attend to the process of individuation for a
species rather than that of a member of the species. We have so far discussed individual
essences, but our examples may have been misleading as they have been of things which are
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Interestingly, the inspiration for this is again given to Group Theory (Deleuze, 1994, 180-1), connecting
multiplicity as both the production of invariants and as the determined problem capable of producing a solution.
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commonly or uncontroversially accepted as individuals. However, for Deleuze, all things which
we can rightfully take as an object must be individuated, and so are in that sense, individuals.
Following Deleuze, DeLanda argues that “the fact that species are constructed through a
historical process suggests that they are, in fact, just another individual entity, one which
operates at larger spatio-temporal scales than organisms, but an individual entity nonetheless,”
(DeLanda, 2002, 58). In other words, the term “individual” here includes species and other such
collective entities which result from concrete historical processes, a use of the term which no
doubt offends the Nominalist. But since all objects must be individuated, there is no meaningful
separation between what are classically taken to be individuals (Socrates, this piece of paper, this
feeling of excitement at a carnival) and what are taken to be kinds (homo sapiens, paper in
general, the affect of excitement) from the point of view of individuality itself.
The problem to which an individual species is the solution is the ecological niche
alongside the evolutionary pressures through which it survives. Here we can see how a problem
is determined by its solution: the niche does not precede the species which fills and maintains it.
The conditions for the niche must be there, there must be evolutionary pressures, resources,
predator-prey relations, etc. But were it not for the species which survives in this niche, the niche
would not be fully organized as a problem to be solved. Between any two species ecologically
related, there is the possibility of another species which arises and survives as a mediator of
exchange between them. This is not to say that a possibly niche exists fully-formed as a gap
waiting to be filled. If such gaps pre-existed the species which fill them, there would not already
be an ecosystem as the possibility of a mediator would imply a lack of exchange between the
related species. Rather, there is an indeterminate field of intensities which becomes a determinate
problem (here, an ecological niche) only if something arises that can determine those intensities
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into a new role in the ecosystem. This is simply a biological riff on the structuralist insight that
there is no such thing as a half of a language, coupled with the post-structuralist insight that
structures themselves are generated and change. If determined problems temporally preceded
their solutions, then we would have the difficulty of explaining how it is that a history makes a
species, rather than how a series of speciation events and the production of reproductive closure
makes an evolutionary history. Such problems then, such gaps in an ecosystem, would be a part
of a species’ evolutionary history (as a problem encountered in the past and responded to) rather
than a part of the atemporal genesis of that history itself. A niche (the problem) is organized into
a niche (is determined as a problem) by a species which fills it (as a certain solution to the
problem), and this species itself is formed by the determination process.
I take the problem-solution structure here to be an explication of the second stage of
individuation discussed in Chapter 2. Where individuation begins with intensities which make
possible the communication between disparate objects, it culminates in the production of a new
virtuality, a new structure of capacities and new actualities, new manifestations of those
capacities as qualities and extensions. The problem, this newly produced virtuality, and the
object’s multiplicity are all related notions, and the same for the solution and the newly produced
actual qualities and extensions. An object, then, is always produced as a problem determining a
solution. The species qua object is the struggle to maintain itself through its members responding
to evolutionary pressures to survive to reproduce. What maintains a species as a species is then
that it is continually responding to the same problem; it has the same multiplicity or essence.
Understanding the problem to which a given species is a response, and how that particular
problem-response complex is a result of the previous species to which it is evolutionarily related
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then provides the conditions necessary for uniquely identifying a species and explaining its
production.
Let us further explore what it means to be a historical essence by connecting this idea
with history as understood through Deleuze’s account of time. Historical essences are possible
precisely because of the excess of powers over time. History can never exhaust becoming, but
that is not to say it has no effect on it. Again, if history had no effect on becoming, this would
lead us into a Platonism because all possibilities would exist in some realm of pure becoming,18
perhaps a Platonism of process and verbs rather than of forms and nouns, but a Platonism
nonetheless. If essences are dispositional and historical, then what is possible is open to change.
Yet we have also claimed that essences function as if eternal. What prevents there being a
contradiction between an essence’s virtual eternity and its fundamental contingency is the
distinction between two aspects of essence: that each essence is both a thing produced and an
active part of processes of production. As a thing produced, essences are fundamentally
contingent. Every essence is produced in time and so will have, like everything else, a birthdate
and a death date. However, since essences are collections of powers, they function at the level of
the production of time, that is, as a condition of what happens temporally. The universe will
produce one history rather than another depending on which essences are produced, and how
long they survive to affect what becomes. Again, this is what separates the problem and a species
essence from being identical to its historical path, even if that path is necessary to it.
G. History and Inscription
We may then ask what happens to those essences which pass into the past as their
object(s) die outside of time? How may an essence survive its object(s) in a materialist cosmos?
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This is the misreading of the virtual in Deleuze critiqued in Chapter 2.
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Through inscription as the production and retention of the past, the past becomes a virtual
stockpile of essences. Insofar as the past is necessary, so are these stockpiled essences. This is a
Bergsonian theme adopted and modified by Deleuze (Deleuze, 1994, 286, see also the syntheses
of time), and it completes our understanding of eternity began in chapter 3. To understand
eternity, we invert the image from the Timaeus: eternity is the pale copy of becoming. Yet it now
appears that we have split eternity in two. There are the grounds of eternal truths, that which is
eternal insofar as it is in excess of time because it is the condition of possibility of time, and
eternity in the sense of the storehouse of essences, the virtual past inscribed on objects which
masquerades as Plato’s heaven. Both will be destroyed when the universe finally tears itself
apart, but both equally deserves the name eternity. The first is the eternity of becoming which
names the powers of difference necessary to the existence of anything at all. The second is the
eternity of being, that which retains the traces and signs of what has been and so can no longer
become otherwise, or rather, can only change by the powers of the present inscribing further
events which alter the past only by adding to it. The confusion of this second, sterile eternity
with the first leads to the classical misunderstanding of eternity as stasis and stability, as the
home of the unchanging forms which yet somehow produces this world. Plato confused the
eternity of retention (eternal because time necessarily requires inscription/retention) with the
eternal necessity of production. We may see, rather, that these two eternities are unified only by
their grounding in objects: the eternity of being, that is, the collection of essences which have
survived their objects, exists only on the condition of their being retained by other objects
capable of bearing their traces. Here the philosopher of identity has been outpaced by the
perfumer who captures the "essence" of a rose by preserving its scent beyond the duration of the
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rose itself. The eternity of becoming exists only on condition of objects with powers capable of
weaving time.
One may of course take issue with calling these essences. One may say that as we have
provided no distinction in kind between the dispositions which make up an essence and those
which don’t, but rather a functional distinction, and essences are, following the Platonic
tradition, reified and thought of as distinct entities in some way (which we of course deny).
Deleuze is here closer to Aristotle when he describes what is essential in terms of functionings,
powers, operations, etc.; “…the essential thing being that it functions, that the machine works,”
(Deleuze, 1972, 156), though Deleuze rejects any criteria of “naturalness” and of final causation,
both of which the Aristotelean account makes use. Again, I can only say that if anything deserves
the name essence, these structured collections of powers of being affected by objects and of
preserving and inscribing oneself on other objects do. We may instead may follow Deleuze and
call them multiplicities, but the fact of the matter stands that if distinguishing between what are
the essential and accidental features of a thing, it is only through knowing what can affect that
object (and how, to what degree, etc.) and what that object is capable of affecting while
maintaining its identity, its invariances, in the face of possible alterations caused by other
objects. In other words, if one has qualms about the term essence and its historical or supposed
metaphysical commitments and claims that this account does not meet them, then we just as well
describe our account as providing truthmakers for essential properties without the existence of
“essences” in any classical sense, as what has been called essence here is not a distinct entity
with its own independent existence. The essence of a thing may be considered then a result of its
powers, but the essence itself has no powers as it is not itself an object (Deleuze, 1972, 163). For
instance, symmetry is not a power of an object, but the result of the powers of the object
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preserving itself in some way, and so is essential without positing the symmetry or powers
themselves as some sort of reified essence separable from the thing of which it is the essence.
Even if an essence is preserved by being inscribed in other objects of which they are not the
essence, it no longer functions as an essence; it is a formal abstraction rather than a real
abstraction. It becomes only a sign of that which it was the essence, or rather, it is only traces of
the essence which is retained, not the essence itself; the preserved scent of a rose is a sign of the
now decayed rose’s former metabolic process, a process that was surely essential to the rose
itself. Furthermore, since the signs of the powers of an object can be retained whether they are
essential or not, it is always an empirical question what the essence of some long lost object was,
which of its powers were capable of preserving its identity, and which were not.
There does remain an open issue here, which is the possibility of the discontinuous
reappearance of the same essence or essential feature. This challenge is levied at the pathdependent historical essentialist (Ereshefsky, 2014, 721-2) in that evolutionary paths must be
continuous, but it is possible for (what appears to be) the same essence to appear in
discontinuous circumstances. For example, the structure of the eye appears at different points in
the evolutionary history of life, or imagine the same mutation occurs twice in the same parent
species at different times, and both times leads to reproductive closure. It seems we would want
to say that in both cases the same essence has reappeared. The path-dependent essentialist rejects
this because each time the path will be different even if the capacities or set of historical
precursors is the same. Yet we have argued that it is ultimately powers which define an essence,
even if they may account for the historical nature of essences, and so we require an explanation
for how these discontinuous cases maintain the same essence qua the same structure of powers.
While a lineage supplies the material, the eye does not come into being in response to the lineage
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of a species, but rather in response to some problem of navigating, perceiving, or moving about
an environment. We then want to say that the essence of the eye is the same despite this
discontinuity. Yet it is only the same if it responds to the same problem, but a problem is
ultimately a structure of differential relations which is covered over by its solutions, by the
production of an identity, and so it in some sense resists being identified itself. To individuate a
problem by its solutions; however, puts the cart before the horse by using the actual to represent
the virtual. Instead, we must understand the similarity of the problems which lead to the
production of the eye as a true repetition. That is, they are only similar after the repetition has
taken place.19
This difficulty is only an apparent one which appears when the continuity of such
evolutionary features is taken to be prior to rather than the result of a production. If there is no
evolutionary continuity between the various species which produce an eye in response to various
problems, then there may well be a continuity higher than species produced by the connection of
these discontinuities. We should not expect the production of real abstractions20 to end at species.
If there is any such thing as life itself, it could only be that which is produced through the
multitude of processes of speciation, of evolution. Life would be, on its actual side, all the
various organisms on Earth, but virtually, it would be the phase space of mutation and
reproduction, in which speciation is constantly producing new capacities and new solutions. That
is, life itself, if there is such a thing, would be the ever changing object whose virtual aspect is
what Dennett famously refers to as unified “Design Space,” (Dennett, 1995) with the Deleuzian
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Baugh 2006 argues for Deleuze having some metaphysical machinery for identifying such discontinuities as
somehow expressing the same multiplicity and so annulling this difficulty (Baugh, 2006, 37). We pursue an
alternative solution below.
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That is, the process of producing generalities through becoming-continuous argued for in chapter 2.
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caveat that design space is itself not simply waiting to be explored, but is mutable and alterable
as new examples of life come into being. That is, design space, life itself, ultimately turns around
which living beings exist, not vice versa.21
H. Conclusion: Non-Classical Essences
We have argued that what is essential to a thing is its powers to preserve its identity,
whatever that may be. Essence is the structure of an object’s affects and capacities to affect other
objects which allow it to remain invariant in relation to the powers of other objects. Since they
are powers, essences are produced the way any other power is, as a part of an object through its
process of individuation. Since all objects are contingent, essences are themselves historical and
may be destroyed if not preserved through inscription in other objects. There are truthmakers for
claims about the essential features of objects, but that does not mean an object cannot become
other than it is. The identity of an object can be preserved beyond the existence of that object
through inscription. Therefore, even a thing’s essence is different from itself. Furthermore, its
essence is tied to the conditions of possibility of the object, of what has the powers to bring it
about, but is not reducible to them.
The Deleuzian account of essence has the added advantage of unifying two separate
accounts of scientific realism without the positing of any unexplained abstract entities such as
transcendent laws or unchanging species-essences. Dispositional essentialism supports scientific
realism in physics by grounding laws on empirically accessible powers, yet it fails to ground
realism in biology because it is ahistorical. Historical essentialism supports realism in biology by
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This difference between Deleuze and Dennett is especially obvious given the different mathematical references
and depictions used. When Dennett depicts Design Space, it is a possibility space set in Euclidean coordinates where
the collection of species fills an external geometric space. That is, new species are expansions into an already
marked out space. Deleuze’s account of multiplicity, on the other hand, is a topological notion which explicitly
makes reference to Riemannian manifolds (the French multiplicité translates the German Mannigfaltigkeit, and so
the reference is explicit in the French, the English translation as “multiplicity” obscures this somewhat). Life, insofar
as it is a multiplicity, has only an internal geometry which changes topologically as new species are produced.
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offering an object which explains how a species is more than just the collection of its individuals
yet is still historically contingent, but does not account for exactly how the historical essence
functions as such. Deleuze’s account manages both roles through the historical production of
new powers which can maintain an identity. That this account supports scientific realism across
the natural sciences completes an internal support (that is, a reason following from the
metaphysics itself) for what we began with as an external constraint: the commitment to the
ontology of sciences (with, of course, the caveat that such an ontology is open to empirical
revision as well as metaphysical novelty). Therefore, if we do indeed manage to provide
groundings for unphysical mathematical truths, then we are also assured of their compatibility
with a form of scientific realism and a materialist order of metaphysical priority.
Furthermore, Deleuze’s account of essence avoids much of the unwanted historical
baggage of the classical concept of essence, in particular, the connection between essence and
the good. If the essence of a thing does not explain (or at least does not exhaust) what is good for
that thing, or more generally, then the Platonic and Aristotelean legacies of equating essences (or
forms, natures, etc.) with the good does not hold. Knowing something’s essence only tells us
how to aid in preserving it as what it is, but nothing about whether such a preservation is good or
desirable. The essence of a cruel person is their capacities to enjoy such cruelty (capacity to be
affected), their capacities to harm others (capacities to inscribe), and the structure which
preserves these capacities in their relations to each other. But if objects can change under their
essence and give rise to a new one, which is a possibility in general for any object since all
objects are contingent, then there is no reason to infer from their essence to what is good for
them. The same follows from the fact that a thing may be destroyed in the process of manifesting
its powers to preserve its identity (e.g. the glass window which attempts to resist the baseball). A
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multiplicity then cannot be teleological or normative in any strong sense. Affirming or judging a
thing worth saving or preserving does then demand we learn something of its essence so as to
know how to preserve it. Or perhaps the essence itself is judged worthy and so we must learn
which things produce it so as to maintain it. Inversely, we may learn of a thing’s essence so as to
better destroy a thing we find repugnant and we may tear a thing asunder to prevent some
essence from spreading. We may see this as a sort of metaphysical grounding of the is-ought
distinction (as I take it the wedge Hume drives between the two is an epistemological one). But
this is the purview of ethics and must be set aside for now.
Instead, we must now turn to the final feature of mathematical truth which we set out to
ground, what we have called transfinite truths. Such truths only come into being alongside beings
with the capacity to relate to that which is excessive over them. We have shown that essences are
both dispositional and in excess of time, without thereby being unchanging. This sets the ground
for the unique sort of counterfactuals that transfinite truths require. That there are powers in
excess of time implies truths of what objects could do if there were there different bounds to the
universe, even on to the infinite and the unchanging, states which are neither physically nor
metaphysically possible. The details of this are the topic of the final chapter.
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Chapter 5:
Transfinite Truths Without the Infinite
The infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists
in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought.
David Hilbert, On the Infinite, 201
How does the infinite subsist in the intelligible world?
Plotinus, Enneads, Book VI

In this final chapter, we are marshalling the concepts explicated so far to give an account
of truthmakers for the entailment relations which exist between and give rise to transfinite truths.
These are the sorts of mathematical and logical truths which deal with infinities as actual and
completed rather than as potential infinities. Since we have accepted the finite ontology of the
sciences, we cannot simply posit transfinite objects corresponding to such truths. In other words,
such truths must be non-representational. Since we have rejected Platonic realism in favor of
modal structuralism, we cannot point to abstract objects, such as sets themselves, which ground
these truths. Rather, abstract transfinite objects and the truths about them must be grounded on
some modal structure which gives them their distinctive features. Here we need add no new
Deleuzian concepts beyond the ones so far explicated to characterize the modal structure which
grounds transfinite truths, but rather give an application of what has been explicated to explain
their expression in regard to truthmakers. We find ourselves with a metaphysics, that of the
powers and the priority of difference, and a particular collection of truths, namely, transfinite
truths in mathematics. These are truths such as the fact that the set of all even numbers is equal in
cardinality to the set of all Natural numbers or the Banach-Tarski Paradox1 that given a sphere
made of infinite points, one can construct two spheres of equal size to the original. We have
rigorously barred as ad hoc the positing of any powers or grounds which we have no independent
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This is a paradox in the informal sense, like Skolem’s Paradox discussed below.
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reason to accept. By “independent reason,” I mean empirical support, especially from the
sciences. Therefore, we must build from this metaphysics the features of the universe that, when
supplemented with the specific constraints of mathematical practice, give rise to transfinite
truths.
While transfinite truths are still necessary, the grounds of transfinite truths cannot be the
powers of difference itself, for the reasons given in chapter 4, namely, that if they could, this
would amount to supplanting difference with some fundamental identity. However, transfinite
truths are truths of mathematics, and since we’ve claimed mathematics studies modal structure,
transfinite truths are truths of modal structure in some sense. Therefore, they must also be truths
which are made true by essences or by some feature of the universe necessitated by essences. We
draw this conclusion because essences will function as necessary and eternal grounds as long as
they exist, and furthermore, it must be something essential which can neither be actualized nor
give rise to an individuated, infinite object that grounds transfinite truths.
The claim that Deleuze’s metaphysics either requires, or at least is consistent with, a
finite ontology is a controversial one. To begin this explication of truthmakers for the transfinite,
I will start by arguing that Deleuze does not accept infinity in any quantitative sense into his
ontology.2 This will clarify the approach to the infinite in Deleuze’s metaphysics and point us
towards truthmakers for transfinite truths. That is, I will argue that the infinite in a quantitative
sense appears in Deleuze’s work as an artifact of representing the modal structure of difference
itself, and so cannot be said of difference without falling into the mistakes of representational
accounts of difference. Furthermore, I argue that when the infinite appears in a way endorsed by
Deleuze, it is a non-quantitative sense of the infinite and so it does not actually commit us to the
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Or rather, does not accept them into his ontology prior to their construction as abstract objects within a
mathematical theory. This is revisited in detail in the Conclusion.
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existence of any infinite objects or an infinity of objects. This qualitative sense of the infinite is
to be more literally understood as that which is without a limit. Following this, we will turn to an
explanation of how such transfinite truths arise in a finite cosmos. This amounts to showing how
the two axioms in modern set theory which lead to such transfinite truths, the Axiom of Infinity
and the Power Set Axiom, can be understood as expressions of the necessary relations of the
modal structure of objects.
A. Deleuze Against the Infinite
It is not uncommon to see the word “infinite” appear in work on Deleuze. Rarely is this
use of the infinite spelled out or justified. That is, the infinite is occasionally accepted by
commentators and scholars as a part of Deleuze’s metaphysics without need of further
explanation or justification.3 This uptake of the infinite in relation to Deleuze is understandable
given that in his own work he employs the term somewhat freely in notions such as the “infinite
speeds” that characterizes the use of the concept in What is Philosophy?, references to infinite
becoming throughout his work, the notion of “infinitely doubled difference” in Difference and
Repetition, and so on.4 This is further complicated by Deleuze’s endorsement of figures who

3

For instructive examples, see Hallward, 2006, 8 where the unlimited is equated with the infinite in Deleuze (we
will see below that Deleuze distinguishes these two notions), Badiou, 1999, where it is argued that virtual is an
infinite One-all that contains everything which is possible or potential, or Bell 2017 where the infinite is affirmed of
Deleuze’s ontology, which we will address directly below. I take these examples as instructive because they
explicitly use a quantitative notion of infinity, which I will argue below that Deleuze rejects as a part of his
ontology. More frequently, commentators will reference the infinite in Deleuze’s writing, but do not specify the
nature of the infinite in a Deleuzian metaphysics. I provide no critique of this use as Deleuze himself uses the term
in several senses and it is not always clear which sense he means and which senses he endorses or rejects. See
footnote 4 below.
4

Here again the references would be too numerous to list, but for instructive examples, see Deleuze and Guattari,
2009, 21 where the concept is said to be traversed at infinite speeds; Deleuze, 1995, 42-50 where finite and infinite
representation are discussed in depth, and Deleuze, 2004, 2-3 on the paradox of infinite identity. We may also add
here cases where Deleuze uses figures of the infinite, such as God, to explore limit cases. For instance, in Deleuze,
2004, 150 where God is invoked to discuss a complete survey of an infinitely extended present moment. The figure
of god as completed determined infinite being makes possible the exploration of the moment as a concept, but this
use of god as a figure for thought does not imply the existence of any metaphysically real infinite being.
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make use of the infinite, such as Spinoza’s modes and substance, Leibniz’s infinitesimal
differences, Nietzsche’s argument for the infinity of past time, etc.5 However, given that the
history of the concept of the infinite is tied to that of God, totality, holism, and other
metaphysical mainstays of the priority of identity, we cannot accept the infinite into Deleuze’s
metaphysics unproblematically or uncritically.
Despite this use of the infinite, Deleuze is just as likely to be critical of it. In Difference
and Repetition especially, Deleuze sees the finite/infinite distinction to be one that arises at the
level of understanding or representation, but which is poorly suited to being applied to the
universe. “The world is neither finite nor infinite as representation would have it: it is completed
and unlimited,” (Deleuze, 1994, 57). This implies that there is no contradiction between the
unlimited and the finite. This unlimited yet finite is in line with certain geometries and with
many cosmological accounts of spacetime following Einstein’s General Relativity (Hilbert,
1984, 186). Nor between the completed and unlimited; what there is is all there is, but what there
is is always producing more. “Completed” should not be read as “finished” or “having done all
that can be done;” it should be read as opposed to having an outside or something transcendent to
the world to which it can be compared to and seen as lacking. That is, there is nothing beyond
what is, no void outside of the cosmos such as in Stoic cosmology, no ideal world of Platonic
Forms by which to judge our world as made of imperfect copies, nor is there a Hegelian telos
towards which the world is progressing and so remains somehow incomplete before reaching
that state. All of these are examples of metaphysical impossibilities which haunt our thinking
because they remain logically possible, and, I will argue below, because of the difficulty of
constraining thought to finitude. We see in this completed yet unlimited cosmos the seeds of a

5

Again, see Deleuze, 1992a, Deleuze, 1992b; and Deleuze, 2006.
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critique of any ontologically real infinity, that is, of the existence of an infinity of objects or an
infinite object. Our account then rejects the notion of an ontological infinite while embracing the
idea of the infinite in a representational sense. Navigating this rejection of the infinite
ontologically alongside its embrace representationally sets the stage for our account below of a
finite cosmos providing truthmakers for transfinite propositions.
Opposed to this reading of Deleuze, Bell 2017 directly engages the question of the
infinite in Deleuze and argues that his metaphysics implies the affirmation of actual, completed
infinities. “Actual” is used here in the sense of the distinction between actual and potential
infinity, not in the Deleuzian sense of the actual as opposed to the virtual. I will argue against
Bell’s affirmation of the completed infinite in Deleuze. In particular, I will use his position to
show how the infinite in Deleuze is never a quantitative infinity. A quantitative infinity is
required by accounts of completed infinities such as Cantor’s notion of the transfinite as
formalized in modern Set Theory. Avoiding the ontological affirmation of a quantitative infinity
means we can affirm a finite ontology, but must look elsewhere than the number of objects in the
universe for truthmakers for the transfinite.
Bell takes as a privileged example the notion of infinite speeds in What is Philosophy?
Here, Deleuze and Guattari define a concept as an intensive relation between components which
thought moves over “at infinite speed,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 21). Deleuze and Guattari’s
account of the concept is a complicated and detailed issue to which we can only give a cursory
overview.6 The part which is central to our concern here is what it means to move over the
concept at infinite speeds. A concept, on their account, always has more than one component
“there are no simple concepts,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 15), but also only ever finite

6

For a thorough account of the Deleuzian notion of a concept in What is Philosophy? See Mader, 2012, Chapter 1.
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components (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 18). What makes the concept distinctive is that when
thought makes use of it, the components are not traversed individually but all at once. The
concept is employed as a whole, not piecemeal.
Bell calls the employment of a concept a supertask (Bell, 2017, 28). A supertask “is a
process in which an infinite number of individuated actions are performed in a finite time,”
(Laraudogoitia et al, 2002, 173). “Individuated” in Laraudogoitia et al.’s definition should be
read in the sense of everyday discrete and identifiable or specifiable, not in the technical sense of
Deleuzian individuation we have been discussing. Bell argues that the employment of the
concept meets such a definition because, on Deleuze and Guattari’s account, the concept is
traversed at infinite speed. The inference here seems straightforward in that if the concept is
traversed at infinite speed, if a speed is infinitely divisible into steps, and if this traversal happens
in a finite time, then a traversal at infinite speeds counts as a supertask. The ontological
allowance of supertasks would, as Bell points out, provide a solution for various antimonies and
paradoxes in the history of philosophy simply by affirming that yes, an infinite number of steps
can happen in a finite time (Bell, 2017, 25). I will here argue that while the employment of the
concept happens at “infinite speed,” its employment cannot be a supertask. In other words, I will
argue that the infinite speed at which a concept is employed is not an infinite number of steps as
found in a supertask. This distinction hinges on the difference between qualitative and
quantitative infinity, and the fact that a supertask is possible only given the latter. A supertask
must have an (at least countably) infinite number of successive steps or operations which it
performs, each one taking some duration to complete, even if that duration is infinitesimally
small. However, the figure of infinite speed is used by Deleuze and Guattari to describe how the
concept is employed all at once rather than by way of successive steps. The steps of a supertask
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must be discrete. Say the supertask takes 1 second for the first step, ½ a second for the second
step, ¼ for the third, and ½n for the nth, then the final step will reach a quantitatively infinite
speed as it will be done in an infinitesimal amount of time, but the task will still be done step by
step. Even if we shrink the length of time of each step to where the whole supertask is completed
in the blink of an eye, the supertask is still qualitatively different in that the task moves step by
step while the concept is employed all at once.
Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari explicitly define the concept as having finite
components, and so the infinite in the infinite speed of the concept does not come from
traversing each component of the concept one at a time. Such a movement would only ever take
place at a finite speed because it happens over discrete, finite parts. “[The concept] is infinite
through its survey or its speed, but finite through its movement that traces the contour of its
components,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 21, original emphasis). Thereby, speed and movement
are differentiated in the case of the concept. A supertask is an infinite movement through discrete
steps, whereas we see Deleuze and Guattari explicitly say the movement through the components
of a concept is finite. Therefore, the infinite speed of the concept is not the movement over its
components, and it is not undertaken in discrete steps, as Deleuze and Guattari affirm the
relationship between the discrete and finite here. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari affirm that each
concept has a phase space, which is a continuous diagram as opposed to state spaces which are
discontinuous diagrams, (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 25). The phase space of a concept would be
a virtual continuum like we established in Chapter 2. It is the concept’s nature as a continuum
over its parts that allows it to be traversed all at once rather than step by step. This travel over
finite parts cannot be a supertask because it could not take infinite steps to range over finite parts.
Having finite components here means having finite external parts, which therefore can only be
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moved over in a finite number of steps even if traversing all possible relations of the external
parts to each other. Once again however, this is not the way in which a concept is traversed
because a concept is traversed all at once, or as a whole made from the intensive relations of its
components, and so there is no way to generate the sort of quantitative infinity involved in the
completion of a supertask from the application of a concept. Therefore, the infinity involved in
the concept’s employment at infinite speeds then is not an infinity of steps.
Finally, whatever infinity involved here is a virtual infinity which cannot become actual
without becoming determined in some way, and thereby becoming finite by way of producing a
boundary or limitation as we saw in Chapter 2. The virtually infinite can never become an actual
infinity. This is then a problem for the affirmation of supertasks, as supertasks require discrete
steps, and so each step must be extensive and thereby actual. Bell, however, refers to the
employment of the concept as an intensive supertask (Bell, 2017, 30). It is unclear what this
could mean since the intensive is not discrete or individuated, and so does not operate in discrete
steps. The notion of a supertask as intensive is based on an affirmation of intensive difference as
an (actually) infinitesimal difference which Bell then attempts to square with Deleuze’s
metaphysical reading of the calculus (Bell, 2017, 30). However, Deleuze explicitly rejects this
literal reading of infinitesimals as a remnant of representation.
“The entire alternative between finite and infinite applies very badly to difference, because it constitutes
only an antinomy of representation. We saw this, moreover, in the case of calculus: modern finitist
interpretations betray the nature of the differential no less than the former infinitist interpretations, because
both fail to capture the extra-propositional or sub-representative source - in other words, the 'problem' from
which the calculus draws its power,” (Deleuze, 1994, 264, original emphasis).

That is, the calculus only appears to require an actual infinity if we do not understand the
problem from which it arises, which grounds it, and from which it “draws its power.”
This leads to a further obstacle for Bell’s affirmation of the actual infinite as it is exactly
this “extra-propositional or sub-representative source” that leads Bell to ally Deleuze with
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Truthmaker accounts (an alliance we likewise endorsed for similar reasons in Chapter 1). Like
we saw with the cosmos above, the notions of finitude and infinitude (whether infinitely large or
infinitesimal) are badly posed to understand difference itself. Attempting to understand
difference in such terms covers over the “extra-propositional or sub-representative source” and
so obscures the truthmakers we seek in understanding how the calculus expresses the nature of
difference itself. If the infinite and the infinitesimal both fail to capture the problem to which the
calculus responds, then the infinite distracts and misleads us from what makes true the
mathematics of the calculus. The finite is also a distraction here as, in mathematics, the finite
implies discrete and difference itself is not discrete or individuated. It is the problem of
mathematically expressing change to which the calculus is the solution, and it is a solution by
way of the differential qua infinitesimal as a formal mathematical tool. However, even if the
differential is among the most powerful formal representations of difference itself, it is still a
representation and so must cover over pure difference (Deleuze, 1994, 179). This covering over
may take the form of either a finite interpretation of the calculus based on limits or the infinitist
interpretation based on the positing of true infinitesimals. The infinite is then not a ground of the
calculus, but an artifact of its expression, and one it can just as easily do without. Therefore, to
affirm the actual infinite as said of difference is, by Deleuze’s own account, to project
representation into difference itself; this produces a contradiction because it implies an identity
of pure difference. Deleuze is unequivocal on this point when he states: “The principle of a
general differential philosophy must be the object of a rigorous exposition, and must in no way
depend upon the infinitely small,” (Deleuze, 1994, 171).
Bell also uses Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of chaos, and the individuation of a
determinate individual from that chaos, as an example of a supertask. Here again, however,
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Deleuze and Guattari do not affirm an infinite number of things, but rather the infinite speed at
which something takes form and breaks down. Instead of reading individuation from chaos as a
supertask, as Bell does, I argue we should read this as a reformulation of the notion of genesis
without dynamism that was discussed in chapter 4. That which happens at infinite speed is not
that which takes time. An event at infinite speed is that which happens in the instant of Aion
rather than that which needs to stretch out across Chronos. It is a task that takes no steps or a
single step (all at once) outside of or beneath time, rather than a task which takes infinite steps in
a finite time. We will see, then, that the infinity invoked in the infinity of chaos that is akin to the
infinite speeds of the employment of the concept.
Chaos, for Deleuze and Guattari, refers to the immediate forming and disintegration of
things “without consistency or reference, without consequence” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009,
118). It should be noted that in What is Philosophy, consistency is the work of philosophy and
reference the work of the sciences. If chaos is without reference or consistency, then it is
metaphysically prior to philosophy and science (and art). Chaos, here, is then related to or
perhaps a reformulation of the notion we saw earlier that being qua difference is subrepresentational and extra-propositional. Deleuze and Guattari cite the work of Prigogine and
Stengers 1988 as support for this account.7 Prigogine and Stengers are not, in these cited section,

7

In a footnote attached to the above quotation, Deleuze and Gauttari explicitly mention the example of crystals
forming and unforming without consequence in a superfused liquid from the Prigogine and Stengers text (Deleuze &
Guattari, 2009, 225 n.1). However, the referenced section in the Prigogine and Stengers text is a description the
quantum vacuum state of Quantum Field Theory and Inflationary cosmology; the mention of a superfused liquid is
meant to illustrate the nature of virtual particle interactions in the quantum vacuum state. Deleuze and Guattari also
appear to be referencing the description of the quantum vacuum state in their account of chaos. There is much to be
said about how Deleuze and Gauttari make use of a scientific description for the purpose of metaphysics while
arguing for . In particular, this picture of chaos is without reference, but is formulated through scientific functions
which operate primarily through reference. It would take us too far afield to go into the nuance of this here, but I
take Deleuze and Guattari’s willingness to make use of a scientific posit for the sake of giving a metaphysical
ground to the activities of science and philosophy as support for my claim that they allied with truthmaker and
indispensablist accounts. It is also worth noting that there is a bit of a circle of influence here as Prigogine and
Stengers make use of Deleuze and Guattari’s work in their rewritings on the sciences, and Stengers herself was a
student of Deleuze.
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giving an explicit account of chaos, but rather a description of the quantum vacuum state and
virtual particles in Quantum Field Theory, as well as the role they play in inflationary models in
cosmology, (Prigogine & Stengers, 1988, 162-3). “Virtual” and “actual” in connection to
particles are terms from Quantum Field Theory and are not synonymous with the Deleuzian
virtual and actual, though there are obvious resonances. Deleuze and Guattari call chaos “a void
which is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all
possible forms,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 118). While they do not explicitly reference it by
name, the French for the quantum vacuum state is le vide quantique, and the French “vide”
usually translated as “void.” This characterization as a “void which is not a nothingness”
alongside the Prigogine and Stengers citation make the reference to the vacuum state clear if not
explicit.
Going into the full details of the relevant science would take us far afield, but we can
understand Deleuze and Guattari’s account of chaos through the reference to the quantum
vacuum state. In brief, the quantum vacuum state is the lowest possible energy state postulated
by Quantum Field Theory. This state, however, is not characterized by emptiness or void as
“vacuum” might suggest, but rather by the continuing coming into being and near-immediate
annihilation of virtual particle pairs (Ray, 2014, 205). Such creation-annihilation events do not
violate conservation laws and remain below the threshold of the uncertainty principle, though our
models of such events are quite strange the more “zoomed in” one is. Despite their seeming
insignificance, vacuum fluctuations described as the exchange of virtual particles are useful for
explaining the interactions of actual particles and physical phenomena such as the Casimir Effect
(Intravaia & Behunin, 2012, 1, cf. Welton 1948). An actual particle is only produced when a
field is raised to energy states higher than that of the vacuum state. With this connection, we can
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make some sense of Deleuze and Guattari’s depict of chaos not as chance or randomness, but as
the inability of a form to persist without becoming determinate in some way. The quantum
vacuum state is highly structured, at least compared to any classical notion of void or chaos, but
its interesting feature here is the fact that it is fundamentally generative, even if what it generates
has no persistence or duration. Chaos is also not some sort of primordial possibility for anything
at all. In the phrase “contains all possible particles,” the use of “possible” here is in the sense of
either metaphysical or physical possibility as the vacuum state certainly does not contain all
logically possible particles.8 And again, it should be noted that virtual particles and actual
particles differ in Quantum Field Theory, so to say that all particles spring forth from the vacuum
state is not to reduce actual particles to virtual particles in the vacuum state. In becoming actual,
and so becoming separated from the vacuum state, interactions which were not possible in the
vacuum state alone become possible. I include this detail to avoid the misreading of virtual
holism critiqued in Chapter 2. This definition of chaos conditions the various disciplines—art,
science, and philosophy—discussed In What is Philosophy? Philosophy is thought which
preserves chaos through the infinite speed of thought via the concept; science slows chaos to
make reference possible; and art produces something which can be given back or add to the
infinite.
If we take chaos as fundamental, it may be misunderstood as a sort of apeiron, some
infinite condition of all things, within which our distinctions are only even heuristic and
conventional. But this is clearly not what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the concept of chaos.

8

This point is admittedly vague. To fully clarify the sense of possibility here as either metaphysical or physical
requires a full account of the relationship between Deleuze( and Guattari)’s metaphysics and contemporary physics,
an account which I neither have nor know of anyone who does. It would be too hasty to simply ontologize the
vacuum state as the metaphysical chaos discussed here, even if it is the inspiration for that account of chaos.
Whichever account is correct, the important thing to remember is that such possibility is never totalized or finalized
as metaphysical novelty remains. “All possible” here should then be read in analogy with “complete” above.
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They characterize chaos as virtual. Their distinguishing chaos as virtual means that the infinity of
chaos is only a virtual infinity, that is, a potential infinity as we argued in chapter 2. Since chaos
is virtual, and the virtual is only one aspect of the real, we should expect there to be something
outside of chaos, or rather, we should expect a non- or anti-chaotic aspect, which would be actual
or intensive, to the real as well. “But there would not be a little order in ideas if there was not
also a little order in things or states of affairs, like an objective antichaos,” (Deleuze & Guattari,
2009, 202). Deleuze and Guattari give chaos a priority, but it is a priority in the order of
discovery, not in the order of ontological grounding. Chaos is first in the order of discovery
because there are no readymade concepts, functions, etc., but if chaos had an ontological priority,
it is unclear how concepts, functions, etc. would be possible in the first place. Since chaos is the
continual annulling of form and stability, chaos alone cannot explain how such forms and
stabilities come into being. It is this antichaos which makes opinion possible (opinion is a term
of derision by Deleuze and Guattari), but it also makes possible the disciplines of philosophy,
science, and art. The difference between opinion and the others is that opinion shelters itself
from chaos, whereas philosophy, science, and art are constantly confronting it. Were the universe
chaos and only chaos, that is, only the infinite speed of taking on and losing form, it is unclear
how philosophy, science, or art would be possible. Instead, there is equally some objective order
or consistency to the cosmos which grounds their possibility.
Ultimately, this rejection of actual infinity in the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari in
these cases stands on the rejection of this use of the infinite as quantitative. That is, the notion of
infinite in “infinite speed” must be a qualitative infinite, an infinite as the “all at once,” not the
quantitative infinite studied by Set Theory. We see this in the distinction between philosophy and
science made in What is Philosophy? In brief, philosophy maintains something of the infinity of
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chaos in order to have consistency between concepts, whereas science institutes a slowing down
of chaos in order to make possible functions which operate through reference (Deleuze &
Guattari, 2009, 118-9). Bell’s analysis mistakenly implies that the difference between philosophy
and science is essentially a difference in the quantitative infinite. However, if this difference in
kind between philosophy and science were explained by a difference in the quantitative infinite,
then it would be unclear why the speed of light has any special role to play in the sciences. Yet,
Deleuze and Guattari are not challenging the sciences with their account of the concept which is
traversed at infinite speeds. The problem with Bell’s implication is that if the cosmos included
events which actually took place at infinite speed in the quantitative sense, then there would be
no sense to the physical limit of the speed of light. For in that case our attempts at description of
the physical universe would demand models with speeds ever approaching the infinite, even if
science itself depended on a limiting to finite speeds. If philosophy preserves the infinite speeds
of chaos, it is not because it is somehow quantitatively faster than science. It is instead the
unique engagement with pure temporal difference which is possible in philosophy, but which
science must cover over in order to make reference and prediction possible, like we saw in
Chapter 3. This is again the difference between the intensive and the extensive, between where
we cannot deal with individuals alone and where we can, respectively. To put both of these
speeds in quantitative terms is to miss this distinction; science does not end and philosophy begin
at roughly 3 x108 m/s.
Therefore, contra Bell, I do not see how Deleuze could affirm the existence of an actual
infinity. That is, the actual infinite is not included in Deleuze’s ontology or metaphysics,
whether as objects or processes. There is no quantitative infinity to be found among things, only
the qualitative infinity found in atemporal genesis. Again, such genesis is not the time of an
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infinitely divided supertask, but the undetermined instant of pure temporal difference. Since this
infinity is only potential and not quantitative, then if there are truthmakers for transfinite truths
(and since there are transfinite truths, they must have truthmakers), they must be built out of
finite resources. This qualitative account of infinite speed cannot be made extensive without
changing into a finite quantity and so it alone cannot stand as a truthmaker for the transfinite.
This is especially the case as it equally lacks any possibility of grounding the power set operation
because a qualitative infinity cannot be broken into subsets and collected, since to separate an
intensity is to change it in kind.
One might rightfully ask whether Deleuze’s rejection of the antinomy between the finite
and the infinite is in contradiction with our commitment to a finite ontology. By finite ontology,
we mean that there exists neither an infinite number of objects nor an object which is infinite in
some way, that is, there is no metaphysically actual or completed infinity. While difference
escapes the finite in the sense that it is not specifiable as identifiable, discrete individuals, it must
equally escape the infinite or else the infinite representation of difference would be possible, and
we would again have the priority of identity over difference. Difference does not escape the
finite because difference is infinite, it does so because it is not an individual or individuated.
Insofar as ontology is the question of what beings there are, it is a question of what can be or has
been individuated. Difference is Being, not a being. One might then suppose that objects stand as
truthmakers for the finite and difference itself as the truthmaker for the transfinite. However, this
is not so, for this supposition would again treat difference as an infinite object. Instead, we must
explain how it is that relations between finite objects happen through difference in such a way as
to give rise to truthmakers for the transfinite.
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B. Completing Infinity
Our discussion has presented two critical threads that must be reconciled: the Deleuzian
avoidance of the antinomy of the finite and the infinite in metaphysics, and the demand that all
truths require truthmakers. To begin to reconcile these two threads, we should return to the
question of the expression of that which is sub-representational. Deleuze engages this issue
directly when he points out that
Modern mathematics also leaves us in a state of antinomy, since the strict finite interpretation that it gives
of the calculus nevertheless presupposes an axiom of infinity in its set theoretical foundation, even though
this axiom finds no illustration in calculus. What is still missing is the extra-propositional or subrepresentative element expressed in the Idea by the differential, precisely in the form of a problem,
(Deleuze, 1994, 178).

Here, Deleuze is referring to the debate among mathematics over the acceptability of the calculus
following both Newton and Leibniz’s formulations in the 17th and 18th centuries. The calculus
was originally treated by some philosophers, such as Berkeley, and mathematicians with
suspicion due to its use of vague notions of the infinite and the infinitesimal. Building on the
work of Bolzano and Cauchy, Weierstrass is generally credited with solving this issue in the
1870’s by providing a rigorous formulation of the calculus in terms of limits which does not
require the use of any actual infinitesimal or infinite quantities.9 However, in referencing
calculus’s foundation on Set Theory and the Axiom of Infinity, Deleuze is not just concerned
with the debates over the infinitesimal which Weierstrass resolves, but in the positing of the
infinite to understand difference in any way. Since calculus is taken to be founded on Set Theory,
the former can make use of the transfinite resources of the latter, and depends on them for its
mathematical consistency. This is clearly a problem for Deleuze as in valorizing the calculus as
an exceptional formal account of change and differential relations, he wants to avoid positing a

9

For both the history and a short formal account of this debate and its solutions, see the classic Boyer 1959, chapters
V-VII.
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fundamental infinity on which such an account would depend. To avoid this problem would not
be to change the foundational relations of mathematics, but rather to account for the extrapropositional and sub-representational source of such transfinite truths, and show that source to
be, itself, finite. Before doing so, let us complete our understanding of Deleuze’s concern by
surveying the transfinite resources which Set Theory makes available to the calculus.
The transfinite resources of Set Theory can be summarized by understanding Cantor’s
Theorem. Cantor’s Theorem, informally, shows that there is no largest cardinal number. In other
words, given any transfinite set, there exists a larger set which cannot be put into a 1-to-1
correspondence with the former set. In Set Theory’s modern formulation as ZFC, this can be
shown to follow from two axioms: the Axiom of Infinity and the Power Set Axiom. The Axiom
of Infinity ensures the (formal) existence of an infinite set. This axiom asserts the existence of a
set which can be put into a 1-to-1 correspondence with at least one of its subsets. This means
there exists a set that contains a subset which is the same cardinality as itself, such is the formal
definition of a transfinite set. The next step in Cantor’s Theorem is to show that given any
transfinite set, a larger transfinite set can be formulated. “Larger” here means that the set cannot
be put into a 1-to-1 correspondence with a transfinite set, and so is shown to have a larger
cardinality than that transfinite set. Showing that such sets exist requires the Power Set Axiom. A
power set of some set S is the set which contains all possible subsets of S. The Power Set Axiom
guarantees the existences of the power set of S for any given set S. It can then be shown that no
set is capable of being put into a 1-to-1 correspondence with its own power set. Since to be
countable is just to be in a 1-to-1 correspondence with the set of Natural numbers (1, 2, 3, …) or
some subset thereof, then the power set of the set of Natural numbers is uncountably infinite
because it cannot be put into a 1-to-1 correspondence with the Natural numbers; there just aren’t

243

enough Natural numbers. The set of Natural numbers has cardinality ℵ0 (Aleph-Null), the
smallest transfinite cardinality. The power set of the Natural numbers is then ℵ1. Furthermore,
the process doesn’t stop, as one can always take the power set of a power set, and then the power
set of that new set, and so on (potentially) ad infinitum. This process is a part of the construction
of what is called the Universe of Sets (referred to as V), where we see that the countable sets
(finite or infinite) are actually just a very small part of what sets there are. In other words, most
of the Set Theoretical Universe is uncountably infinite sets. These are then the transfinite
resources made available to every branch of mathematics by their foundation in Set Theory.
Since the calculus is founded on Set Theory, the rigorous formulation of the calculus
does not, in Deleuze’s estimate, succeed in excising its dependence on the infinite. In the above
quoted section, Deleuze is concerned with a rigorous understanding of difference itself. He finds
this understanding in the calculus excepting where the calculus falls into the infinite, which it
does precisely because it is a representation of difference, not difference itself. Even though the
modern calculus has banished the infinitesimal, it is still a poison fruit for understanding
difference itself if that means we must posit the entire Set Theoretical Hierarchy, known as V,
(not just infinity but an infinity of infinities!) in order to make sense of how difference itself
operates. We should expect any attempted rigorous expression of difference itself to have such
artifacts because difference itself cannot be represented. However, these artifacts cannot be left
unexplained if we are to maintain mathematics as the study of the modal structure of our finite
cosmos. This leads us to seek the grounds of the expression of the infinite.
If we look in the direction from difference to mathematics, then we find ourselves with
the question “what is the problem to which the transfinite is the solution?” Answering this
question is essentially providing truthmakers for the transfinite, because the transfinite truths we
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find are to be understood as an expression from some sub-representational reality (as argued in
Chapter 1, following Bell’s reading of Deleuze). Furthermore, we have already found
truthmakers for potential infinity in the process of becoming-continuous that results from
individuation (as found in chapter 2). While the continuum is taken to be mathematically
equivalent to the Real number line, this is not an equivalence open to us yet. It is not yet open to
us because becoming-continuous only operates as a potential infinity whereas the Real numbers
are treated by set theory as a completed (actual) infinity. Before handling the set of Real
numbers, we must first give a ground for truths about the smallest transfinite sets, sets with
cardinality equivalent to the set of Natural numbers, and explain how such a completed infinity is
an expression of a finite cosmos.
We will show that such truthmakers for a completed infinity can be found by covering
over a difference in the metaphysical structure of the object. The infinite is then an expression
resulting from a certain way of eliding the difference between the virtual and actual by treating
the potentially infinite nature of the former through the extensional boundary of the latter. To see
this, let us first look at Cantor’s own philosophical account of what a set is.10 Cantor compares
his notion of a set both to the Platonic eidos and the mikton in Plato’s Philebus. I will focus here
on the latter comparison as it is more central to our purposes (Cantor, 1941, 144n.1).11 The
mikton is the mixture of the unlimited and the limited, which gives rise to a new compound being
(Plato, Philebus, 27b). Cantor sees this expressly as a manifold. He defines a manifold as any

This claim appears in a note at the end of Cantor’s “On Infinite, Linear Point-Manifolds.” The note is
disappointingly short given the potential philosophical depths of Cantor’s claim. The connection between Cantor
and Plato is explored in more depth in Hauser 2010.
10

However, it is worth noting that we will compare Cantor’s understanding of set and Deleuze’s concept of a
multiplicity below. Cantor sees a set as sharing features with Plato’s eidos, and Deleuze means multiplicity as a sort
of replacement for a concept of eidos, as we explored in Chapter 4.
11
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“Many which may be thought of as a One,” (Hauser, 2010, 783).12 What then is a transfinite set
but an infinite many understood as a one? If this is so, then we have a ready answer to what a
completed infinity is the expression of: it is the expression of the fact that each object is
extensionally 1 (i.e., it is an object) yet contains a virtual continuum which is potentially
infinitely divisible. Furthermore, this expression is possible by covering over the difference
between the virtual and the actual and treating both as extensive such that the object-asextensional-one contains a virtually-infinite continuum-expressed-as-extensional-many. To make
this case, it is helpful first to look at Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Cantor’s notion of a set
(where they are clearly aware of its Platonic inspiration) and explicate the resonances between
Cantor’s account and Deleuze’s own notion of individuation.
In Example 10 in What is Philosophy? (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 120-1), Deleuze and
Guattari argue that while set theory deals in the transfinite, it is not about the infinite. There, they
discuss Cantor’s definition of an infinite set as one which contains a subset capable of being put
in one-to-one correspondence with itself, and the argument for the hierarchy of transfinite
cardinals from the fact that no set can count its power set.13 About these points, they say: “it is
This is Hauser’s translation. It seems to me to be more accurate than Bingley’s translation of the same line as “By
manifold or set, I mean in general every multiplicity (jedes Viele) which can be thought of as an Unity (als Eine),”
(Cantor, 1941, 144n.1).
12

There is here an important interpretative issue in this portion of Deleuze and Guattari’s text, as was pointed out to
me by Jon Bova. In this section, Deleuze and Guattari affirm that the set produced by taking the power set of the
Natural numbers is “Aleph 1 [ℵ1], which possesses the power of the continuum or corresponds to the set of real
numbers,” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 120). If this is taken as a gloss of modern Set Theory (that is, ZFC or
equivalent formalization), then this statement is flatly wrong because it amounts to affirming the Continuum
Hypothesis. The Continuum Hypothesis, that the power set of the Natural numbers is the Continuum, was shown to
be independent of the axioms of ZFC by Gödel (who showed it did not follow from the axioms) and Cohen (who
later completed the independence result by showing it did not contradict the axioms). However, Deleuze and
Guattari are here addressing the connection between science and philosophy in terms of reference and concepts, as
well as a metaphysical understanding of both. Here, the reference is directly to Cantor, not ZFC (perhaps because
their interest in the moment of the formation of these ideas rather than their full formalization). Cantor did, in his
early work on set theory, think that such a proof was possible was implied by his work, and seemed to be persuaded
by the fact that ℵ1 shared important properties with the set of Reals (Hallett, 1984, 79-81). The offending section,
then, is either a mistake over a modern formal result or a too quick gloss on Cantor’s work and appraisal. However,
no argument given by Deleuze and Guattari depends on this mistaken affirmation of the Continuum Hypothesis.
13
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odd that this conception has so often been seen as reintroducing infinity into mathematics: it is
rather the extreme definition of the limit by a number… What the theory of sets does is inscribe
the limit within the infinite itself, without which there could be no limit,” (Deleuze & Guattari,
2009, 120). Cantor’s work is interpreted by Deleuze and Guattari as being not about or in
reference to the infinite, at least not primarily, but as the formal rendering of the introduction of
limits into the unlimited. This process of limiting the unlimited is that of the determination of an
object as a limited thing, and so, they argue, the limit precedes the limited thing and makes it
possible (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 120).14 If so, then Set Theory gets its truths and their
stability qua entailment relations not because of some existing collection of infinite objects
which it represents or references, but because it instead expresses formally the determination of
the undetermined into a limited thing.
This process of limiting within the unlimited that produces a limited thing is, in much too
brief, the same sort of account Deleuze gives of the individuation of an object explicated in
Chapter 2: intensive differences (the unlimited) form a boundary (process of limiting, the
differentiating of a thing an object independent of its parts and milieu) in order to produce a new
thing. Set Theory is not an expression of this process, but of its product. That is, Set Theory is
not an account of how the many is determined as one (individuation), but of the formal relations
which obtain between various many-determined-as-ones (sets). The relation between the Axiom
of Infinity and its entailed theorems would then have to be grounded in a relation within the
object itself which characterizes this unique part-whole relation. This relation is one where the
set contains a set of the same cardinality; that is, the many-as-one contains another many-as-one
with which it can be put into a 1-to-1 correspondence.

This notion of the limit is expressly related to Deleuze’s account of modality in that it is related to the
actualization of the virtual chaos (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 118).
14

247

Such a relationship is found within any object. All objects contain other objects as parts,
both of which are made up of a virtual continuum. We have already seen that such a virtual
continuum is potentially infinite. However, we have also shown, in Chapter 4, that such a
continuum is bounded and preserved as an essence or multiplicity, that is, the powers which
preserve an object as the object it is. What is important here is that these powers of preservation,
as long as they obtain, preserve an object as an object, as one thing. We then have in every object
a relation between potential infinities which is determined as one. Therefore, the multiplicity
which preserves an object as an object, grants this relation a determinate one-ness which grounds
its expression as a completed infinity.15 Were this relation between an object and its parts just
between powers and not enclosed as a boundary of the object, then it would only be a
relationship between potential infinities, and so only a potential infinity itself. However, because
this relation obtains within a determination, it grants a one-ness to this relation of potential
infinity which (while not actually infinite itself) can be expressed as a completed infinity. Now,
this relationship between the powers of an object’s parts and the binding powers which preserve
them as a whole does not, in the object itself, constitute a strict 1-to-1 correspondence. Such as
correspondence is the result of covering over the non-extensional differences between such
powers and rendering them extensionally. This operation is like that of rendering degrees of

15

We have moved quickly here, but it is worth making a distinction between completed infinities in general and
completed infinities on the model of the Axiom of Infinity. I take it that the fact that all objects have both a
determination as one thing which is related to its virtual continuum (this is the role of a multiplicity or essence)
stands as a ground for the expression of completed infinities in general. The Axiom of Infinity further characterizes
such completed infinities by way of defining an infinite set as a set which contains a subset of the same cardinality
as itself. This further characterization requires the relation between an object’s virtual continuum and the virtual
continuum (at least one) of its parts in order to be grounded. All objects necessarily have a multiplicity and parts,
and so this distinction is not made by different classes of objects but by which relations of an object are expressed.
What is important here is that there this is a possible truthmaking ground for propositions about completed infinities
which are not necessarily characterized in Set Theoretical terms, that is, by the Axiom of Infinity.
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intensities such as temperature into quantified extensions in Chapter 1. Thereby, we have a
ground for the expression of the Axiom of Infinity and its entailments in ZFC.
This grounding of the Axiom of Infinity allows us to reinterpret a postulated relationship
between potential and completed infinities: The Domain Principle. The Domain Principle is
originally formulated by Hallet 1984 in a reading of Cantor’s work, but it receives its most
robust defense and application in the work of Graham Priest. In Priest’s formulation, the Domain
Principle states that talk which quantifies16 over potential infinities commits us to the existence
of a corresponding completed infinity. That is, if we posit some progression or series as a
potential infinity, there exists a set whose members are steps of that progression. Explicating the
uses to which Priest puts the Domain Principle would take us too far afield, but he takes it as a
defense against criticisms of totalities and as a bulwark for his defense of a para-consistent
reasoning in general. The shape of such arguments is generally to point to a variable which can
take an infinite number of values, argue that such a variable or propositions which contain it lose
determinate sense without a domain which contains those values, and concludes that therefore
such a domain exists (an example of this is found on Priest, 2003, 158-9). If such a domain is
inconsistent (i.e. it contains contradictions), this is taken is a fair trade off for preserving
determinate sense (Priest, 2003, 126. If such a principle held in the way Priest interprets it, the
above account would fail since we made use of a potential infinity to explain truths about but not
the existence of completed infinities. However, our account also provides an alternative
interpretation of the Domain Principle.
First, we must note that the Domain Principle functions as a logical principle at the level
of formal discourse which includes quantification. Given the structure of formal logics, if one is

16

Priest is clear that it is not reference in general, but quantification in particular to which the Domain Principle
applies (Priest, 2003, 281).
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to make a statement which expresses a potential infinity, this requires quantifying over an
infinite domain. In other words, in order to make use of our formal tools, especially
quantification, we require a model with a domain that includes a completed infinity to which that
potential infinity refers. If, for example, we have a potential infinity modeled by the function
f(x) = x+1, then, in order for this function to have a sense at all, we have must have a domain
with the cardinality of the Natural numbers. This function outputs a series whose limit
approaches infinity, but which of course does not produce a transfinite set itself. However, so the
Domain Principle goes, that series implies the existence of a set which is the correlated
completed infinity, the set of all Natural numbers.
While Hallet and Cantor’s reading of the domain principle applies strictly to Set Theory
and similar formal, mathematical contexts, Priest accepts the Domain Principle as applying
generally and having metaphysical import. Priest does so by treating the principle as a result of
the logical form of quantification itself and accepting quantification as straightforwardly
ontological. In other words, the jump from Set Theory to discourse in general is not so far when
one equates reasoning well in general with the use of a formal logic and remembers that model
theory is set-theoretical. As we have blocked the inference from logical structure to ontological
structure, we must reject Priest’s reading of the Domain Principle as his use attempts to infer the
real existence of the domain of which the domain of the model one’s formal system makes use.
The Domain Principle tells us little about any underlying metaphysical reality or the nature of
infinity as such. Rather, the Domain Principle can, at most, be interpreted as the commitment
that in a formal system with model-theoretic resources, expressing a potential infinity commits
one to asserting a formal surrogate for a completed infinity. This tells us only about the limits of
formal discourse and the process of expression as a covering over, not about the metaphysical
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reality which grounds the expression of such discourse. More pointedly, the Domain Principle, at
most, gives us a constraint which reflects the formal requirements of extensional quantification,
but it does not explain how quantification is able to us about what there is unless one assumes the
only way to read a formalism is naively.17
In many ways, our rejection of Priest’s generalized use of the Domain Principle is a
microcosm of our rejection of the priority of identity. In generalizing the Domain Principle, one
must accept that propositions about variation, potential, change, etc. have sense only if there
exists a prior stability (Priest, 2003, 125-6). Because change can be unlimited, one would then
have to posit a foundational infinity in order to make sense of such unlimited change. Change,
then, is understood in terms of a prior stable identity, the same for intensity and extensity, and for
becoming and being. Yet it is clear from our investigation that such a posit amounts to a demand
that reality be isomorphic with the structures required by our models of reality. However, if one
takes similarity and identity to be what is in need of explaining, such a demand is unwarranted,
and such an isomorphism unfounded. The formal need of a transfinite set for the sake of giving
sense to a model of change does not, on its own, imply anything about the nature of change
itself. Instead, we have seen how such a sense can be given to a formal completed infinity by
way of the covering over of intensive yet finite reality into a purely extensional discourse. The
Domain Principle then does not have metaphysical import, and nothing about the fact that there
are potential infinities in the cosmos requires us to posit a metaphysically prior, or even simply
existing actual infinity to explain that fact. Having then firmly grounded the lowest order of
transfinite truths in a finite cosmos, let us do the same for the rest of the transfinite by providing
a ground for the Power Set Axiom.

17

If we were to follow this point here, it would return us to the issues of Chapter 2.
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C. Powers and Power Sets
The power set operation is established in Set Theory by the Power Set Axiom. This
axiom simply says that given any set, we can construct its power set (i.e. the set of all possible
subsets of that set). That axioms define what can be done in a formal system gives us a
connection to the ontology of powers worked out in Chapter 1 and 2. Since axioms describe what
can be done, one should see an axiom as a sort of a formal disposition in that an axiom describes
or stipulates what can be done within a formal system. We have good reason to do this because
even an axiom which asserts the existence of a certain formal object generally does so by saying
what that object does or can do. For instance, the Axiom of Infinity does not simply say that an
infinite set exists: it tells us we may make use of a set which can be put into a 1-to-1
correspondence with at least one of its proper subsets. So, even an infinite set is defined as what
it can do. The parts of a formal language which specify names and propositional variables can
also be reduced to a reading of a formal disposition. For instance, the fact that First Order Logic
includes an infinite list of propositions means nothing more than that we may always include
another propositional variable (P, Q, R, etc.), we may assign true or false to the propositional
variable, and the proposition, from a formal point of view, is no more than this capacity to be
true or false. Such infinite lists are not (and cannot be) specified in advance. Rather, they denote
a formal disposition of the system to make use of any number of unique proposition letters which
are generated in the use of the system. The full list is always virtual. A collection of axioms,
then, could be understood as the dispositional essence of a formal system.
The question then is what powers could ground the power set operation? Of what aspect
of the modal structure of difference and objects is the power set axiom a formal expression? The
ground of the power set operation must be virtual since it is a power. It cannot be a power of
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difference itself since it depends on specific features of the sets involved. That is, we argued in
chapter 1 that the extensionality of formal truths about sets is grounded in the actual aspect of
objects. Since the power set is an operation over sets, its grounding must also depend on actuality
in some way. It need not be grounded in any specific actuality, but the mere existence of
actuality itself.
We have three pieces which go into the power set operation: the original set, its subsets,
and the operation itself which returns the set of all possible subsets. If we read this as an
expression of objects and dispositions, we then have an object, its external parts (that is, the
objects which make it up, as described in Chapter 2), and the power of some other object which
can relate the two. We have a ground for infinite sets in the relation between part and whole as
argued for above. What is needed now is a relation between that relation and something else of
which the Power Set Axiom can be an expression. We know that taken together, all the subsets
of a set cannot be counted by that set. This is then an excess of all possible subsets over a set.
Therefore, reading the power set operations in terms of objects, parts, and dispositions means we
must read the “subset” of an object as its external parts. This is because there is no excess
between a thing and its internal parts (an object, strictly speaking, is its internal parts and
relations), but the external parts of a thing are always in excess of that thing. We have already
argued that a thing is in excess over its parts, and equally, the parts of a thing are in excess over
it. In other words, the existence of an object implies two excesses. These two excesses are what
prevent an object from being reduced to its parts or exhausted by what it is a part of, as argued in
Chapter 2.
If an object’s parts were not in excess over it, then that object would be indestructible.
This is because, as we argued in Chapter 2, if an object fully internalized its external parts, those
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parts would no longer be able to connect with other objects in such a way that would disassemble
that object. So, since nothing is indestructible, there always exist powers to take an object apart.
This sort of power remains virtual as long as the object maintains itself, but this power always
exists along with the object nonetheless. This is simply what it means to affirm that an object is
contingent: there always exists a power or powers capable of unmaking it. For there to not be
such a power would mean that an object were necessary, and we have already argued against the
existence of necessary objects. Furthermore, no object can become equal to this power because
to do so would be to internalize its external parts, to completely manage and control their excess
over itself. This power is not a power of difference itself, but the powers of other objects which
can actually perform the operations required to deconstruct a thing.
Recall in Chapter 4 that we argued an object’s essence implies that an object preserves
itself in the face of powers which can potentially alter it (i.e. its symmetry). The powers referred
to here are those which an object cannot maintain itself in the face of, and so are those which
destroy its symmetry. Since these powers external to the object imply the existence of other
objects of which they are the powers, and all objects have an actual aspect, these powers imply
the existence of some actuality. This necessity of actually satisfies the condition for
extensionality, and so grounds the possible expression of actual relational excess in a formal
theory like Set Theory. Since there is no greatest whole or all-encompassing object, every object
implies the existence of powers capable of taking it apart. Every object implies powers in excess
of it, powers which can free the potentialities of its parts. I take Cantor’s Theorem, the truth that
a larger set can always be produced from a set, to be an expression of this fact. This is because
the very contingency of an object implies the existence of something greater than itself which it
cannot equal in some way. That is, it is not a greater object which implies this fact (as the powers
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of a collection of objects capable of destroying an object will do just as well), but the very
contingency of any object at all. Then, every multiplicity, every essence, implies such a potential
excess of the thing over its parts and beyond its relations. Truths expressing this excess would
then be grounded in the nature of essence itself.
Following the above, the Power Set Operation can be seen as the expression of that
modal situation where the potential of an object or objects to relate to another object’s parts
exceeds that object’s own relation to its external parts. Take, for example, the part-whole
relationship of the human body. The human body is a whole resulting from the relations of
various external parts, such as blood cells, bones, organs, etc. which each maintain a certain
potential excess over the body as a whole. Now take a much more powerful object, say a
hurricane. The relation of a hurricane to a human body is one of just this sort of excess. The
hurricane has the power(s) to relate to the parts of the human body well beyond the body’s own
ability to relate to its parts. Now this excess clearly exists in such an actual situation as a body
being battered and torn apart by the hurricane. But this event is only a manifestation of a power
that must always exist as a power, based on the fundamental contingency of all objects. The
hurricane only makes apparent what is always true in that an object is always related to a
multitude of other objects, and those objects are related to the first’s external parts. These
external relations cannot be banished by an object. That is, the virtual excess of a thing’s parts in
relation to the thing’s environment is an ineliminable modal structure. Here the term
“environment” should be read as a collection of other objects and their relations to which the first
object relates. We must specify this sense of “environment” since it does not imply that this
excess only results from an object “larger” than the initial object in question. Instead,
“environment” implies only the power to relate to the parts of an object in excess of that object’s
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own relation to its parts. In our example of the human body, a sublime natural disaster is not
required for decomposition; a virus will do just fine.
This is a virtual excess which cannot be overcome. By which I mean no object can
completely ward off this excess or protect itself from it. Furthermore, this excess must remain
potential, because were this excess to be actualized, it would be destructive to the object and
thereby annul the relation between itself and its parts. For the essence of a thing to remain, this
potential can neither be annulled or actualized. This is not to say that no object is ever destroyed,
but that the continued existence of an object and its essence implies such a potential destruction.
And so, if any objects exist at all, so will this modal structure of excess. 18 Since the continued
existence of some objects is required, the truthmakers for the transfinite require some stability,
similarity, or sameness produced from difference. This continued existence requires more than
difference itself. If this is indeed the grounding of the truths generatable by the use of the power
set operation, then Cantor’s Hierarchy of transfinite sets can rightfully be said to be an
expression of a finite universe, true yet non-representational. Moreover, since essences condition
the weaving of time, what they and they alone ground can be said to be eternal, and in this way
such transfinite truths are eternal truths. Therefore, there is no object which escapes a relative
excess over itself, and this is an eternal truth. There is, then, a necessity to these relative
excesses, and this is a metaphysical fact. Importantly, we see this metaphysical fact expressed in

18

This condition of all existing objects is not a solely negative one. This excess leads to a radical possibility of
reconstitution. This, I think, is the point of Deleuze’s obscure reference to a Superfold in his book on Foucault. Here
Deleuze asks, in a Nietzschean register, if several major ontological categories (man, life, and work) are being
reconstituted in some way, that is, the forces which had been organized in those forms have been freed to reassemble
themselves? His answer is that whatever new form these forces take, “It would no longer involve raising to an
infinity or to a finitude, but to an unlimited finity, thereby evoking every situation of force in which a finite number
of components yields a practically unlimited diversity of combinations,” (Deleuze, 1988, 131). In other words,
because of this radical excess that constitutes us (and everything else), we are capable of being radical reconstituted,
that is, assuming one can maintain at least some structural integrity or determination to prevent complete
dissolution.
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set theory as the possibility of always being able to generate a larger set from a given set itself
through the power set operation. Again, this is not because an actual relationship exists between
an object and every possible permutation of its parts, as such would be to treat an intensive
relation as extensive; rather, this relation is rendered extensive in its expression through a formal
system such as ZFC.
One might object here that we have not yet grounded the strangest part of the SetTheoretical Hierarchy, namely, the inaccessible cardinals. Inaccessible cardinals are one of the
more exotic topics in Set Theory. They are sets which cannot be “reached from below.” In other
words, they cannot be constructed by building up with sets with the usual axioms, even by
unlimited iterations of the Power Set Axiom. For example, were there no Axiom of Infinity, the
set of all natural numbers would be inaccessible because no operations on finite sets could
produce it. While they are formally strange and fascinating formal objects, their metaphysical
grounding seems quite straightforward to me. The modal structure which underlies such formal
truths is that of the fact that parts cannot reduce their whole. While the parts produce the whole,
from the parts themselves the whole is inaccessible. No combination resulting from the
permutation of the powers of an object’s parts will produce that object. Recall from Chapter 2
that a power separate from those of a thing’s parts was needed to bring forth a new object, and
that Deleuze calls this the dark precursor. Were this not the case, the whole would be reduced to
its parts. And so, I take the formal relations that hold between inaccessible cardinals and their
subsets to be an expression of this modal structure. This may be counter-intuitive as truths about
such sets seem like they should be about something quite large. However, the modal structure of
quite small objects will exhibit this fact. Such an intuition is analogous to the question put to
Socrates in Plato’s Parmenides about whether the Form of the large is itself large? This
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strangeness only arises if we are thinking of Set-Theory representationally and expect cardinality
to be isomorphic with the size or number of objects in the universe, a conception which cannot
be maintained if we maintain that the universe itself is finite.
D. Skolem’s Paradox
To exhibit the metaphysical ground of transfinite truths and show its conceptual benefits,
I will use it to make sense of a formal result which is generally treated as unintuitive: Skolem’s
Paradox. Skolem’s Paradox is not a paradox in the sense of a contradictory formal result. Rather,
it is an unintuitive consequence of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and so is a paradox in the
more colloquial sense. The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is a result in model theory dealing with
the size of models required by various collections of formal sentences. Model theory studies the
relationship between formal theories (expressed as a collection of propositions provable in the
formal theory) and formal models which provide the semantics for the theory. A model
“satisfies” a theory if the model provides the right truth values; that is, the propositions which
can be proved in the theory are true in the model, as defined by some valuation function. One can
then study the various properties of formal theories and the constraints they place on the models
such that they are satisfied; for example, the size of models required to satisfy a theory can be
deduced. Size here refers to the cardinality of sets, that is, the number of objects in a domain or
the number of propositions being modeled. Countable models require only a finite number of
objects in a domain or a countably transfinite number (that is, no greater than the set of Natural
numbers). Uncountable models require a number of objects larger than the set of Natural
numbers.
The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem results show a curious relationship between
cardinalities of transfinitude since propositions about any transfinite sets can be made true by
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models which contain no more than countably infinite objects. The theorem actually consists of
two parts: Downward and Upward. The Downward theorem, in essence, proves that any formal
sentence or collection of sentences which has a uncountably transfinite model also must have a
model which is only countably infinite. In other words, in order to model any sentence
formulable in set theoretical terms, you will only need a set as large as the set of Natural
numbers, that is, countably infinite. The Upward part of the theorem shows that any model (finite
or transfinite) has extensions (i.e. a larger model that includes the original model) for all higher
cardinalities. This means that if there exists a model which satisfies the sentence(s), then there
exists a model of a higher cardinality which also satisfies the sentence(s).
Skolem’s Paradox, then, takes the result of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and couples
it with Cantor’s Theorem, which we surveyed above. To do so, we must take Set Theory itself as
the sort of collection of formal sentences that the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem discusses. When
treating Set Theory in this way, it can be shown (though not without difficulty, see Bays 2006)
that the sentences of set theory themselves need only a countably infinite model to assign those
sentences their proper truth values. Cantor’s Theorem, for example, needs a model no larger than
the set of Natural Numbers to accurately model its sentences that assert the existence of
uncountably large cardinals. A countably infinite model is notably smaller than V. Skolem
himself took his paradox to prove the relativity of the notion of cardinality (Skolem 1922, cf.
Jané 2001). That is, there need not be an absolute notion of the size of transfinite sets. Instead,
what is “countable” and what is “uncountable” are relative to the sets in question in that one set
could be given a privileged status such that any set which is can be put in a 1-to-1
correspondence with is called countable, and those which it cannot are uncountable. These
relations would then be used to define cardinality in such a model, with the privileged set labeled
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as the symbol used for the cardinality of the Natural numbers in normal models, ℵ0. This
produces an interesting result. For following Skolem’s view of the relativity of cardinality, a
finite set could then act as a formal model of the Natural numbers (i.e. as the definition of
countable in this particular model), and the iterated applications of the power set operation on
that finite set standing in for the Natural numbers would produce sets which model cardinalities
larger than the Natural numbers, as the set resulting from each iteration cannot be put into a 1-to1 correspondence with the set resulting from the previous iteration. This model provides the
same truth values to the normal propositions of Set Theory as the more common transfinite
model. Here we must note the set theoretical truth that no matter how many times you iterate the
power set operation of a finite set, you will only ever produce another finite set. This still
maintains the required features though, as a finite set cannot count its equally-finite but still
larger power set. For example, a set with 3 members will have a power set with 9 members, and
we obviously cannot count 9 members using only 3 members, since counting here means
establishing a one-to-one correspondence. These finite sets can then model the relations of
cardinality between transfinite sets while themselves only ever being finite sets. If we limit our
domain to the Natural numbers, we can still construct a model of Cantor’s theorem which will
satisfy all the sentences of that theorem. Skolem takes this possible model to imply that there is
an “absolute perspective” from which all sets are countable, (Skolem 1922). The domain of such
a model is the Natural numbers and so is still a transfinite set (we will address this below when
we return to potential infinities). However, what matters for this question of truthmakers for the
entailment relations between propositions about higher cardinal transfinite numbers is that such
relations can be made true (i.e. the model provides the right truth values) by relations between
finite sets if the right relations obtain (i.e. that between a set and its power set).
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As a formal result, the paradox is unassailable, yet it remains thoroughly unintuitive.19
That is, it is not a paradox in the same sense as Russel’s Paradox, which indeed is a contradiction
within a formal system. However, the paradox does not necessarily imply the truth of Skolem’s
claims that countable and uncountable are relative notions, and that there exists some absolute
perspective from which all sets are countable. Whether Skolem is correct on this point is a
question of both mathematical truth and the relation between mathematics, logic, and language;
but it is also immediately a question of metaphysics.20 We find two important positions on the
question in the literature, those of Moore and Bays. One may argue, as Moore 2001 does, that
working in Set theory involves not just the understanding of sets and set membership provided
by the axioms of ZFC (or some other axiomatization), but also cannot be separated from
pragmatic background knowledge of what is intended by the use of the terms set and set
membership. On this understanding, Set Theory is not just a set of axioms, but is also the
understanding of how to make use of such axioms, to what they are to be applied, intuitive
notions what the symbolism is meant to capture, and other such extra-formal knowledge that
allows us to make use of the formal theory in the first place.21 This additional understanding,
It is worth noting that Skolem’s Paradox does not arise in Second Order Logic. Second Order Logic is not without
its difficulties and controversies, and so this fact is often treated not as a resolution but as the horns of new dilemma:
either accept Second Order Logic and put Skolem’s Paradox to rest, or reject Second Order Logic and accept
Skolem’s Paradox. Our commitment to pluralism may allow us to avoid such a dilemma, and in so doing, treat the
dilemma not as something to be settled but as a fact about different formalism which is to be explained. Such an
explanation can be offered in brief here: Skolem’s Paradox arises because of the nature of relations between parts
and wholes, and Second Order Logic uses a form of quantification whose very expression covers over certain
aspects of those part-whole relations such that Skolem’s Paradox cannot be expressed because the differences on
which it depends are elided.
19

This is not to say that no one has drawn metaphysical conclusions from the paradox or from Skolem’s
interpretation of it. However, it is an open debate since it has been taken as both support for and rejection of
Mathematical Platonism. It is taken to be an argument against mathematical Platonism because it implies that some
central set theoretical notions are relative to various models of axiomatizations of the set theory, and so no absolute
notions exists (no pure abstract forms, as the Platonist would posit). However, the Platonist may always respond, as
Cellucci 1970 does, that models and axioms only imperfectly capture true mathematical reality, thereby taking their
relativity as a further sign of some underlying absolute which they imperfectly study.
21
More technically, it seems here that Moore has in mind the sort of understanding which makes possible the use of
the formal system vis Wittgensteinian worries about rule following.
20
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Moore argues, should lead us to make a distinction between those models strictly implied by the
formalism (which would include the Löwenheim-Skolem models), and those models we should
be concerned with given our practical understanding that functions alongside the formalism. On
the other hand, one might agree with Bays 2006, that there is a “generic” solution to the paradox,
as well as more specific solutions which must be tailored to particular models. According to
Bays, the generic solution is that an equivocation exists between the natural language meaning of
“uncountable” and what “uncountable” means in a particular model. That is, the model
successfully models uncountable sets in some way, but not with actually uncountable sets, in the
same way that a scale model replica of a sports car may model the relative sizes of the parts
accurately without accurately modeling the actual size of the parts. Such a replica certainly
doesn’t disprove the existence of full size sports cars. So, if we can model larger transfinite sets
with the Natural numbers alone, this is not a reason to deny the existence of larger, uncountable
sets. Other proposed solutions to the paradox go into more specific mathematical details (again,
see Bays, 2006).
Settling this debate is not a part of our task here. Our aim is not to explain the “correct”
use of the formalism or chart the proper course for mathematical practice, but to explain what the
cosmos must be like such that mathematics discovers or is able to construct the truths that it
does. None of the stances in this debate show Skolem’s paradox to lead to any formal
contradiction and thereby it is a paradox only in the sense of being an unintuitive, but true result.
We then offer only a way of understanding what there is such that this formal result is no longer
unintuitive. I take the relevance of Skolem’s paradox for the metaphysics of mathematics to be
that there is no formal problem with transfinite truths being made true by models of a lower
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cardinality than the sets referenced in those propositions, assuming the right relations hold sets of
various sizes.
We have shown above that the characteristics of transfinite sets can be understood as the
expression in extensive terms of relations which hold between finite objects. If we read from the
cosmos into the model, this is the exact situation we see: propositions about higher-ordered
transfinite sets are satisfiable by sets of a lower cardinality (these models still require an infinite
domain the size of the Natural numbers, but we have explained this as a result of rendering a
potential infinity extensional via its expression). This shows an absolute notion of transfinitude
could just as easily arise from relative excess, with relative transfinitude as an intermediary step.
The absolute notion of transfinitude could be made use of mathematically without issue while
those absolute notions still depend on a relative metaphysical excess for their truthmakers rather
than any metaphysically real infinity. If so, then we need not posit any metaphysically real
infinities. That is, if there is a formally acceptable use of absolute uncountability, then it may
depend on a cascading series of relative uncountability, ultimately grounded in a finite ontology.
The production of absolutes from relations is precisely the purview of the metaphysics of
difference which seeks “not a relativity of truth, but, on the contrary, a truth of the relative,”
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, 130).
E. Conclusion: The Infinite Expresses Only the Finite
Truth is an expression of what is rather than a representation of the cosmos. For this
reason, a finite ontology may give rise to transfinite truths. The infinite does not subsist or preexist; the finite is not carved from the infinite. Rather, the relative excesses of objects over
objects hemorrhages the transfinite. No object in this relation of relative excess need be infinite,
nor is an infinite number of objects required. This is why we can experience the Kantian sublime

263

while overwhelmed in a supermarket trying to choose a flavor of jelly. Following the constraints
imposed by a metaphysics of difference, transfinite truths can be produced, but infinities cannot
be individuated as objects. This is because any such power to produce an infinite object or an
infinite number of objects would annul difference itself as fundamental. The universe may
generate truths about gods, but it could not incarnate them. The ground we have found is
sufficiently general in that transfinite truths depend on essence and excess in general, not on any
particular contingent essences. We therefore need not fear the sudden loss of the stability of
mathematical truths. However, these grounds are not so general as to be a result of the powers of
difference alone. We can continue to maintain that the universe cannot give rise to real infinities
because being-qua-difference lacks that power. Without some ontological stability and similarity
in the form of the essences of objects, the excessive relation between objects which stand as
truthmakers for the transfinite would not be possible. This non-representational account of Set
Theory and the rejection of the actual infinite is directly expressed by Deleuze as we saw above
in Example 10 from What is Philosophy? Set theory gets its truths and their stability qua
entailment relations not because of some existing collection of transfinite objects which it
represents, but because it instead expresses formally the determination of the undetermined into a
limited thing. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari here endorse, in terms of their own
metaphysics of modality, a position nearly identical to mathematical modal structuralist account
that holds that mathematics is the formal rendering of modal structures. In particular, that modal
structure which set theory expresses is the modal structure of the production of the object from
undetermined intensities which we explored in earlier chapters.
What, then, of the absolutely infinite? By “absolute infinite,” I mean infinite without
qualifications and without anything greater than it. Note that transfinite sets are not absolutely
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infinite since for each transfinite set, a larger set than itself can always be produced. In fact, we
have no formal systems which deal with the absolute infinite without contradiction and
inconsistency, so I see no reason to search for truthmakers for claims about such an idea. Of
course, dialetheists will be dissatisfied here, since they may accept propositions about absolute
infinity as a true or real paradox. But if logics are not wholly representational, then the existence
of paraconsistent logics does not require us to posit the existence of real paradoxes or actually
existing contradictions. This would be just one more example of an ad hoc posit following the
fallacy of taking ontological structure to mirror logical structure. What is required to explain the
absolutely infinite is then not an account of what makes it true, because no such account can be
given, but finding the problem to which the creation of this concept responds. Here the concept
of the absolute infinite takes on an exceptionally human character, as pointed out by Morton in
Hyperobjects (Morton, 2013).
While I cannot develop the point here, my conjecture is that the existence of a concept of
the absolute infinite is a result of a cybernetic problem that a being like us must experience. In
cybernetics, Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety says that in order for a system to control another
system, the first system must have a greater number of potential states than the system it
controls. In brute fact, we cannot control the cosmos; we lack the potential variety. Yet we need
some way to manage this finite yet ineliminable and sublime excess over ourselves.22 The
concept of the absolute infinite plays this role by giving us something we can manage in place of

22

In this sense, we find a Kantian insight in a new guise. In The Critique of Judgment, Kant famously explicates the
mathematical sublime through a discord between the imagination which seeks infinity and reason which seeks
totality produced by a sensation whose magnitude we cannot manage. In these terms, if the absolute infinite is
anything at all on our account, it is the result of a deceitful alliance in the human mind between the imagination and
reason which tries to insulate us from the fact that we are limited finite beings in a cosmos filled with much more
powerful, though equally, finite beings whose magnitude we cannot even adequate cognize, let alone master. As the
dynamical sublime, on Kant’s account, results from our experience of the immense power of nature from a position
of safety from those powerful forces, my conjecture provides a bridge between the two. The notion of an absolute
infinite is a sort of cognitive position of safety which we retreat to when overwhelmed by excessive finitude.
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that which we cannot. We see this in that people are often ready, and relatively ably skilled, to
reason about the infinite, yet they cannot reason with similar adroitness about numbers in the
thousands, let alone the astronomical scales required to understand the cosmos in a predictive
manner. The concept of absolute infinity does not provide us with anything like cybernetic
control of the cosmos, but it does respond to the problem of control by providing a way of
coping--not with our finitude, because we are as finite as the cosmos itself--but with our relative
smallness. The concept of the absolute infinite is our attempt to make up for our inability to
become equal to the powers of the cosmos.
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Conclusion:
Expression and Formalization
“What this book [Difference and Repetition] should therefore have
made apparent is the advent of a coherence which is no more of
our own, that of mankind, than that of god or the world.”
-Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xxi

What has been given here is a metaphysics of difference, a contingent cosmos where
there is vast enough symmetry and structure to provide necessary truths, yet an equally strange
cosmos that can generate new eternal truths, where objects change underneath their essence, and
where, ultimately, the infinite is just the excess of one finitude over another. I have argued it is
precisely this strange cosmos which makes a well-grounded realism about the role of
mathematics in the sciences possible. It is not because we can say with certainty that the objects
of these theories exist and exist exactly as described; this would be to fall into the trap of realism
as representation. Instead, because the cosmos itself gives rise to continuity across discontinuity,
produces symmetries, and generates identities by covering over fundamental differences, we
have the possibility of the production of consistency. It is the forces capable of generating this
sub-representational, inhuman consistency which make our truths possible and give sense even
to the unphysical yet rigorous results of formal systems. The forces underneath this inhuman
consistency are the powers of difference itself, and they are the only possible ground of
necessary truths. Understanding our knowledge of these grounds in terms of expression rather
than representation, we may even want to say our theories and formal systems are “true from”
rather than “true of” the cosmos. Every provable theorem is true from this cosmos though many
of them will fail to represent the cosmos or anything within it. As we saw in Chapter 5, for
example, Cantor’s Theorem is made true by the modal structure of objects, but we try in vain to
find any transfinite collections of objects which the theorem appears to be about.
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We may now offer an explanation of the indispensability of mathematics for the sciences.
Mathematics studies the modal structure of difference itself. In other words, it studies the limits
of the powers of being otherwise, the differential structure of modality itself, or the pure limits of
the consistency of things themselves. These formulations are synonymous. Mathematical truths,
and necessary truths in general, are then not so much about what there is but about the broadest
limits of what could be otherwise given what there is. The sciences study what there is, and what
there is is always a matter of contingency. Importantly, the sciences study contingency in a way
that primarily aims at prediction. Prediction seeks to uncover the necessary relations among the
contingent in order to anticipate what will unfold. What there is always contains within itself
ways of becoming otherwise; it is suffused with both powers and difference, that is, with
structure. We have seen in this work that to be suffused with structure means that even what is
contingent is so atop relational necessities. Because science studies what becomes otherwise and
mathematics is the study of the limits of such ways of becoming otherwise, mathematics will be
indispensable to the sciences.
We may even venture a guess as to why branches of mathematics are developed long
before they see any application. Application requires greater empirical investigation. In this
metaphysics, that means that to apply a branch of mathematics requires discovering what
differences are covered over and what sorts of powers and relations of difference obtain within
the domain to which it is be applied. To develop a branch of mathematics, one need only cover
over differences by way of a formalism in order to investigate the limits of what follows. Here
our language misleads in that we misunderstand the relationship between particular and universal
if we understand the universal as simply the grouping together of particulars as the Nominalist
and extensional logics tend to. We have seen that difference between the particular and the
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universe is instead one of their relation to difference and identity.1 The particular is much more
complex than the universal. This is because, as we have shown, the universal always involves a
massive and consistent covering over of differences; in other words, a greater abstraction, than
the particular which lives amid difference itself. It then requires less empirical investigation, not
more, to develop truths which treat of anything at all or of a large variety of things as the same
sort of thing (e.g., the enormous covering over of differences that allows us to count any number
at all as one). Producing truths which maintain a greater variety of differences among what is
studied requires much more empirical investigation.
This account is opposed to views which take such truths to be fictional, but also to views
which account for such truths as referring to a specific kind of abstract object, or even the
dispositionalist who takes necessary truths to refer to always manifesting dispositions. Despite
their differences, what these views have in common, and what we have provided an alternative
to, is a representational understanding of truth and a conflation of the actual with the real. We
have instead argued: (1) that truth is first an expression of what there is; similarity,
representation, or identity are secondary, (2) that the actual is made possible by intensive order
and virtual structure, all of which are equally real, and (3) both of these claims follow from a
metaphysics which takes difference itself as fundamental.
Since I have avoided epistemological questions in this dissertation, there is little to say
here that can be justifiably ventured about the practice of mathematics, of how exactly it is that
mathematics studies these structures. We briefly touched upon the inscription of essence into the
past in Chapter 4, and this is surely the starting point we must take to extend this project further
to an epistemology of the actual human practice of mathematics. We would have to investigate

1

Recall from Chapters 2 and 4 that universal and particular are not differences in metaphysical kinds as any
particular object stands to its parts as a concrete universal. Rather, it is a difference in the focus of analysis.
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how a particular kind of object, the human knower, is capable of being affected by differential
structure, how it is capable of inscribing them, what translation effects this has, and what new
productive powers are made possible through this inscription. However, we can here say a few
words about what this means for the being of formal systems and what it is to be a formal object.
Take for example several of the variety of set theories—such as ZFC, Von Neumann Set
Theory, or Intuitionist Zermelo-Frankl Set Theory (IZF)—rigorously describe modal structure
and serve as a proper foundation to mathematics. How should we understand this situation? Does
this variety imply that the way in which we speak of modal structure is only an aesthetic or a
pragmatic choice of theory? We could seek an analogy in linguistics, and particularly in the
concept of linguistic drift. In this case, the possible analogy would mean that we would expect
lineages of formal systems fracturing into dialects with changes in meaning all along the way.
But this analogy fails, since there will be no semantic drift in these formal languages. IZF will
not import the Axiom of Choice from ZFC like English may import the French grammar of
adjectives following nouns. Such changes in natural languages do not necessarily change the
essence of that language; English is robust to these changes even if it accepts grammatical
structures unfamiliar to it in adopting foreign phrases. On the other hand, any change to the
axioms, rules of inference, or theorems in a formal system, however this may take place,
immediately changes the essence of that formal system. Taking a Saussurean time-slice of a
natural language as structure is always an abstraction of fecund, living thing. Yet a formal
language is exactly this sort of atemporal structure. This fact is perhaps what lends them their
strangely inhuman qualities. The entailment relations between axioms and theorems are not
human creations, even though they can only be expressed through what we create. We may
choose the formal parts which become a system, the axioms, rules of inference, domains, types,
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etc. but not what follows from them. Try as we might, we cannot maintain the geometry of
Euclid when we negate the parallel postulate. That choice reverberates instantaneously,
atemporally. It opens the way to an alternate expression of eternity in the form of non-Euclidean
geometries. History takes roughly 2000 years to pass from Euclid to Gauss and Riemann, but not
even a moment separates their geometries, only an instant. What Euclidean geometry describes
as possible is inconsistent with what a Riemannian geometry describes as possible, yet they are
each equally internally consistent. They exist by carving out, by expressing a consistency amid
an untotalizable structure of modal relations.
Totality has a certain comfort. Many would readily sacrifice consistency for the sake of a
totalizing viewpoint from which to gaze down at all possibilities together. There is much to
praise about such an embrace of paradox, of attempting to contract and comprehend all there is
on pain of its continual herniation. However, we cannot affirm it. One may attempt to hold
several inconsistent worlds in mind at once, but this should not mislead us to believe that there is
some overarching totality in which they insist. Rather, the materiality of the cosmos gives rise to
incompossible but consistent formal expressions, each with their own essences and infinities.
There may be non-human truthmakers for the transfinite, but the notion of the infinite is, at base,
a human construction with no real analog or actual correspondence. The infinite, then, is an odd
comfort, a human response to the overwhelming yet finite objects which we encounter every day.
This is not a novel idea.2 What should be shocking to us, however, is the way in which a notion
such as the infinite has rigorous formal properties. Even something as human, all too human, as
the infinite is suffused with an inhuman consistency that binds us on pain of contradiction and

2

Morton 2013 is, to my knowledge, the most direct version of this claim, though it resounds throughout the history
of critique of the religious ideas of the infinite qua god or gods.
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nonsense. Even the infinite has limits, and this attests to its real source in the excess of finite
things.
The rejection of totality and any real infinity follows from the rejection of the possibility
of adequately representing difference itself, and thereby leads to an embrace of logical pluralism.
The question of what sorts of infinities there are has not been seen as neutral to the question of
which logics are “correct.” For instance, set theory and classical logic are taken to both accept a
commitment to actual infinities since the formal theory requires quantifying over completed
infinities. However, thinkers like Dummett argue for a connection between intuitionist logic and
a commitment to only the existence of potential infinities (see Dummett 1975). This is because,
as an Intuitionist, Dummett is committed to the objects of mathematics being mental
constructions, and we lack the power to clearly mentally construct a completed infinity. Since we
aim to employ logics to analyze and reason validly about what there is, we should then choose a
logic which models the universe well and which is in some way isomorphic with important
features of it. If there are no metaphysically real completed infinities, then that would be a point
for Intuitionism, on Dummett’s reckoning. By now, our critique should be a well-worn refrain:
this is to believe that a logic can function as an ideal representation of what there is.3

3

Chapter 12 of Priest 2006 provides a much more robust defense of logical monism. Priest moves beyond the
question of the correlation between metaphysics and logic and defends a monism based on what he calls the
“Canonical Application of Logic.” This canonical application of logic, he claims, is in the analysis of reasoning.
While considering all logics qua logics may leave us with a trivial pluralism (because there is no reason to prefer
one to the other), asking which logic succeeds in fulfilling the demands of the canonical application is what will
provide an unambiguous answer as to the correct logic. Priest lists two such demands: reasoning preserves validity
in the vernacular, and validity inferences must hold for all possible states of affairs. The priority of difference leads
us to reject both of these demands as grounds for monism. First, we have no reason to believe that any single logic
best captures vernacular reasoning because producing a formal logic requires covering over differences in the
vernacular. If they did not, we would have no reason to produce formal logics in the first place as the vernacular
validity would already be good enough. Different coverings will lead to different logics that express vernacular
validity differently, between which we cannot adjudicate. Second, any notion of validity will require some logical
substitutability, and thereby implies identity. Since the set of possible states of affairs is delimited only by difference
itself, and difference itself has no identity, no identity can adequately capture all possible states of affairs. On both
account, then, we should support logical pluralism. This is all without considering the fact that Priest gives us no
reason to privilege the vernacular in the first place, whereas, we have many reasons to distrust the vernacular as we
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However, in our case, we have accepted logical pluralism. So, our question is neither
“Which logic is correct given a certain ontology?,” nor “Which logic best models the
metaphysics we have argued for?” For any modelling will be partial and its successes or failures
are a pragmatic question. Accepting this, we see a certain weakness in positions which try to
establish a relation of adequacy between logics and metaphysics: if the universe somehow
constrains which logics are “correct,” such that there being no existing actual infinities should
lead us to accept intuitionist logic, then what explains the existence of logics which are capable
of handling consistent, valid reasoning about completed infinities? If the universe constrained
logics in this way, if its features did dictate a correct logical isomorphism a priori rather than
require the pragmatic work of establishing limited correspondences, then surely we should
expect logics and mathematical theories which imply the existence of completed infinities to be
nonsense and unworkable in this universe (granted, as we have, a finite ontology).
One might object that our account seems to be surreptitiously committed to the existence
of infinite objects, despite our express rejection of that notion. For, since we treat formal systems
as real things, as things which exist in this universe the way anything else exists, and there are
transfinite truths, then aren’t the transfinite objects of these formal systems a part of our
ontology? And if so, then haven’t we accepted both an infinity of objects and infinite objects
such as the Real numbers, and the set of all integers into our ontology?
There are several pertinent rebuttals to this objection. First, there is an ambiguity about
what is meant by the claim that there are no infinite objects (nor an infinity of objects). The
formal objects of these systems are not objects in the metaphysical sense we have been using.

seem to go wrong quite often in our reasoning with it. This fact seems to me to be the motivation for the creation of
formal logics in the first place, and it would be fruitless to judge our new tools by how well they reproduce the tool
we wished to improve upon.
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Rather, formal objects are internal parts of (finite) formal systems, and formal systems are
themselves objects in the metaphysical sense. It is a basic claim of mathematical structuralism
that mathematical structure exists and mathematical objects subsist only as nodes in that
structure (as in Hellman 1994), but this must be explicated the terms of this project. Transfinite
truths are indeed true, but they are not true of anything outside the formalism that generates
them.
Second, we agree with Hilbert when he points out that “we find writers insisting, as
though it were a restrictive condition, that in rigorous mathematics only a finite number of
deductions are admissible in a proof - as if someone had succeeded in making an infinite number
of them,” (Hilbert, 1984, 184). Strictly speaking, infinitary proof systems do exist in that there
exist rules of inference which take a transfinite number of propositions and return a result.
However, no such system requires actually moving through an infinite number of steps, nor even
enumerating every member of a transfinite domain. In other words, infinitary proofs are not
examples of supertasks because the transfinite collections which they make use of are already
completed infinities, or more precisely, the formal surrogates thereof. Such formal surrogates are
produced not through reference to an actual list but by way of a formal disposition that
guarantees such a surrogate can be furnished within the system, that is, by way of only a
potential infinity.4 Were this not the case, were infinite steps possible, it is unlikely that we
would need an axiom like that of the Axiom of Infinity to furnish our formal domains with a
transfinite set.
While mathematics does deal in the transfinite, it has only ever and can only ever do so
by finite means. Even a system with infinite axioms requires an axiom schema (a formula for

4

For an example of providing a formal interpretation to an infinitary inference rule, see Fernández-Duque and
Joosten, 2017.
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producing an infinite set of axioms) whose use is only ever potentially infinite and actually
bounded by the resources of the cosmos. Such a schema means only that an axiom of a certain
form can be produced when needed. In other words, the use of an axiom schema is only a
potential infinity because it is impossible to discretely list each axiom which it implies, even if it
refers to a transfinite domain. We are then left to ask whether its sense comes from its referents
or the formal possibilities which it opens up. If one remains a realist, then the former implies
Platonism, whereas the latter is supported by this project. Again, this provides no
recommendations to the mathematician; this is not a defense of finitist programs in mathematics
which would reject such transfinite proofs. It is only a rejection of literal readings of existence
claims in mathematics, and a caution against naively assuming quantification implies actual
reference. In other words, infinities need not actually exist for propositions and the entailment
relations about them to have sense.
Finally, and more positively, it is the structure of mathematical truths, that is, of the
entailment relations within a mathematical theory, which gives rise to mathematical objects. This
is the mathematical structuralist view that we accepted in our Introduction. It is no mystery how
a finite structure gives rise to a potential infinity of objects. If all we had were the number zero,
the number 1, and the successor function (the function which adds 1 to a given number), we have
a finite structure which can potentially produce a well-ordered infinite series with some obvious
truths (e.g. no number is its own successor). But note that this infinite production never takes
place. Such truths then are not truths about what objects there are, but are instead truths about
what these structures can do. These propositions are thus misread if they are understood as
existence claims about objects rather than as descriptions of formal powers. Hence, transfinite
sets, and functions between them, must function as if transfinite, but this “as if” is not the “as if”
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of the fictionalist; rather it is a sign of the excessive powers of a structure over what actually is
the case, a virtual “as if.” We have no right to say such claims about transfinite sets are somehow
“really” false since all powers are in excess of what can actually happen in the cosmos.
If, alternatively, one wants to object that the set of real numbers is actually finite, or only
ever potentially infinite, let them try to show this. For even if such a proof were possible, the
finite universe will run out before it was achieved. The bounds of the universe simply prevent
any such production. There are transfinite truths and, intra-theoretically, there are transfinite
“objects,” but again, there will never been an individuated infinity. For example, take the
transfinite truth that the Even numbers can be put into a 1-to-1 correspondence with the Natural
numbers. We are as sure of this mathematical truth as any other, and it is certainly a transfinite
truth in that it deals with a set which contains a subset of the same cardinality as itself. In fact,
since the Even numbers are a subset of the Natural numbers, this truth is proof of the
transfinitude of both sets. This truth is not established by an infinite number of actual 1-to-1
correspondences being shown, but by the proof of some power of the structure in question (here
set theory) to relate these two sets in an exhaustive way. Take for example Cantor’s well-known
diagonalization proof of the uncountability of the real numbers. In brief, such a proof shows that
there always exists a specifiable Real number which has not been included in an infinite list
produced by combinations of the Natural numbers. This proof does not involve a step-by-step
coordinating of a 1-to-1 correspondence between Natural and Real numbers, then showing
something has been left out. Such a proof is metaphysically impossible. Rather, the proof
proceeds by showing how a function can be applied to the operation which populates the list in
order to produce a number which that operation will not produce. This, however, proves what
would necessarily be the result if that metaphysically impossible process of attempting to
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enumerate a 1-to-1 correspondence between the Naturals and the Reals were to somehow be
carried out. This is what is meant by the virtual “as if” rather than the fictional “as if.” The
virtual “as if” designates what would be the case if the universe had the resources to completely
manifest the relevant power, that power being an unmanifestable disposition which is already
within it. This is a direct example of how the modal structure of a finite universe may still give
sense to propositions about transfinitudes and about impossible worlds.
We may then fully separate the metaphysical and mathematical senses of “object.” It is
common to speak of sets, points, etc. as mathematical objects, and we have spoken of objects in
general throughout this work. The question is then: Are mathematical objects, as commonly
understood, objects in the metaphysical sense we have employed? Objects in the metaphysical
sense are in excess of their external parts and their external relations, and they are individuated
by their powers. So, let us consider whether mathematical objects possess these features.
Consider in particular the sets of set theory. Sets are extensionally defined, and so are nothing
more than their parts, and sets are individuated by their members, not their powers. Thus, sets, at
least, do not meet these criteria to be objects in the metaphysical sense. In fact, were we to speak
of mathematical objects, using “objects” in the metaphysical sense, we would be speaking of
something like set theory itself rather than speaking of a set itself. Set theory, as a collection of
axioms (so more correctly, a set theory, like ZFC), does not depend on external parts (whatever
they may be) and it is individuated by its powers, i.e. what axioms it has, what theorems it
entails, and which sets it can construct. Metaphysically speaking, then, ZFC is an object, but a
set in ZFC is not.
Does this mean that only Euclidean geometry is an object and a triangle is not? I do not
think so. Rather, it seems to me that this implies the difference between the rigorous object and
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the non-rigorous one. We may speak of any mathematical object non-rigorously, and then
perhaps we are speaking of an object in the metaphysical sense as well, but any rigorous,
formally defined mathematical object is only an internal part of a mathematical structure and so
is not an object in this sense on its own. Triangles as rigorous features of Euclidean geometry are
not objects in the metaphysical sense, but internal parts of Euclidean geometry. However,
triangles do not only appear in Euclidean geometry, or even only in axiomatized geometries, and
so are not reducible to any such system. We must be careful to not confuse the triangle as the
internal part of a rigorous axiomatic system, and a triangle as an object, in the metaphysical
sense, in its own right. I take the question of which objects there are to be an empirical one, and
so there is no a priori way to say which non-rigorous objects that mathematics treats as rigorous
are themselves objects in the metaphysical sense.
This distinction gives us an insight into the pragmatic criteria which should be used to
evaluate a formal system’s success or failure. A successful formal theory is then one which has
internalized all of the objects of interest to itself. To accept a slight anthropomorphism, this
involves an internalization of “interest” itself. For example, ZFC aims to study all sets, and so it
attempts to internalize all sets. Here, this means that all sets must be producible from its axioms.
This then changes what it is to be a set, because now to be a set is no longer the vague notion
which spurs the mathematician to produce the theory. A set becomes what is producible and
explorable within the theory. For example, intuitively, any collection can be called a set, but
different axiom systems will adjudicate differently whether these are “truly” sets. The intuitive
notion of set used by Cantor leads to what is commonly called Russell’s Paradox. This results
from being able to specific a set which leads to a contradiction, here the set which contains all
sets which do not contain themselves, known as the Russell Set. The Russell Set is intuitively a
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set, and it is a set producible in Naïve Set Theory,5 but it is not a set in ZFC. ZFC blocks this
production by way of the Axiom of the Foundation which, informally speaking, specifies that no
set can be a member of itself. The blocks the production of the Russell Set, and thereby does not
fall into that particular paradox. In so doing, ZFC establishes a different meaning to Set than
Naïve Set Theory does. Russell’s set is of interest to Naïve Set Theory, but it cannot be
internalized by it. Therefore, the Russell Set is also an object in the metaphysical sense though
we may say it exists only as a mental construct, not as some Platonically real mathematically
object. It is not an object internal to Naïve Set Theory, but an object generated by it. ZFC and
other set theories do not generate this object, thereby protecting their possible consistency.6 In
doing so, they establish a rigorous account of what it is to be a set, and are maximally successful
when all and only those things which meet this definition are constructible by their axioms.
Formal systems, then, aim at a certain sterility, that is, it essential to a formal system that it be
immune to copying errors, as we discussed in Chapter 3. They avoid producing anything illformed by fending off their potential to generate anything new, anything which they cannot
already express by their own formal resources.
Here we can finally clarify how it is that transfinite mathematical objects can be accepted
in a finite ontology. It is only with the formal machinery of set theories or other such
mathematics that transfinite truths come about. These are not truths of transfinite objects in any
metaphysical sense. Rather, they are truths of the internal parts of finite objects, namely, of the

Naïve set theory is an intuitive, non-formalized way of thinking of sets. It is often used to refer to Cantor’s
formulation of set theory, as opposed to modern formalized axiomatic set theories. It usually includes only the
axioms of extension (sets are identical if and only if they have the same members) and the axioms of comprehension
(for any predicate, there is a set whose members satisfy that predicate). This leads to a host of paradoxes, of which
Russell’s paradox is the most famous.
5

6

They avoid this paradox. I say possible consistency because their consistency cannot be proven as shown by
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, but much work in contemporary set theory takes its consistency as possible and
shows what would follow if it is consistent.
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objects which are produced by coupling axiom systems, rules of inference, models, or other such
formal parts.7 These truths are truths of what formal structures can do. Transfinite objects are
objects only in the loose sense of mathematical objects. We may, of course, speak of the set of
real numbers outside any formal system, as our example of triangles above shows. But since
such talk of informal sets lack the structure of entailment relations and formal machinery of set
theory, it is unclear what sorts of truths we may derive from them (and we know we will derive
paradoxes).
If mathematics has appeared ethereal and otherworldly in the history of thought, it is only
because of the mistakes of reducing truth to representation and grounding to identity and
similarity. By instead tracing out the grounds of mathematics from Deleuze’s modal
metaphysics, we can see mathematics as inherently this-worldly without needing either to posit
the existence of purely mathematical entities or a fundamental mathematic reality to the cosmos,
or needing to embrace mathematical fictionalism. If we return to our opening question, that of
what ontology our best theories commit us to, we see that we need not be mathematical
fictionalists simply because we reject the metaphysical independence of mathematical objects
from their formal systems. Rejecting this independence also does not require us to give up a
robust scientific realism because we have given a non-representational account of formation of
mathematical truth. Furthermore, this account furnishes us with an explanation for why
mathematics is indispensable for our scientific accounts of the cosmos. Mathematics is a
privileged tool for investigating what happens and predicting what may happen in this universe
because the study of mathematics is itself the study of the structure of what may happen in the
widest sense. What may happen is only what can be brought about by the powers that exist in

7

There are, of course, systems with infinite axioms, but the argument is recursive. Infinite axioms are specified by
an axiom schema which is finite as we affirmed in Ch. 5.
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this cosmos. It is the special sciences which study the powers of contingent objects, and it is
mathematics which studies the powers resulting from the necessity of being qua difference itself.
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